

Studies in International Economics and Business

**Leonid L. Kistersky
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**PROSPECTS FOR THE EAST-WEST
CIVILIZATIONAL CONVERGENCE:
CONFUCIAN TRADITION DEMOCRACY
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Monograph

Prague
Coretex CZ SE
2021

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Prospects for the East-West Civilizational Convergence:
Confucian Tradition Democracy in the Republic of Korea.
Prague : monogr. / Coretex CZ SE, 2021, 248 p.

ISBN 978-80-907576-0-8

This monograph presents a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of traditional Confucian democracy – from the ontological foundations to the case study of its historical and cultural specifics, socio-economic and political dynamics in the Republic of Korea – in the context of realizing prospects for bridging the historically and axiologically conditioned dichotomy of East and West. This monograph also explains to what extent the values, customs and traditions of the Republic of Korea are Confucian and discusses how this is relevant to the democratic practice and amazing success of multifaceted modernization in the Republic of Korea. By analyzing an impressive array of scholarly works on the ease or difficulty of integrating Western democracy with a Confucian outlook, the authors examine the prospects for such integration going forward. The monograph outlines possibilities for transition countries, like Ukraine, to make use of the experience of the Republic of Korea and other “Confucian Tigers” for a catch-up economic and political modernization. The monograph is intended for the academic community and all others interested in the impact of Confucianism on contemporary globalization.

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ISBN 978-80-907576-0-8

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PROLEGOMENON

Today, only two macro-civilizational systems of the world, Western (based mainly on the Romano-Germanic heritage) and Northeast Asian (formed under the powerful civilizational influence of Confucian values), are part of the world-system core of states. Both systems demonstrate the greatest competitiveness, scientific and technological progress, and economic dynamics. Between those systems is the post-Soviet-Eurasian space, a zone of historical rivalry between East and West, having been plunged in a systemic value and socio-economic crisis.

In the light of recent advances in synergetics, which has already revived, at the scientific level, the holistic worldview based on universal regularities and patterns previously inherent in mythology and religion [1; 2; 3; 4], the issue of trans-civilizational dialogue and integration seems particularly vital. This, in turn, relativizes the dichotomous thinking inherent of the bipolar and the post-bipolar worlds.

For the post-nonclassical, organically interdisciplinary “thinking in complexity”, the perception of “the fluid, procedural nature of reality, where many classical oppositions are erased” is becoming more and more characteristic [5, p. 43]. In this regard,

the conceptual contrast between East and West needs further, essentially interdisciplinary development in accordance with the latest achievements in the world of science.

Currently, economic and sociological science emphasizes the urgent need for considering the paradigm of “global environment”, or theoretical and methodological metamodel covering both the formation of metasystemic characteristics of the global economy and non-economic (not directly economic) processes and phenomena of global environmental, informational, security as well as ethical, moral, religious, that is axiological, nature [6, pp. 43–44]. Today, there is a rising topicality of the American economist and Nobel laureate Gary Becker’s thought that the global threats to the world economy are caused by the motives of behavior of market participants, in many respects by the decisive role of psychological factors [7], which, in turn, are determined by individual and social values. Famous French sociologist of the XX century Pierre Bourdieu, like Max Weber, believes that the structure of society is determined not only by economic logic [8, p. 146], and adds to the economic capital the cultural capital that he named by analogy.

The synergetic method determines special importance of the triad “values – institutions – politics” in the study of modern democracy, in understanding all levels of social relations and its multifaceted impact on the prospects of political, social, and economic modernization.

The East Asian Confucian tradition countries’ successful performance, especially regarding the anti-pandemic measures, have highly actualized the issue of restructuring mainstream patterns of effective democracy, rethinking the relationship between democracy, strong state, human rights, traditional/innovative values, and sustainable development.

That has become especially challenging if compared to Western, primarily Anglo-American, liberal democracies against the background of West's evident retreat from the world conceptual and practical leadership positions in global economy, finance, and globalization processes.

The intensification of the competition for global leadership between the United States and China in the context of rapid globalization has brought to the fore the problem of comparative analysis of ethical and value principles of socio-economic dynamics, innovation and competitiveness of the Euro-Atlantic, primarily Protestant, community, on the one hand, and East Asian, primarily Confucian, on the other, especially from the viewpoint of respective ethical values systems' competitive advantages, compliance with the interests of global economic leadership, and mutual adaptability.

As a leading Ukrainian sociologist Yevhen Holovakha emphasizes, the unsuccessful experience of reforming the economy and political system of Ukraine is largely due to the inconsistency of the value system of contemporary Ukrainian society with the requirements that in the contemporary world determine the very possibility of successful modernization. The absence of a socially responsible elite and a persistent moral and cultural tradition in society are the key reasons for the failure of modernization in Ukraine over the three decades since the proclamation of independence. Accordingly, "a change in the value component is one of the decisive conditions for the modernization of the economy and the development of democracy in Ukraine [9, p. 28]". The rationalistic direction of such a change, relieved of ideological blinders, was formulated by an outstanding American historian Charles Beard, who saw the pragmatic basis of Americans' success in the fact that "the structure of their ideas and the structure of their interests coincided with impressive exactness [10, p. 395]."

The extremely contradictory interaction of individual and regional value structures within Ukraine, observed since the first years of independence, determines the choice of “global preference”, which implies a much greater openness, in comparison with most other countries of the world, to the perception of globalization, and above all experience in the development of the most competitive economic and social systems. The search for a model of democracy suitable for Ukraine, capable of making the long-awaited leap forward in the modernization of the country, is actively going on today.

Oleksiy Shestakovsky and Yevhen Bilous in a report on “Sociocultural dimension of modernization of Ukraine’s economy”, prepared within the scientific and technical project of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, justify the need for a strategy of purposeful transformation of values of Ukrainian society, designed for several decades [11]. The authors of the report argue that, along with the critical study and creative application of successful examples of reforms, legislation, and practices of public administration in countries close to Ukraine in cultural dimensions, especially Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania as well as Mexico, a special attention should be paid to the experience of Confucian tradition countries [11, p. 34].

The case of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is especially fascinating, since it is, in fact, the “most Confucian part of the world [12, p. 191]”, effectively utilizing the ancient Confucian legacy tradition for the sake of national development.

The authors of the book have been engaged in scientific research of the influence of ethical and value systems on the success of the economic and socio-political modernization of society for many years. However, the immediate impetus for work on the subject of the book was Vasyl Marmazov & Igor Piliaiev’s “The Ukraine Crisis and Prospects for the East-West

Trans-Civilizational Model” report at the Ninth East Asian Conference on Slavic Eurasian Studies held on June 30 – July 1, 2018 in Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia) [13]. The important milestones in implementing the project of the future book were Piliaiev’s research report titled “The Ukraine Crisis in the Northeast-Asian Comparative Perspective” prepared for Center for Chinese Studies, Taipei [14], and, in terms of further methodology development and comparative analysis of most competitive value systems of modernity, the authors’ contribution to the international team of authors’ “Reformation: The Success of Europe and a Chance for Ukraine” monograph recently published in Prague (Czech Republic) [15]. At last, the authors’ academic works on the impact of the Reformation on the development of the value system in Ukraine [16], on the East-West dichotomy in the globalizing perspective [17], and “Modernization of South Korea: Origins, Achievements, and the Experience for Ukraine” were published in autumn 2021 [18].

Given the huge role of education and science in the Confucian constructions of the economy and the development of society, the authors share their knowledge and practical experience of the principles of organizing modern education and scientific research at the world’s leading universities. Over the past years, for differing periods of times, the authors had the honor of working at or being part of universities in the USA, Europe, and the Confucian East. These universities included Stanford, Brown, University of Tokyo, National Chengchi University (Taipei), Higher School of Business (Poland), Vilnius University, where the authors taught and conducted research, compiled curricula, published articles, books and textbooks, worked with students and collaborated with foreign colleagues.

Due to a very successful modernization despite the long-lasting war with the Communist regime in the North, the ROK

poses both a striking example of the East-West fruitful integration with regard to complex society characteristics and a valuable experience of tackling the key regional conflict with global/nuclear powers' involvement.

Based on a synergistic interdisciplinary approach, in our book we will strive to implement the methodological mega-task outlined in due time by Pitirim Sorokin, that is to integrate (on our topic) humanitarian knowledge into an updated integral system [19]. The book could be an important contribution to political science, political economy and constitutionalism, since experience of the formation and development of democracy in the Republic of Korea is extremely important for Ukraine, which has been forced, like the ROK in the time, to look for ways to modernize the economy and develop a democratic society under the long-term military confrontation with its northern neighbor.

By the term *Confucian tradition democracy* in our book we mean a democracy based on the Confucian intellectual, moral, social, cultural, political, and other tradition.

Our analysis of the Confucian tradition democracy in the Republic of Korea will focus primarily on the period of the Sixth Republic – that is, the contemporary period in the history of South Korea. The period of the Sixth Republic began in 1988, after the transfer of power from the leader of the authoritarian Fifth Republic, Chun Doo-hwan, to President Roh Tae-woo, elected in direct elections, who led the reforms that began in June 1987, providing for direct presidential elections, lifting the ban on political activities of politicians objectionable to the regime, and other measures.

However, for a deep understanding of contemporary South Korean democracy, the place and role of Confucianism in it, it will be necessary to investigate some key problems rooted in the periods of the First-Fifth Republics and, deeper, in the colonial

period of Korea in the first half of the 20th century and the era of flourishing and official status of Confucianism during the Joseon Dynasty.

Thus, through the interdisciplinary approach, in the light of recent advances in post-classical synergetics and social sciences, the use of tools of civilization and political transformation theories, we have tried to achieve the following results:

- Influence identification of the Confucian characteristics of South Korean democracy, built on the synthesis of Western democracy and Korean national roots, on the effectiveness of state reforms and modernization of public institutions, on the economic growth and well-being of citizens, on observance of their fundamental social, economic, cultural, civil and political rights;
- Ratio finding in the South Korean model of democracy of individual, family, corporate, party interests, on the one hand, and societal and state interests, on the other, compared to the post-Soviet and other countries;
- Complex combination and peculiarities of various ethical systems/factors' influence on the ROK's democracy development, considering the Confucian tradition's leading role and impact;
- Ways fingering to resolve strategic crises on the Eurasian megacontinent by overcoming the East-West traditional cultural and value paradigm, inclusive dialogue, harmonization of various normative orders with participation of the key megacontinental policy actors, strengthening cooperation between European, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific cooperation and integration institutions;
- Given the decades-long failure to efficiently democratize the post-Soviet space through West-driven reforms, to offer usage of the experience of building the Confucian tradition

democracy in the ROK to post-Soviet countries, especially to Ukraine, as the countries historically belonging to the periphery influence of the Confucian world;

- To what extent the Korean model of democracy of the Confucian tradition can serve as a model for states of “stalled” modernization, but which have unambiguously chosen decommunization and geopolitical orientation toward the West, primarily the United States, NATO, and the EU, such as Ukraine or Georgia.

We believe that the study of South Korea’s successful modernization experience based on interconfessional and intercivilizational convergence may offer solutions to similar problems not only in Ukraine but also in other countries of Europe and Eurasia.

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Chapter 1

ONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFUCIAN ETHICS

Confucian and Cartesian Types of Rational Subjectivity

Even though, unlike the Abrahamic monotheistic and other traditional world religions, Confucianism is not focused on ontological problems, understanding its ontological origins and foundations is extremely important for clarifying its significant, but not antagonistic, differences from the ontological foundations of the socio-political order, and, accordingly, democracy, posited by the Western post-Reformation philosophy of modern times.

In the Confucian traditional worldview, according to a Confucian philosopher Bin Song's interpretation, the entire universe is a constantly creative process called "Tian" (天, Heaven), the one and only ontological domain in which all possible cosmic events take place. Tian, as an all-encompassing, constantly creative cosmic power, which permeates everything, creates a process of dynamic harmony, endowing energy and creativity to all creatures within Tian, always and everywhere [1]. The axiologically transcendent,

non-anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric character of Tian entails that human beings have their own intrinsic needs and particular responsibilities for the manifestation of Tian's creation in their own human way, as "A man broadens his paths, not his paths him" [2, Analects 15:28]. Thus, one's personal contribution to the continual flourishing of the entirety of human civilization against the cosmic backdrop of Tian, will become the ultimate criterion for the meaning of an individual human life and for judging the value of a human person [1].

Instead, in Cartesian reflection, the individual thinking self, that is, the human individual acts as a starting point for the simultaneous institutionalization of the personality and the world, from which the rational foundation and construction of the external world begins as an object of development, conquest, ordering and control by the subject of the mental process (the individual carrier of reason). In this context, the Western democratic order is the result of the "co-foundation of the individual and the world in political institutions" [3, p. 222], what a French philosopher Etienne Balibar shrewdly pointed to at the moment of the triumph of the Western liberal order and the alleged Fukuyama's "end of history" [4]. The primordial primacy of the individual, and hence of his individual interests over the collective principle, over the collectivity per se is a kind of "generic marker" and "visiting card" of the West in comparison with the traditional societies of the East. Western individuals unite into a community only by virtue of rational public coordination of their interests, i.e., the social contract in the well-known Jean-Jacques Rousseau's understanding.

Meanwhile, in Confucianism, collectivism, for all the hierarchical structuredness of its manifestations [5, p. 246], is considered as an intrinsic and complementary value of a harmonious society. At the polity level, this necessarily implies a

socially responsible “strong state” that tirelessly cares about the well-being of its country and people.

Moreover, while in Christianity, morality is derived from Holy Scripture, Descartes deduces an ethical position from the basic procedure of cogito. Kant considers moral principles to be an innate moral imperative. Through its 2500-year tradition, Confucianism synthesizes those foundations, putting forward the humanistic principle as an innate human quality that requires, however, a thorough education (cultivation) by elder members of the family, community, and state. For all its secularism and rationalism, so surprisingly underestimated by M. Weber, Confucianism, however, through the idea of the Mandate of Heaven, “placed the origin of the political authority of the ruler in the transcendental realm.” [3, p. 226]. Thus, the moral foundations of politics in Confucianism are substantiated by rational imperatives of harmonious development but, nevertheless, are not reduced to them.

Henry Rosemont has starkly worded the ontological contrast between the Confucian and Western mentality in the following way:

For the early Confucians there is no me in isolation, to be considered abstractly. I am the totality of the roles I live in relation to specific others. I do not play or perform these roles; I am these roles. When they have all been specified, I have been defined uniquely, fully, altogether, with no remainder with which to piece together a free, autonomous self [6, p. 177].

Confucianism is characterized by the integrity of the individual and collective principles, the personal, family, communal and societal interests. At the level of the worldview, the consciousness of the Confucian tradition societies is “holistic, not individualistic, wherein reality is evidenced not by the subject, but by the unity, harmony of the homomorphic fractal nature of the

universe [7, p. 12].” In this sense, Confucianism is closely associated with universalism, believing that individual happiness is unrealizable in the absence of a person’s consciousness of solidarity with the surrounding world and without establishing harmony between them, which is possible only through cognition (in universalism) and execution, implementation (in Confucianism) of the laws underlying world development, and following them.

South Korean social philosopher Uchang Kim draws attention to the fact that, in contrast to the self-confidence of individual consciousness (Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am”) seeking to master and conquer the external empirical world, which is the starting point of the Cartesian and all modern Western Gnosticism, the Confucian worldview proceeds from the primordial sociality of human, ethically inclined to seek harmony and balance with the world around him [3, p. 242]. However, both types of rational subjectivity – Cartesian and Confucian – contain vectors of active pragmatic interest in the empirical world, the ability to impartially observe existence and reality from a universal point of view. Thus, to overcome the separation of individual free will from society’s activities, which is a characteristic feature of modernity, Uchang Kim advocates a dialectical fusion of universality and individuality by converging, in particular, Western neoliberal and Confucian values [8, p. 29].

The concept of Golden Mean (*Zhong Yong*), i.e., moderation, is the highest principle of moral cultivation in Confucianism. It entails an exclusive methodology in addressing politics, philosophy, and everything in the universe. This concept has permeated into all aspects of traditional Chinese culture [9]. A stable harmonious state appears as the main semantic and behavioral pattern and attractor [7, p. 11]. Order and harmony are the qualities most valued and sought by all Confucian states, and national peace should not be disturbed [10, p. 62].

Unlike religions of Indian origin, which avert a person from active self-realization in the outside world, religions of East Asian origin, and above all Confucianism, allow and support personal self-realization, provided that it does not undermine the foundations of social harmony, established traditions in society and does not undermine the established balance between society and the environment. At the same time, Confucianism oriented a person to hard work according to his/her vocation for the benefit of his/her society (more precisely, the hierarchy of societies in which a person was included – from family to state). A prominent 20th century political philosopher Leonard Shihlien Hsü substantiated the phenomenal adaptability of Confucianism to a program of progress. A prominent 20th century political philosopher Leonard Shihlien Hsü substantiated the phenomenal adaptability of Confucianism to a program of progress [11].

Striving to inspire people in the reconstruction of a distressed society of the late Song era, beleaguered by nomad invaders, the Neo-Confucianists felt a need to give impetus and more spiritual depth to the Confucian teaching by transforming ethical norms of human society into categories of a universal scale. To this end, they formed the canonical “Four Books”: The Analects, Mencius, The Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean. In particular, Confucian self-cultivation was expanded to Ch’an¹ meditation and the aesthetic practice of the arts.

Proponents of the Western liberal model of democracy often underestimate the synergistic social context of civil and political freedoms. Meanwhile, the value of freedom for a person and society is inseparable from the problems of their harmonization, socio-economic and cultural development. The importance of self-cultivation among intellectuals was paramount for Confucius, who advocated meritocratic government by a stratum of highly

¹ A form of Chinese Buddhism.

educated professionals and scholars. Further, in Mencius' cosmological vision (4th c. B.C.E.), which was fully claimed, exalted, and venerated by neo-Confucianists just about 1,500 years after his death, it obtains a determinately spiritual dimension, reflecting the unity of self and cosmos: "To fathom the mind is to understand your nature. And when you understand your nature, you understand Heaven [12, Mencius. XIII. 1]."

As David Hinton brightly argues, Mencius' and neo-Confucianism's insight of the individual as an integral part of a self-generating and harmonious cosmos stipulated a strong faith in the intrinsic nobility of human beings. That is why one may characterize modern Confucianism as passionately humanistic but, at the same time, essentially secular and rationalist universal teaching, as well as political and ethical guide to action. The Mencian and, inductively, the aggregate Confucian heart is not only full of compassionate and practical concern for the human condition but so empty yet to contain the ten thousand transformations of the entire cosmos, global world, society and individual. [12, pp. 11–21] This, in our opinion, is the key to the riddle of the amazing flexible ability of Confucianism to a renewed and active perception of the transformed and ever-changing world. The key ontological problem of Western materialism, including classical Marxism and its Leninist-Soviet version, is the rigid dogmatic primacy of the material, purely hylic basis and the underestimation of the spiritual and cultural dimensions of reality. In the USSR, this led to a militant movement of atheists, persecution of the church and believers of almost all confessions [13], the belittling of the intelligentsia's role in society compared to workers in the sphere of material production, cardinal mistakes of the country's leadership regarding the importance of the development of such "delicate" spheres, bridging the classic "matter – mind" dichotomy, as

cybernetics (which was declared “bourgeois science” under Nikita Khrushchev) and genetics. Instead, in post-reform China and in the democracies of the Confucian tradition, the key principle of the Confucian and neo-Confucian worldview is the establishment and maintenance of harmony with Heaven, as the source of both the spiritual and material hypostases of our world. The latest discoveries in the field of fundamental science testify to the essential unity of the material and spiritual worlds which, at the level of empirical research, both open up as fractal energy flows.

Thus, from the contemporary post-neoclassical viewpoint the Confucian values fit into the universal context of the integrity and fractal unity of person, society, nature, and cosmos.

Contemporary Impulses to the Rationalistic Integration of Religion and Science

By the beginning of the 21st century, science was able to understand a lot more. But the spiritual impulses leading people – in everyday life, in economics, in politics, in art and even in science – turned out to be incomparably more complicated than the rational guidelines that science could offer. It turned out that scientific rationality itself is by no means as sterilely separated from traditional knowledge as it seemed before [14]. The outstanding American-Spanish philosopher of the XIX–XX centuries George Santayana’s ingenious conjecture that nature itself entails its own ideal, and “the progressive organization of irrational impulses creates a rational thought” [15, p. 65], has become more actualized.

As the eminent philosopher Semyon Frank pointed out on the eve of World War II: “The thought of profane, secular, non-religious humanism is revealed as an illusion and an internal contradiction [16].” The events of September 11, 2001, and the

discussion on genetic engineering for Jürgen Habermas only confirm that the enlightened arrogance of the mind, secular scientific knowledge should be replaced by a much more accurate position. No matter how much this mind tries to appropriate the authority and pose of the sacred, this is a hopeless attempt. And this means, according to Habermas, that the profane mind must nevertheless have respect “for the coal that ignites whenever the issue of theodicy is raised [17].”

At the same time, one can't turn a blind eye to the gradually growing (beginning with Francis Bacon) utilitarian-pragmatic attitude to knowledge as a way of mastering the forces and riches of nature in the name of their consumption, which often led to predatory-consumer exploitation of both – natural resources and colonized societies surrounding them. The reverse side of the Protestant “spirit of capitalism” was the confidence of Western people of that time (especially Calvinists) in their God-chosenness, and therefore, the superiority established by God over other nations.

At the foundation of the most modern European science, there is the initial premise of the deep correspondence of the laws of the created world and human mind, human nature, created “in the image of God [14, pp. 5–6].” This premise allows us to talk about the possibility of transforming the image of science from a formal explanatory to a meaningful understanding in the direction of assimilation of the logos nature of creation, humanization and ethization of knowledge. Immanuel Kant was the first to rationally formulate the moral law of life with its hierarchy of values as “an expression of the same harmonic essence of the universe [18, p. 148].” That is why, in the context of the synergetic achievements of modern science, which restores an integral and whole, previously inherent mythological and religious, scientific picture of the world, the common foundations and patterns of development of

the universe, the discourse on values, on “constitutional goods” of the “Highest order” [19, p. 94], which determine a position of the subject (and, accordingly, society) in the moral and behavioral space, provide a reference point for assessments and decision-making that determine personal identity, creating the spiritual meaning of life [19, p. 32].

The process of modern intensive informatization of the world economy and the global human community is essentially a bifurcation point in the trajectory of civilizational development. The outstanding thinker Vladimir Vernadsky, founder of the doctrine of the biosphere and its transition under the influence of scientific achievements and creative human labor into a new state – the noosphere (the sphere of the mind), considered civilization and the biosphere as one integral organism (system). He emphasized the inevitability of a new stage of planetary development, when not only the mind will become a decisive factor in the biosphere development, but also there will be a need for appropriate qualitative changes in social structures to ensure future sustainable development of our planet. [20]

At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, science, as in the 20s–50s, during intense discussions about quantum mechanics, but at a qualitatively different level, touched the “‘Highest order’, the Logos of the universe [21, pp. 208–212, 318–330].”

Post-nonclassical globalized scientific cognition is characterized by the problematization of traditional distinctions of reality into subjective and objective, spiritual and corporeal, animate, and inanimate, natural, and artificial. Such self-organization of meanings of modern science with the help of “synergetic reflection” [22, p. 10], which previously was the sphere of almost indivisible domination of religion and mysticism, at the beginning of the XXI century came very close to the insight of the universal laws of the macrocosm, microcosm, and social world.

New contours of a unified worldview

At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries it became clear that, along with imbalance and nonlinearity, the immanent quality of animate and inanimate nature is fractality, i.e., irregular in arbitrary increase the similarity of small parts of the structure to itself. Fractality is identical to the existence of large-scale spatial invariance: part of any fractal repeats the whole with some similarity factor [23]. Both the macrocosm (star clusters, galaxies, the universe) and the microcosm (all macromolecules, the human genome, the structure of DNA, water, light, sound, electromagnetic, gravitational waves, etc.) have a fractal structure [23], and the space of human activity: social, economic, historical, geopolitical, cultural, etc. [23; 24].

The nature of human personality and identity is also fractal. In his work “The Ego and the Id”, the founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud compares the personal self with an onion: “... if it is gutted, it would be possible to identify all the successive identifications that formed it in its time [25, p. 32].”

By fractality, man and society are self-similar to the universe, being its organic part. George Santayana, in his fundamental work “The Life of Reason”, examined science, art, society and religion from the viewpoint of “moral benefits” achieved by mankind in its quest to establish a balance with the environment [15]. And the reason each time forms those ideals and chooses those ways of harmonizing relations that most closely meet the requirements of the life impulses of the individual and society as a whole. According to a leading figure of the Vienna Circle² Otto Neurath, an Austrian-born philosopher of science, sociologist, and political economist, “the scientific world-conception serves life, and life

² A group of philosophers, natural and social scientists, logicians, and mathematicians who regularly met since 1924 to 1936 at the University of Vienna (Austria) having sought to develop, based on empirical experience, a self-consistent scientific conception of the world.

receives it [26, p. 318].” Arisen at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries, more and more winning ground, post-nonclassical epistemology organically and synergistically combines the methods of scientific, hilosophical, religious, artistic knowledge and the corresponding pictures of the world. As the prominent Belgian synergetic physicist, Nobel laureate Ilya Prigozhin pointed out,

We are witnessing the formation of a new rationality in relation to the world, society, and man, implying a convergence of the activities of a scientist, religious figure, and writer. Indeed, for example, the universe of art is very different from the classical image of the world, but it is easily correlated with the modern physics and cosmology.
[27, p. 51]

Moreover,

We are beginning to understand that Western science, as it existed until recently, is determined by the cultural context of the XVII century – the period of the origin of modern science and that this science is limited. As a result, a more general understanding of science and knowledge in general begins to take shape, an understanding that meets the cultural traditions of not only Western civilization. [27, p. 47]

Modern ideas of post-nonclassical science about the fundamental unity of man, society and the universe, about fractality as a universal regularity of natural, biological and social phenomena and processes are close to the neo-Confucian as well as Protestant ideas of the unity of natural and social being [28], towards holism – the direction in modern Western philosophy, which considers the integrity of the world as a consequence of creative evolution, which is guided by non-material and unrecognized “factor of integrity”.

In the second half of the 20th century, under the influence of postmodern theories, many historians began to abandon attempts to identify patterns and core lines of historical development. But at the beginning of this century, the desire to create large-scale all-encompassing theories began to increase again. For example, David Christian, a well-known researcher from Australia, tries to view the history “from a bird’s eye view”. In his latest concept of universal history, synthesizing history at three levels – on the scale of humanity, the planet, and the Universe – based on the coherence of the laws of evolution. For David Christian, history is “a fugue whose two major themes are entropy ... and, as a sort of counterpoint, the creative factors that manage to form and sustain complex but temporary equilibria ... [29, p. 237].”

Apparently, in this direction of the movement towards holistic but a multivariate vision of the world and its spatiotemporal dynamics, one can foresee prospects for further development of Confucianism, the possibility of the emergence of new trends in it, reflecting the post-nonclassical culture and worldview – synthesizing religion, ethics, metaphysics, science, and art.

Conclusion

As the analysis shows, the Confucian worldview and understanding of reality are surprisingly close to the contemporary scientific post-non-classical picture of the world in all its fractal diversity being discovered by neoteric synergistic tools. The phenomenal capacity of Confucian systems for homeostasis is amazing. That is, the ability to reproduce themselves, to maintain dynamic equilibrium in conditions of competitive openness, readiness to flexibly borrow successful institutions and technologies from other social systems to restore and maintain dynamic

equilibrium, provide thereby horizons for further systemic development.

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Chapter 2

THE NATURE AND FEATURES OF THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION DEMOCRACY

Confucianism is unique in its integrity, social impact, depth of scholarly tradition, practical wisdom, and art of living.

John Duncan believes that “Confucianism is complex, difficult to define, and subject to appropriation for a wide range of political and social purposes [1, p. 38].” Conversely, Doh Chull Shin aptly defines Confucianism as a system of political and social ethics advocating for the achievement of *datong shehui*, a community of grand harmony and mutual caring [2, p. 317].

It is characteristic, however, that until now, in all successful cases of transition of states (territories) of the Confucian tradition to competitive pluralistic democracy, there has been a factor of a powerful external impetus and further permanent influence of factors of the Western (first Anglo-American) hard power (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan).

However, critical observations show the obvious presence of Confucian traditions in the application of democracy and rule of law in East Asian politics [3, p. 263]. As argues Tomasz Śleziak,

Despite having the officially adopted the modern doctrine of democratic capitalism, such countries as Republic of Korea or Japan accommodate traditional social systems in which group harmony and interpersonal cooperation are universally accepted values. However, the reason for this does not lie in the Western thought of democratic politics, but instead, in the ethical and philosophical system of Confucianism [4, p. 28].

There are scholars who argue that Confucianism contains “democratic seeds”, and these seeds can serve as the very foundation of sustainable democracy in Confucian East Asia [5–8]. Especially, their arguments are based on Mencius’ notion of the Mandate of Heaven and other Confucian principles of social and political order. Some salient features of Confucianism that are often considered compatible with democracy include political accountability, equality, dissent, tolerance, and social participation.

In this regard, the study of democracy in the countries of the Confucian tradition seems to be especially relevant.

Myths and fables about Confucianism in Western and post-Soviet thought

Unfortunately, a myth about a certain “mystical” nature of Confucianism and ritual Confucian ethics is still widespread in Ukraine, Russia, and other countries of the Christian tradition, and the opposition of Confucianism to the rationalism and pragmatism of the West and Western values is widespread. Thus, the Ukrainian social philosopher Alexander Shmorgun accuses

Confucianism, especially in its neo-Confucian version, of “the most severe blocking of any forms of social mobility vertically and horizontally [9, p. 113]” and even that “Confucianism has a basic reactionary-conservative dimension ... of the medieval-decadent type, which sometimes borders on outright obscurantism [9, p. 115],” and the Confucian ethics allegedly orients “its own citizens to assess the identity of the modern East rather in a mystical-mythological than in a scientific way [9, p. 100].” Shmorgun unreasonably opposes rationalism and humanism of the Western type to some “traditions of Eastern mystical ethno-conservative altruism in the spirit of the Confucian family code [9, p. 100].” Thus, Confucianism is presented as a kind of antipode to Protestantism [9, p. 114]. At the same time, Shmorgun does not cite any opinion of Chinese or Confucian scholars (or scholars from countries of the Confucian tradition) to substantiate his sentences. Meanwhile, just Protestantism, in contrast to Confucianism, is based not on rational foundations, but on faith, on a religious-mystical source (the Bible). And the phenomenal progress of economy, science, democratic forms of organization of the state and society, the wide and massive development of a diverse culture are just the characteristic features of contemporary countries of the Confucian tradition.

In this regard, the myth about the “right-brain” society of the East looks like a deep delusion when it comes to the Confucian East. For example, Kamaludin Hajiyeu points out that the Eastern religion is associated with the right-hemisphere, intuitive-figurative, artistic perception of the world:

The right ... hemisphere deals mainly with post-industrialism, self-actualization, self-expression, a sense of interdependence and harmony of a person with the surrounding nature, etc. Western society is more focused on the left hemisphere, that is,

on rational-logical activity, while Eastern society is on the right, that is, on the intuitive irrational dimension. [10, p. 82]

Many authors generally express deep doubts about the religious oriental identity (Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, ethnoreligious Shinto-Confucian-Buddhist traditions of Japan) as a spiritual generator of the socio-economic reforms of the East in the XX–XXI centuries, and this, of course, actualizes the search for new criteria of civilizational identity in the contemporary world [11, pp. 147–177; 12; 13; 14].

At present, in the context of escalating ideological struggle of values against the background of the crisis and decline of the collective West’s global hegemony, in academic circles, one can often find the opinion that high morality, which is aimed at Confucianism, implies primarily external social success and material retribution, a kind of capitalization of this success in earthly life. Thus, the Russian koreologist from Kukmin University (Seoul) Andrei Lan’kov in his publication on the website of the Carnegie Moscow Center writes:

In the East Asian (that is, somewhat simplifying, Confucian) tradition, there was no developed idea of afterlife retribution. ... It was tacitly assumed that in Confucianism, Heaven (a distant analogue of the Christian God) rewards a person for his moral perfection already in this world. This reward manifests itself, however, primarily in material form – in money, luxurious residences, beautiful concubines and, most importantly, service success, which for Confucian ideologists was perhaps the main one of all awards.

Of course, other traditions also existed in Confucianism – for example, the tradition of a noble man who, while remaining faithful to the collapsed dynasty, refused to serve the new masters of this world. Or, for example, the tradition of a brave

bureaucrat who fights corruption and lack of principle and eventually dies but remains a hero in the memory of posterity. ... However, this option for saving the soul was available only for few representatives of the elite – somehow no books were written about the deeds of peasants. Overall, it was earthly success that was important in Confucianism, which was not an allurements or devilish temptation, but a confirmation that Heaven favored a given individual. [15]

This highly distorted interpretation of Confucianism completely ignores such pivotal (key, fundamental) principles of Confucianism as the principle of Harmony (including social harmony as its integral dimension) with Heaven, living in accordance with the laws of Heaven, and organically related to this principle “The Confucian doctrine of the Mean”, which is close to the optimality principle in Western philosophy and science. However, this concept of the “golden mean” and the priority of Harmony with Heaven are somewhat ignored by many modern researchers of Confucianism in Eastern Europe and the West.

Here we can cite the example of Korea in the Joseon era (1392–1897), which is characterized by the division of the highest Confucian elite of the state into two groups – those who chose the path of public service and those who chose the path of spiritual and moral service and self-improvement. The latter (*seonbi*) deliberately, guided by the Confucian canon, preferred the life of a noble sage with a modest income to a career of a state official (also, according to Confucius, worthy of a nobleman), which promised great material benefits.

Thus, understanding the true nature of Confucian tradition democracy involves dispelling a web of myths that distort the adequate perception of Confucianism among Europeans and Americans.

The Confucian Emphasis on Humanism

The key problem of liberal democracy is its moral neutrality, which deprives society and the state of the moral core, relativizes good and evil, the noble and ignoble behavior of the rulers and ruling elites in relation to their citizens and the people in general. This is especially true in the context of secularizing societies, public and political life, the increasing loss by Christianity in the West, as well as in the post-communist countries of Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia, of the role of moral support for citizens, the political and intellectual elite.

Instead, the Confucian principles of benevolence and reciprocity stress humanism, or consideration of other people in society in contrast to expanding extreme individualism, up to solipsism in the West. Doh Chull Shin believes that these humanistic principles can be reformulated to promote democratic government for the people, not just by the people, in contemporary East Asia [2, p. 64]. Yung-Myung Kim (1997) especially points out that the Confucian emphasis on societal order and respect for authority might indeed aid the survival of burgeoning democracies [16].

Confucian Tradition Democracy: Hierarchic Equality?

Confucianism believes in the equality of man by nature [17; 18], requiring, like in Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* [19], the development of an informal citizenry through universal education for people from all social strata as well as an equal opportunity for public appointment [20]. As argues Baogang He, "Confucianism provides for equal opportunity for political positions, which are open to all scholars through an examination system [21, p. 43]." In this sense, Confucian society essentially operates the principle

of equal opportunities, traditionally attributed as one of the key advantages of American and other liberal democratic societies, as far as everyone has an opportunity to take merit-based civil service examinations and, respectively, to be appointed as a governmental official. In this regard, Doh Chull Shin emphasizes:

Citizens in Confucian societies, as in democratic societies, are expected to respect the rights and personal sovereignty of others, because all residents of a country are equally integral components of their national network. These norms certainly parallel democracy's emphasis on equality and opportunity, indicating that, although East Asian societies today might not always actualize such values, Confucianism can be used to foster such democratic behavior. [2, p. 61]

However, for the Confucian worldview, order is the main factor in the society functioning. For the current Confucian tradition, the issue of socioeconomic inequality is quite important and may be met and solved by means of a participatory democracy which, in its turn, is capable to satisfy citizens' welfare concerns.

Professor Joseph Chan from the University of Hong Kong takes a reasonably flexible approach to the issue, saying that there can be good forms of hierarchy that promote people's wellbeing and virtue and express attractive ethical relationships, and there can be bad forms of equality that produce the opposite. The key to a healthy relationship, equal or otherwise, is the virtue of its participants. [22]

However, some researchers (Anh Tuan Nuyen, for instance [23]) are even more resilient when claim that in advocating meritocracy, Confucianism does not abandon the idea of equality, but invoking Aristotle's account of equality in the Nicomachean Ethics, it can be argued that the unequal distribution of rights and benefits reflects one aspect of equality, namely the vertical aspect,

or the unequal treatment of unequals. It is appropriate to recall here that the political ideal of Plato is the stability of the state, which also determines a certain social inequality, since everyone does his job, and the happiness of the polis has an absolute priority over the happiness of its individual member.

Conversely, Sophia Gao and Aaron Walayat argue that Confucianism and democracy both acknowledge a type of equality among all people. Confucianism argues that people have equal potential for moral education, whose realization entitles them to participate politically. The view in democracy is that people have political equality, but education and development are necessary for a person to participate politically. The bar for Confucianism is high, requiring moral development, and low for democracy, requiring civic education, yet both systems acknowledge the need for some limitations on political participation. Although the matter of degree differs, Confucianism and democracy both acknowledge a realizable potential equality among people. Therefore, as Gao and Walayat conclude, the two traditions have some soft compatibility [24, p. 224], i.e., regarding the compatibility of certain ideas and values.

The Concept of *Minben* as a Social Foundation for Democracy

The classical Confucian concept of *Minben* 民本 can be translated as “people are the foundation (or root) of the nation.” When Mencius taught he quoted for all to hear from the Shujing (“Classic of History”), one of the Five Classics of Confucianism, the saying “Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear [25, Shangshu (Esteemed Documents), ch. Taishi (Thai Oath) B].” This assertion can be surely interpreted that the preference for people justifies the

legitimacy of political power [24, p. 217]. In William Henry Scott's opinion, Mencius' expresses herewith the Confucian view of the people's primacy in the universal order of things. Just the people, according to Confucian classic teaching, is the instrument by which Heaven may withdraw its mandate from a corrupt ruler and give it to a nobler one [26].

The idea of *minben* which is inherently critical of an illegitimate regime has been deeply rooted through the normative politics in China and Korea [27, p. 270]. Confucian leaders are expected to respect public opinion, remain cognizant of social demands, provide for the national welfare, and maintain liberty, equality, and impartiality [8]. If a leader fails to remain accountable to his subjects (or citizens in a modern republican state), his subjects need no longer respect his rule. That was clearly and persuasively demonstrated by mass public protests in the ROK which led to the impeachment and subsequent arrest of then President Park Geun-hye in the late 2016 – the early 2017.

Viren Murthy argues that although the Confucian idea of “minben” is not synonymous with democracy, some its tenets are conducive to the promotion of a regime in which citizens are politically and economically empowered. In particular, he persuasively demonstrates the way that Confucius, Mencius, and Jia Yi (c. 200 – 169 BC), a Confucian scholar who focused on the failings of the Legalist-based Qin Dynasty, stress that government should meet the basic needs of its people. [5]

At the same time, “Confucianism places less emphasis on the creation of legal institutions to protect moral rights, emphasizing instead the moral cultivation of individuals³ and preparing them to exercise these rights [24, p. 218].” Confucians tend to see democracy as granting too much power to the majority, while the

³ The junzi 君子, Confucius's vision of the ideal man, is usually translated into English as an “exemplary person”.

latter may easily make a mistake, and, therefore, trusts the elected leader too much. Conversely, democrats consider that Confucianism uses to give too much power to non-elected elites.

Some contemporary scholarly appreciators of Confucianism have tried to harmonize the above different visions, especially through proposing a two-chamber or multi-chamber legislature, with one chamber based on universal suffrage and the other(s) based on meritocratic elitism [28]. For example, Daniel Bell proposes to take the Confucian idea of gentry and institutionalize it as a Confucian chamber in a democratic assembly [29].

Yutang Jin proposes to define the democracy that has developed in the countries of the Confucian tradition as Confucian leadership democracy, as a form of organization of the political system allowing to maintain a real sort of the Golden Mean balance between Confucianism's "plebeian and elitist values [30, p. 81]", paying due tribute to both Confucian meritocracy (the Confucian sages' rule) and participatory Confucian democracy. However, the Confucian tradition is much wider and deeper than the categories of leadership, administration or government, which are rather instrumental in relation to the concepts of Harmony and the Mandate of Heaven. Therefore, Confucian leadership democracy may only be considered as a certain dimension of the Confucian tradition democracy that is democracy based on the Confucian intellectual, moral, social, cultural, political, and other tradition.

Societal Participation

The Confucian teaching encourages vigorous civil societies through providing equal and mandatory education by the state. Bai Tongdong construes Mencius' prescription regarding the state's responsibility to provide equal education as promoting

social mobilization through instruction [31], since an educated population is more disposed to make reasonable demands on rulers and public leaders [7]. It means the principled compatibility between Confucianism and democracy with respect to societal participation.

Civic organizations have a long history in East Asia, and often serve as a mediating factor between the state and the family. One should note, however, that the similarity between Confucianism and Western democracy promoted by scholars in this school of thought is concerned primarily with *societal*, rather than *political*, participation. Widespread political participation is a much more recent phenomenon in the region, than societal, and the latter is not as closely attuned to Confucian ideals as is societal participation. [2, p. 62]

Sophia Gao and Aaron J. Walayat rightly emphasize that both Confucianism and Western liberal democracy impose some restrictions, though different in nature and scale, for political participation. Confucians believe that people have equal initial opportunities for public career (through cultivating virtues, obtaining education and passing exams) but different “potential for being wise and virtuous” [24, p. 221], while in the West the right to political participation is stipulated by age, a resident’s citizenship, or naturalization and, in the case of eligibility for some offices (e.g., president) by the requirement of being the county’s native. Also, felons are disenfranchised. Moreover, in some US states felons’ voting rights suspension extends even to the period after they have completed their sentence [32].

Thus, both in modern Western democracy and in Confucianism life experience, education and self-cultivation are necessary and justifiable conditions for a person’s political participation [24, p. 224]. Though the Confucian tradition and liberal democracy have different priority requirements for political

participation (primacy of moral virtues and cultural education in Confucianism and primacy of civic education in liberal democracy), the both systems acknowledge the reasonability for certain restrictions on political participation and, therefore, are compatible from the viewpoint of basic political values.

Parallels in Confucianism with Democratic Right to Protest and Opposition

The Confucian doctrine resolutely disapproves of a ruler's arbitrary action against the ruled. Instead, the ruler's accountability to the people is the core of those tenets. According to Mencius, "The common people are the most valuable; next are the national altars of the soil and grain; the ruler is insignificant. Therefore, he who can gain the hearts of the common people will be the son of heaven [33, Mencius 7B:14]." The *Mandate of Heaven* holds that people's acceptance or consent is the basis of legitimate rule. The Mandate of Heaven is just revealed through the will of the people: "Heaven sees through the eyes of the people. Heaven hears through the ears of the people" [34, p. 20, Mencius 9:5]. In fact, one can draw hereof secular foundations of modern democratic concepts of the people's sovereignty.

It is the responsibility of rulers and intellectuals to virtuously develop a balanced and harmonious society. The ruler is to fulfil the above Mandate so that the inherent nobility of human beings, according to Mencius, can flourish. However, if the ruler undermines the foundations of the state and is negligent about people's welfare, he loses the Mandate of Heaven, the people have every right to depose him. [34, p. 20]

So that state leaders' authority is often checked by the citizens being attached to the Confucian notion of government for the people.

Both Confucianism and democracy oppose the despotic behavior of political leaders, and both belief systems promote the right and ability of the people to remove malevolent leaders from power [35]. As argues Doh Chull Shin, “Democracy might emphasize the protection of personal liberty from governmental oppression to a greater degree than Confucianism, but both doctrines still maintain that citizens deserve leaders who are accountable to the populace [2, p. 60].”

A similar concept of accountability is evidenced in Confucianism’s tradition of *remonstrance*, in which a country’s residents maintain open dialogue with leaders on pressing issues. According to Xu Keqian , early Confucians viewed governance as an act of mutual commitment on the part of rulers and the ruled [6]. Confucianism regards good government as one of the ultimate purposes of the tenet [36, p. 1]. According to Mencius, the real loyalty includes “rectifying the evils in the ruler’s heart [37, Mencius 4A:20].” “If the ruler made serious mistakes, they would remonstrate with him, but if repeated remonstrations fell on deaf ears, they would depose him [37, Mencius 5B: 20].”

A Confucian ideal means “harmony in diversity,” not eliminating opposing views [38]. And the Confucian practice of remonstrations, a fundamental principle of citizens’ right to dissent, balances Confucianism’s archetypal commitment to order and stability. That assumes the absence of blind faith and skepticism, typical, for example, of conservative Orthodoxy. As far back as Leonard Hsü in 1975 pointed out that in principle, the Confucian notion of *dao* or ethical living allows people to speak out against any injustice or malice that transgresses basic human values. Communal problems can be solved only when all citizens participate in a democratic fashion, challenging existing ideas when necessary to ensure that the optimal outcome is reached [8].

In Confucius' *Analects*, the concept of remonstrance, or filial critique, exists as a built-in check for out-of-control authority. Being a counter-balancing support to the principle of filial devotion, remonstrance is intended to correct a disbalancing improper behavior – to stop the father from imperiling the family, for example, or the ruler from causing the ruin of the state [39, p. 83].

One may also recall herewith the more than two thousand years old Confucian-spirit tradition of exiled poets in China to throw their newly composed verses into the Xiang River, or other waters, as they traversed them on the way to their decreed places of exile [40, p. 16].

Korean scholars Hahm Chaihark and Jongryn Mo argue for the need to revive and adapt for the contemporary era such Choson dynasty institutions as royal policy lectures and the Confucian censorate, traditional institutions that played the role of monitoring the dealings of the ruler [41; 42]. Especially, the Admonishment Branch of the Censorate, a high-level supervisory agency in Confucian China staffed by censors, was responsible for monitoring the behavior of the emperor, to ensure that he did not make mistakes and remind him of his duties [43, p. 49]. During the Chosŏn period, the royal lecture was intensified and its role was enlarged to a policy council. It provided occasions allowing higher literati officers not only to inculcate the neo-Confucian ideal on kings but also to give them moral admonitions as well as political criticisms. It functioned in fact, in most cases, as a means for scholarly and literati officers (the meritocratic bureaucracy) to restrain the power of the ruler [36]. Against the background of the 2016 impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, these recommendations only increase their relevance.

The Confucian idea of social harmony and the historical practice of tolerating multiple religions can promote the Western

liberal tradition of tolerating and combining diverse interests, especially those of minorities, to help the state advance [2, pp. 61–62].

In both Confucianism and Western liberal democracy, dissent can be a vital component of political procedure, although in practice, Confucianism tightly limits possibilities of expressing dissent by permitting popular opposition to the ruler only when such actions do not incite subversive political actions like mayhem or rebellion leading to tumult, disorder, and social chaos [44].

Thus, according to Confucianism, the divine obligation of political leaders to serve the people may be, therefore, viewed as corresponding to the Western rule of law – if either is violated, leaders ought to be held responsible for their actions [45].

Hence, Confucianism may serve a serious protector against ochlocracy, i.e., the power and despotism of the crowd, populism, and incompetent interference into the affairs of state governance. The Confucian practice of selecting government officials by public and open exams, on the other hand, can be viewed as a non-liberal democratic institutional alternative to the free and competitive elections of political leaders [23, p. 143].

Confucianism and Democracy: The Compatibility Issue

Although a number of scholars adhere to the position of the incompatibility of the values and institutions of secular liberal democracy of the Western model and Confucianism [22; 23; 46]. However, in our opinion, their position is primarily due to ideological and political motives, in particular, inertial vestiges of Western exceptionalism and the growing rivalry for global leadership between the United States and China, rather than the results of an impartial scientific analysis. Indeed, the very

empirical reality of the Confucian tradition democracies, primarily of South Korea and Taiwan, contradicts this point of view.

As emphasizes Zhengxu Wan, empirically and theoretically the “incompatibility” argument, pitting Confucianism against democracy, “proves highly untenable, while the compatibility and convergence arguments seem much more plausible [47, p. 220].” And practically none of contemporary critics of Confucianism seem to find Confucian values such as filial piety, respect for elders, and harmony within the family particularly problematic or dangerous per se, as they are the values to which the Korean constitution is indirectly committed; they are only worried about the ways in which these values are sometimes manipulated in the service of political engineering or illiberal statism [48, p. 18].

Doh Chull Shin rightly criticizes the dichotomous perceptions ignoring similarities, value compatibility and complex interrelationship between democracy and Confucianism as well as their convergency potential [2, p. 63].

Compatibilists often take two approaches in reconciling Confucian and democratic elements into a single political system. One model is compatibility based on coexistence. This model includes elements from Confucianism and democracy coexisting in one society or one political system. The other model is one of integration, which not only has Confucian and democratic elements coexisting but also interprets them as influencing each other and becoming integrated to form a new political system [24, p. 225].

An increasing number of scholars have recently begun to note that Confucianism and democracy can be reformulated in such a way that new and hybrid regimes can be built throughout and outside the region [2; 49; 50; 51]. While admitting that Confucian values of order and efficiency promote social stability and cooperation, they believe that some kind of combining liberal thought and self-reliance with honoring Confucian principles of

common good and mutual responsibility would develop in East Asia.

Daniel A. Bell argues that government solely by the people is inappropriate for historically Confucian societies [29]. He has spoken against “one person one vote” as a mode of selection for public leaders [51], for democratically elected representatives might not be fully able to measure long term consequences of their decisions. Bell proposes instead a system combining Confucian ideals of government by intellectual elites with liberal ideals of electoral accountability of government to citizens, utilizing both traditional and modern institutional frameworks.

Baogang He, Professor at Deakin University (Melbourne, Australia), describes the relationship between Confucianism and democracy in terms of four models: the conflict, the compatible, the hybrid, and the critical ones [21; 52].

He aptly designates certain Confucian institutions and traditions which could be compatible with and convertible into characteristic features of Western-style liberal democracy:

- the Confucian institution of Xuetang (学堂学堂), a public forum in which the intellectual elite discuss and debate moral, social, and political issues, which can be transformed into a modern civil society;
- the Confucian tradition of scholarly criticism could be transformed into a formal opposition force if the practice of criticism were afforded genuine political significance;
- the Confucian tolerance of plural religions could promote liberal toleration;
- the balance-check system could be transformed into a modern power-check system;
- the examination system could be developed into a system of equal access to public office and as a way of ensuring a meritocracy. [21, p. 43]

However, as Baogang He rightly points out, the compatibility arguments do not disprove the Confucianism-Democracy conflict potential:

One may argue that the apparent compatibility is plausible simply because the core areas of conflict between democracy and Confucianism have been overcome by cultural transformation and the retreat of Confucianism into private life. Therefore, at a deeper level, the compatibility model supports key aspects of the conflict model. [21, p. 57]

Tu Wei-ming considers the democracy with Confucian features a practicable alternative to liberal democracy [53, p. 211]. And Sor-Hoon Tan argues that unlike a liberal democracy which operates under constraints of interest groups, Confucian democracy can promote both individual freedom and common good [49].

Doh Chull Shin, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, convincingly substantiates those Confucian political legacies may pose a viable East Asian brand alternative to the Western “mainstream” liberal democracy. While those legacies and values encourage demand for a non-liberal democratic government that prioritizes the economic welfare of the community over the freedom of individual citizens, Confucian social legacies promote interpersonal trust and tolerance, which are critical components of democratic civic life. Thus, citizens of historically Confucian Asia may combine the best of Confucian ideals and democratic principles in a novel, competitive, particularly East Asian brand of democracy. [2]

Baogang He enumerates possible types of democracy which might be blended with Confucianism in the hybrid model: Confucian communitarian democracy, Confucian elite democracy,

Confucian consultative democracy, Confucian electoral democracy, etc. [21, p. 44]. Let us further cite He:

Confucianism can offer a package of democracy reform programs including duty-based rights; communitarian care; the promotion of a public spirit; the introduction of a remonstrance system into parliament to improve the two-party system; and the promotion of scholarly rulings, which is relatively better than the ruling power of the wealthy. [21, p. 47]

Nevertheless, Francis Fukuyama finds that the Confucian examination system, focus on education, fairly egalitarian income distribution, relative tolerance, tradition of dissent and protest, and tendency toward egalitarianism are not only compatible with, but also actually promote, liberal democracy [54].

In this regard, we would like to highlight the above-mentioned recent work by Sophia Gao and Aaron Walayat (2020), in which they thoroughly analyze the problem of the above compatibility in two aspects – values (abstract concepts) and institutions – in terms of feasibility of convergence or integration [24].

As the two scholars emphasize, compared to liberal democracy, Confucians presume that democracy may give too much power to the majority. By contrast, Western democrats consider Confucian societies as overmuch empowering the elites [24, p. 220].

Today, many restrictions remain concerning who can vote and run for office, but most of them are viewed by most people as reasonable or even taken for granted [32].

Regarding the institution-centric hard Confucianism-Democracy compatibility model, its advocates seek to find compatibility not only between Confucian and democratic

institutions but also between abstract ideas from one tradition and the institutions in the other, especially by introducing Confucian concepts into democratic institutions [24, p. 225].

Undoubtedly, the idea of the compatibility of democracy and Confucianism requires from the academic community both in the East and in the West the most serious attention and further reflection.

Confucianism and Communitarian Democracy

The social and economic success of the Confucian tradition countries, especially of the East Asian Tigers full democracies (South Korea and Taiwan), which is gaining more and more global recognition, forces a critical rethinking of those ontological postulates (axioms) that are embedded in the modern (post-war) doctrine of human rights, namely its initial “big-ego” individualism as a basic principle not only of a market economy, but also of human rights and humanitarian policy in general. Social relations under this doctrine, in particular with regard to communities and the state, are conditioned by the axiomatic principle of rational expectation of an increase in one’s own individual benefit, whereby Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau substantiated the idea of social contract [55; 56; 57]. The world famous Russian and Ukrainian economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky, a key member of an “Eastern” historical school [58], criticized Western-born capitalism for being a source of fetishism and alienation. He believed that it would be replaced by “ethical socialism”, fundamentally different from the socialism oppressing market and human rights, which Lenin enforced after the Bolshevik revolution. Tugan-Baranovsky appealed to the ideas of socialism for ethical and moral but not for economic, selfish and consumer reasons [59, p. 52]. He and other

theorists of ethical socialism (Richard Tawney, Clement Attlee et al.) emphasize the need for a morally oriented economy based on the principles of altruism, cooperation and social justice, while at the same time opposing proprietary individualism [59, pp. 58–59]. Such ethical socialism, according to Tugan-Baranovsky, will be based on universal human values. The above is very close to the communitarian principles to which modern neo-Confucianism appeals in the developed democracies of Confucian tradition.

As Daniel Bell emphasizes in the East Asian and global context, “community is valuable – at least as valuable as the need for freedom, if not more so [60]”.

Against the background of growing criticisms of liberal democracy many scholars have tried to substantiate “some kind of communitarian democracy as having affinity with the Confucian philosophical orientation [61].” In such converged or hybrid democracy political legitimacy of a ruler and the ruling elite would be based on moral and intellectual merit instead of birth, social background, or transcendent motivation.

Especially, one could proceed herewith from John Dewey’s concept of communitarian democracy with primarily a moral ideal that inspired Western and East Asian scholars to seek some symbiosis of the liberal and Confucian values democracy [62]. Dewey posited that democracy is not only about voting rights, but also “equipping citizens with the ability to take on the responsibility to make informed, intelligent choices and decisions leading to the public good [63].”

Some contemporary Confucian critics of the individualist fundamentalism of Western mainstream doctrine of human rights even propose to “dethrone” rights from the top of modern democracy values. As argues, e.g., Joseph Chan, rights constitute neither human virtues nor virtuous relations, so that in a healthy close relationship, parties should best ignore rights and focus on

the norms of mutual caring and loving, rather than on introducing or invoking rights [22]. In our opinion, however, the above view underestimates the fundamental importance that the humanistic ethics of Confucianism attaches to a person in all the fullness of his/her individuality.

Instead, one of the most profound Confucian thinkers of modernity Tu Weiming emphasizes that for Confucianism just

a concrete living person is the center of relationships. As the center, the dignity independence and autonomy individual is an essential feature of the person. As relationships, sociality is indispensable for personal identity. The Confucian idea of the person is rooted in body, home, community, world and cosmos and yet it seeks to transcend egoism, nepotism, racism, narrowly defined culturalism and anthropocentrism. Confucius regards the secular world as a secret by overcoming the exclusive dichotomies of body mind, spirit matter, and creator and creature [64, p. 7205].

As Gilbert Rozman expounds, Confucian ideals promote familial lifestyle, strengthening social bonds and creating effective public administration in nation scale [65]. These factors crucially contributed to the “Miracle on Hangang” phenomenon in striking contrast to the development of the situation in North Korea, where, as argues Joanna Rurarz, gradual departure from Confucianism to embrace the totalitarian one-party and one-leader dictatorship has thrown the country into desperate poverty and stagnation [66, pp. 400–403]. Hong Sah-Myung reaches similar conclusions, emphasizing the crucial factor of *chaebol* corporate system essentially based upon the Confucian concept of family structure [67, pp. 235–236].

Doh Chull Shin from Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, combined deep theoretical analysis of

Confucianism with the empirical investigation of its significance for citizens in East Asia. Shin especially capitalized copious amounts of data sets made by the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) on the role of Confucianism for citizens in East Asia regarding their civic and political participation [2]. His analysis brings out the following important regularities:

When people are attached to the legacies of paternalistic meritocracy, they are favorably disposed toward nonliberal democracy, characterized by a democratic regime structure and an authoritarian mode of governance, and unfavorably disposed toward liberal democracy, characterized by a democratic regime structure and a democratic mode of governance. In the minds of people in Confucian East Asia, therefore, it is a nonliberal democratic system, not an authoritarian political system, which is most compatible with Confucianism. Moreover, it is liberal democracy, not electoral or delegative democracy, which is incompatible with Confucian legacies. [2, p. 323]

Since the paternalistic elitism in Confucianism differs from democracy, it is quite remarkable that, as sociological surveys testify, in contemporary democratic South Korea, Japan and Taiwan only minorities of citizens are attached to the Confucian political principles of paternalism and elitism, while in three authoritarian countries of Confucian tradition – mainland China, Singapore, and Vietnam – there are majorities attached, at least somewhat, to the above principles [2, p. 319]. At the same time, in all historically Confucian countries upholders of paternalistic meritocracy are found to be least supportive of liberal democracy while most supportive of non-liberal democracy [2, p. 17].

At the same time, the research carried out by Shin has, in our opinion, serious methodological flaws. Shin shares the conceptual

methodology usually accepted by liberal scholars at the Confucianism – democracy compatibility debate. According to Shin, Confucianism can be “conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity, and other humanistic values or nonliberally in terms of conformity, duty, loyalty, and other authoritarian values [2, p. 69].” But such traditional Confucian virtues as benevolence or reciprocity, being apparently humanistic, are not essentially determined by liberty. On the one hand, they may refer, e.g., to the nonliberal order of the early feudal China of Confucius’ time. But traditional Confucianism is “androcentric, patriarchal, and undemocratic [48, p. 8]”. And on the other hand, according to the Confucian teaching, individuals are not autonomous, hereof the civic and political spheres of life are interdependent. It means that rights (freedoms) and duties cannot be defined in terms of the individual but must be defined in terms of the relationship between the individual and his/her community (society) [68]. Therefore, in the East Asian nonliberal version of democracy based on the Confucian tradition, such values as conformity, duty, loyalty in no way tied strictly to authoritarian regime. They rather have the equally positive meaning compared to the above mentioned (allegedly “liberal”) virtues of benevolence or reciprocity.

Shin’s conceptualization of democracy “procedurally as government by the people or substantively as government for the people” looks theoretically more feasible but remains highly relative since the notion of democracy cannot be reduced either to just a procedure, or to just a mission (“government for the people”).

The hybrid version in this context, providing for opportunities of a deep integration and convergence between Confucian and democracy values/institutions, looks the most feasible and promising, especially for the ROK’s case, since, as Sungmoon Kim argues, the latter

provides us with important insights into ways that the institutional hardware of liberal democracy and democratic constitutionalism can be compatible with Confucian cultural software – namely, Confucian legal and political reasoning and practices [48, p. 6].

Conversely, Confucian social legacies turn out to be quite compatible with the communitarian democracy model characterized by cooperative relations between individuals instead of interpersonal rivalry for individualistic interests [60]. In all three Confucian tradition countries with full democracy (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), only a few citizens are unconditionally committed to liberal democratic reform (less than 2%), and they are overwhelmingly outnumbered by supporters of nonliberal democratic rule many of which are deeply ingrained in the virtues of Confucianism. What is especially notable, that unqualified supporters of full liberal democracy among college-educated young people do not exceed 2% as well. [2, p. 324] It implies that the forthcoming shift of political leaders in the three East Asian Tiger countries does not share (neo)liberal values and is not poised to demand further democratization reforms towards Western-style liberal democracy. However, we may agree with Shin that the above survey results rather suggest an inspiring opportunity for forming a new, innovative political system that would combine “the best of Confucian and democratic ideals of good government [2, p. 325]” against the backdrop of both indigenization and liberalization of traditional Confucian ethics currently taking place in the East Asian region [2, p. 333].

Fred Dallmayr assumes three models of the recent Confucian revival: a minimalist (limiting Confucian prescriptions to private family life only), a maximalist (which erects Confucianism into a comprehensive ideology governing politics and society), and a

hybrid or in-between mode (focused on limited constitutional reforms combined with personal and civic education). While criticizing Confucian maximalism by Chinese scholars such as Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, Dallmayr tends to back-up the third, self-limited mode of Confucian revival in South Korea and East Asia, because just the third mode, in his opinion, is capable to healthily constrain the power of the political ruler (or the ruling elites) [69].

At the same time Dallmayr warns against mixing political ideology and the dominant system of moral values, that is core ethical principles of society. Dallmayr is deeply worried that the maximalist revival of Confucianism is likely to establish Confucianism not as civil but as a state religion, thereby making it a dominant political ideology. But this contradicts the “post-modernist” principle of moral relativism and non-hierarchical pluralism, currently dominant in the West (neocons, Fukuyama), as well as widely accepted principles of personal freedom(s) and equality before the law. Meanwhile, contemporary Confucianism in the Republic of Korea appears primarily not as a kind of political ideology, but as morality, mainstream ethics, a social worldview of most South Korean citizens. [69]

While such philosophers as Joseph Chan, Chenyang Li, and Tongdong Bai call for a moderate version of Confucian perfectionism which would embrace some key Western democratic institutions, most notably competitive election, Dallmayr believes that merit and virtue are not created by constitutional or legal provisions (including through the church, school, the convincing while unobtrusive propaganda of relevant moral values) but have to be promoted independently or at least in couple with social or public institutions [such as royal lectures during the traditional Confucian period in China]. In this regard, Dallmayr argues, the Confucian meritocracy’s predisposition toward self-selection and

top-down imposition should be counterbalanced with the role of civic education in a social or political body conceived as an ethical community [69].

A prominent advocate of the Confucianism-democracy compatibility thesis Daniel Bell argues that democracy can be, and has been, established in Confucian societies. However, further successful democratization and consolidation in Confucian societies depends on the separation of Confucianism from politics, in no way allowing it to re-acquire the status and role of official ideology, as well as on blending Confucianism, Buddhism, Western Christianity, and democratic cultures in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. [70] As Baogang Ho points out,

Contemporary Confucianism constitutes less of an obstacle to democracy than Islam, for example, because the former retreated from politics, while the latter is still very much part of the political machinery. [21, p. 51]"

At the same time, one cannot overlook the powerful role of Christianity and, personally, many key public leaders of Christian denomination, such as Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee Teng-hui, or Kim Dae-jung, in pushing for, and demanding, democracy in South Korea and Taiwan.

Confucianism and Deliberative Democracy

Not only from the conceptual standpoint of the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy, but also from the viewpoint a critical approach to assessing democracy from the standpoint of the Confucian doctrine itself (from a Confucian perspective), the Confucian tradition democracy has much in common with deliberative, or discursive, democracy, i. e. such a model of

democracy in which authentic deliberation, not mere voting, with participation of common citizens is considered to be the source of legitimacy for the law and is of critical importance to decision-making. For Confucianism, “electoral democracy has many deficiencies and flaws, and deliberative democracy is a more acceptable form of government and decision-making [21, p. 39]” seeking to foster public contribution to government without simple reliance on majority rule [71].

According to Chen Shengyong, “The development of Chinese deliberative democracy since the 1990s has drawn heavily on the Confucian tradition of public consultation, mixed with Western theories of deliberative democracy and social science methodology for deliberative polling [72].

Baogang He maintains that the practice of local deliberative democracy in mainland China is neither purely a Chinese local phenomenon nor merely the result of Western influence [73]. However, when helping the local officials to facilitate a deliberative forum on rural women’s demands for equal payment [74], Baogang He, on his own admission, “was struck by the absence of Confucian language, the domination of individualist thinking among citizens, and the language of rights and equality in the official document [21, p. 53].” However, He’s assertion about the smaller proportion of Confucian elements than that of Western ones within contemporary hybrid practices of local deliberative democracy in mainland China looks dubious. He’s single empirical example regarding the disproportion of Confucian and Western elements of public (social) culture – with a clear, in his opinion, dominance of Western elements – is locally limited only by his personal experience from the provincial Chinese city of Wenling.

Meanwhile, in our opinion, it would be a great mistake to reduce an ordinary citizen’s Confucian values, thinking and views to their empirical local level manifestations through the fully

pragmatic and desacralized instruments of deliberative democracy. Yes, indeed, to address specific issues of social protection, such as, in this case, the struggle for equal pay for equal work for men and women, i.e., against gender discrimination in wages, a woman, entirely in accordance with the approach of modern reformed Confucianism, appeals to her economic interest, which is entirely consonant with the interests of fighters for women's rights in the West. But this does not mean that the same Chinese women would not sacrifice their material interests in order to protect their parents, families, or would not prefer the interests of the community or the state to personal material interests.

In Bi Hwan Kim's view, certain Confucian virtues can be highly favorable for building a deliberative constitutional culture in South Korean society [75].

In this respect, the development of deliberative democracy which is seen by some renowned Western political philosophers as probably the most welcomed and perfect type of developed democracy for the Western and future world [76–79] may be well grounded on Confucian traditions and values as well as fruitfully infused by Korean historical heritage.

Conclusion

The synergetic ability of Confucian systems for homeostasis is amazing – that is, the ability to reproduce itself, to maintain dynamic equilibrium in conditions of competitive openness, readiness to flexibly borrow from successful institutions and technologies of other social systems to restore and maintain dynamic equilibrium and provide horizons for further systemic development.

We may conclude that the democracy of Confucian tradition is a living and actively developing phenomenon. In this regard,

South Korea is the unique example of a completely sovereign state recognized by the world community, in which, as a result of mutual influence and interpenetration of both indigenous and imported political concepts, movements and strategies a regime of highly developed pluralistic democracy has developed, in which values, norms and institutions of Confucianism and Western-style democracy not only coexist, but increasingly integrate. As for China, whose socio-cultural influence in Korea has traditionally been and remains powerful, then there, whilst at the local level, there is a process of approbation of blending democratic practices, in particular those of deliberative democracy, with indigenous traditional, notably Confucian, values and practices.

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Chapter 3

PECULIARITIES OF THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION DEMOCRACY IN THE ROK

A Stable, Strong, and Prosperous State of Diversity

The Republic of Korea represents the unique example of successful modernization and building of efficient structural democracy in a full UN member state with the historically central role of the Confucian tradition. Meanwhile, in Japan, Confucianism was never included into central elements of local culture, while a “vigorous” democracy in Taiwan was built after it had lost the UN membership. Another state of Confucian tradition – Singapore – still preserves some specific features of authoritarianism being ranked only the 75th by the prestigious Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2019, compared to the South Korea’s 23rd (the best rank for Asia) and Japan’s 24th positions [1, pp. 10–11]. The example of South Korea shows us an instance of the successful combination between Confucianism and democracy.

The Republic of Korea has become a highly developed middle power. A stable, strong, and prosperous state is open to

the world and characterized by high rates of political and socio-economic development.

In September 1977 *Fortune* magazine had this to say about business in Korea:

What positively delights American business men in Korea is the Confucian work ethic. ... Work, as Koreans see it, is not a hardship. It is a heaven-sent opportunity to help family and nation. The fact that filial piety extends to the boss-worker relationship comes as a further surprise to Americans accustomed to labor wrangling at home. [2, p. 76]

In comparison with “a vigorous democracy” in Taiwan, it is the first and thereby unique case when a fully-fledged – pluralist and structural – democracy was successfully implemented in the fully recognized UN member state of the Confucian tradition. Confucian philosophemes underlie the Korean ethnomental conception of the world, behavioral patterns, and values, and are the basic type of traditional Korean identity.

Meanwhile, according to the Korean Statistical Information Service 2017 and 2015 national census, the majority of South Koreans (56.1% compared to 47.1% in 2005) are irreligious, while Christianity (about 28% of the total population), mostly Protestantism (19.7%), and Korean Buddhism (15.5%) are the dominant confessions among those affiliated with a formal religion. The statistics impugn, in fact, the widespread perception of East Asia “generally regarded as “non-Christian”. As Prof. Chongko Choi points out, Christianity “is quite successful in Korea [3, p. 372].” Therefore, considering the Confucian tradition’s leading and, probably, pivotal role for the Korean society, a special attention should be paid to studying the various religious and secular ethical systems/factors’ complex influence upon the ROK’s democracy development.


An outstanding philosopher of the twentieth century Albert Schweitzer called for the harmonious development of all aspects of culture, both material and spiritual, with the inevitable supremacy of its moral side [4]. This is the cultural and value paradigm put forward today by the Republic of Korea as a country of centuries-old and, which is at the same time a leader in modern economic modernization in Asia and a developed structural democracy. South Korean society is multi-religious and religiously tolerant: the largest religious community is made up of Protestant Christians (about 20% of the population), there are also a significant number of Buddhists (15.5%) and Catholics (8%) [5]. However, 56% of the population is non-religious [6], which brings Korea closer to such Central European countries as the Czech Republic or Estonia.

Only less than 1% of South Koreans consider themselves religious Confucians [5]. However, the influence of Confucianism as a philosophy of life, value system and practical ethics in the country is extremely high.

Dr. Isabelle Sancho in her lecture has presented variety of diverse views on Confucianism and its role in the contemporary Asian countries and territories. The text contains multiformity of pros and contras regarding the role of Confucianism and its influence on modern and contemporary society, especially in the Republic of Korea. However, Confucian values and norms are still influential in Korea. [7]

An important indicator of the popularity of ideas in the society is their support by young people and the impact of those ideas on the younger generation of the country. Bianca Mitu refers to the survey conducted in January-February 2015, which used a sample of 250 Korean young people studying in the UK universities, that clearly indicated that majority of the respondents believe that the contemporary Korea is still influenced by Confucian ideas [8] (see Figure).

Do young people believe that contemporary Korean society is still influenced by Confucianism?



Source: [8, p. 36].

The contemporary South Korean youth's attitudes to Confucianism

**Confucianism in the ROK:
Great Tradition for Great Development**

The majority of “the Korean Miracle” analysts accept the importance of the role played by Confucianism in the outstanding development of South Korea. They also recognize that Confucianism has changed in response to the challenges of the world contemporary developments and remains the dominant way of life in the Republic of Korea. Confucian culture regulates the customs and the consciousness of the Koreans. Therefore, any discussion about the Korean development should start with a discussion about Confucianism, because even in contemporary Korea the Confucian tradition remains intact, more so than in neighboring East Asian countries such as China and Japan [9, p. 34].

We believe that one of the strongest features of the Confucian culture is syncretism, which

adsorbed the idea of profit seeking, competition and rationalisation of economic activity, but retained its emphasis on collectiveness, family and harmony in the society. Combined with the continuing Confucian emphasis on education, merit, hard work, discipline and high achievement motivation, these values form a potent underpinning for economic growth. Confucianism encompasses a broad array of moral, social, philosophical and religious ideas, values and practices, which can adapt themselves to address any number of unique circumstances. [10, p. 36]

Confucius taught that the improvement of the situation in the country should begin with the example of the rulers: if they behave honestly and nobly, the citizens will soon follow their example. At the same time, Confucianism defends the self-worth of conscientious and diligent work, since only it can maintain human harmony with Heaven and society.

The basic moral commandment of Confucianism is, “Do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself.” In essence, Confucianism is an exemplary model of social and personal relations that has absorbed the wisdom and experience of thousands of years of civilization, proved its exceptional viability, ability to dynamically modernize and creatively assimilate the achievements of other cultures and civilizations.

We dare to say that the unique synthesis of values of the two most competitive systems of work ethic in the modern world – Confucianism and Protestantism, the combination of political institutions of Western, especially Anglo-American democracy, with the Confucian tradition ensured the phenomenal success of South Korean modernization. In essence, the “Miracle on the Han River” is the South Korean Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, emancipation, democratization, industrial, scientific & technological, information revolution and the achievement of

the sixth technological mode – milestones passed by the West for more than 500 years [10], which the country managed to overcome in the course of one generation.

It is appropriate to assume that the Confucian understanding of equality and inequality in the Republic of Korea has been largely modified under the influence of the ethical teachings of Buddhism and Christianity. It should be especially noted that Buddhism is fundamentally egalitarian, thence the egalitarians of Buddhist ethics propose that we ought to view and treat all sentient beings equally [11]. Since the 14th century, Korean Buddhist art has become identified with what has come to be known as “folk art” [3, p. 49].

Daniel Bell articulates a Chinese model of Confucian democratic meritocracy, that is, “democracy at the local” and “meritocracy at the top” [12, p. 168]. Meanwhile, “By contrast, in South Korea, national democracy co-exists with a strong local Confucian culture in Andong [considered “The Capital of Korean Spiritual Culture”], which has been the center of Confucianism since the ascent of the Joseon Dynasty [13, p. 52].”

As a result of the socio-political modernization of the second half of the XX century, the Republic of Korea has managed not only to assimilate the essence of European-American democracy, but also to embody the original historical, cultural, and national characteristics of Korea. At the same time, the ideal of the rule of law Western state was largely modified by traditional (Silla⁴) collectivism based on Confucianism and communal tradition.

Sungmoon Kim rightly points out that the outlook of ongoing modern Confucian practices is “distinct not only from Western-style liberal democracy but also from traditional Confucianism

⁴ Silla or Shilla (57 BCE – 935 CE) (Korean: 신라; Hanja: 新羅) was a Korean kingdom located on the southern and central parts of the Korean Peninsula. Silla, along with Baekje and Goguryeo, formed the Three Kingdoms of Korea.

practiced in premodern East Asia [14, p. 5]”, insofar as traditional Confucianism is “androcentric, patriarchal, and undemocratic [14, p. 8].” Nevertheless, as the realities of the ROK’s democracy testify, traditional Confucianism has a strong potential to be transformed through legal and political processes into a new Confucianism that supports democratic practices. Korea was the first in East Asia to abandon the centuries-old dogmatized tiered system of competitive examinations for recruiting public officials and “now is taking the lead in synthesizing liberalism and Confucianism in East Asia [15, p. 51]”.

The rule of law in contemporary South Korean society is understood and interpreted wider than the formal rule of law as often understood in the continental law European tradition. The South Korean legal scholars who draw on Confucian tradition are well aware that “to be a substantial rule of law, the contents of the ruling laws must be just [3, p. 389].” That is why from a jurisprudential point of view, then rites occupy a middle ground between law and morality. If the basis of morality is internality and substantiality, these rites are a kind of externalized, formalized morality. The degree to which morals became legalized was very high in Korea, probably the highest among all East Asian countries: to such an extent that Koreans proudly called themselves the “Eastern Country of Rites” (*Dongbang Yeuijiguk*) [3, pp. 167–168]. What is more, justice should not neglect the aesthetic aspect but, in prominent Confucian tradition philosopher of law John C. H. Wu (1989–1986)’s conviction, should be understood as a triple synthesis of the truth, the good, and the beautiful [16, pp. 239–271]. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, as the strong critic of contemporary Confucianism Junghoon Lee (Yonsei University, Seoul) admits, the Korean courts, still heavily influenced by the Confucian statism, tend to give far more moral weight to the interests of the state than those of individuals

even when they acknowledge the citizen's constitutional rights to such freedoms [17].

At the end of the Joseon Dynasty, the Confucian scholar Byonghon Lee (1870–1940) tried to establish a Confucian Religion (*Gongjagyoo*), in cooperation with Yuwei Kang in China, but his efforts failed because of his notion of religion in terms of Protestant Christianity [18, pp. 205–220]. Nevertheless, a century later, efforts in this direction resulted in establishment Confucianism as an organized religion. Institutionalization of a religion took place at a conference at the National Confucian Academy (*Seonggyungwan*) on August 29, 1973, a “Declaration of Ethics” was adopted, calling “for the restoration of human dignity and the continued development of sound traditional manners and morals on the basis of filial piety and loyalty [3, p. 184].” Confucianism as the religion “believes in Confucius who taught the construction of an ideal society based on humanity and ethics [3, p. 188].”

At present, there is the *Seonggyungwan* (National Confucian Academy), network of local and private Confucian schools, and various associations of Confucians, such as *Yurin* (Confucian Forest), *Yuja* (Confucian Gentlemen) and *Yusa* (Confucian Scholars). The main temple of *Seonggyungwan*, built in honor of Confucius, has his statue in the center flanked to the right and left by 94 Chinese Confucian sages and 18 Korean Confucian scholars. A grand ceremony is held by Korean Confucians in *Seonggyungwan* every February and August according to the lunar calendar. Other rites, for example those in honor of clan founders, are held at shrines throughout the ROK. As posits Chonko Choi,

Korean Confucianism is not merely a theory, an ethic or a way of thinking, but also a social organization. ... This is natural in a society where the establishment of a guaranteed state religion

is not permitted and where politics and religion are kept strictly separate. [3, p. 182]

Meanwhile, it should be recognized that the number of Confucianism believers in the contemporary Republic of Korea is not comparable with the all-pervading role and influence of Confucianism as an ethical teaching and value system.

Nowadays, Korean Confucianism is seen by the common people as a living code of ethics and custom, rather than a religion. <...> However, whenever sociopathological problems arise in the rapidly changing Korean society, it is often argued that a social and ethical reconstruction on the basis of traditional Confucian values is necessary, especially in the light of rising juvenile delinquency and increasing violent crimes. [3, p. 183]

On the one hand, Confucianism absorbed the influence of other religions, which is especially clearly seen during the Confucian ceremonies [3, pp. 167–168]. On the other hand, the influence of Confucian ethical thought remains strong in other religious practices, and in Korean culture in general. At the same time, Koreans still remain a strong inclination towards lineage and kinship, and there appear to be many new family clans even in large cities such as Seoul. At Seoul National University, Korea University, a leading private university in Seoul and others the courses of ethics, moral instruction, etc. frequently referring to Confucian ethics (norms), have been introduced and are being taught.

As Chongko Choi rightly argues:

... Korean Confucianism should pay attention to the human rights of the North Korean people also. Despite the division of South and North, human rights must be emphasized and

discussed openly because they have universal implication. [3, p. 188]

As can be seen from the above opinion of a prominent South Korean scholar of Confucian ethics, Confucian thinking tends to avoid antagonism and is prone to finding a reasonable compromise even in the face of a tough real confrontation, i.e., a war or an armed conflict of seemingly irreconcilable ideologies. In this way Confucianism may be the best bridge towards dialogue and cooperation in achieving the final reunification of the Korean peninsula. [3, p. 189–190] And in the North Korean law, for all its strongly totalitarian “Socialist” appearance, as Choi soundly maintains,

the Confucian character of “law as a teacher and parent” is hidden under the title of Juche (identity, self-reliance). Accordingly, we Koreans may anticipate the possible reunification of North and South Korean laws through the medium of Confucianism. [3, p. 188]

One may see the impressive presence of Confucian signs in the ROK’s official symbolics.

The National Flag of the Republic of Korea, also known as the *Taegeukgi* (Korean: 태극기), has a blue and red taegeuk in the center. The *taegeuk* symbolizes the harmonious balance (complementarity) of yin and yang, the two fundamental forces in the universe, which are the origin of all things. In the development of Confucian philosophy, yang and yin increasingly embodied the interaction of polarities: light and dark, day and night, sun and moon, sky and earth, fire and water, heat and cold, active and passive, hard and soft, positive and negative, outer and inner, upper and lower, even and odd, etc. [19, p. 11] The color-

themed taegeuk symbol using blue and red is typically associated with Korean tradition; the red half represents positive cosmic forces, and the blue half represents the complementary or opposing, negative cosmic forces. It is used in Korean shamanism, Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. [20, p. 66] And on the national flag the four trigrams (of the eight from the Chinese classic the Book of Changes (*Yi Jing*), a core Confucian text) represent Heaven, Earth, Sun, and Moon. These symbols date back to the initial times of Korean history and can be found in even more remote precedents in China.

The unofficial national and official educational motto of South Korea, *Hongik Ingan* (Korean: 흥익인간; Hanja: 弘益人), dating back to the period of the first Korean kingdom Gojoseon⁵ can be translated to English as “To broadly benefit the human world” [21]. It is apparently imbued with the Confucian spirit of social responsibility and contains, in fact, a universal globalist dimension. And it’s not just words. The ROK started a “social responsibility campaign” at global level that included actions such as donating big amounts of money to poor countries that found themselves in difficult situations.

It is also characteristic that the ROK’s most common notes, the 1,000 and 5,000 won denominations, both bear symbols of Korea’s Confucian traditional culture: portraits of the two most prominent Korean Confucian scholars of the Joseon dynasty, respectively Yi Hwang (1501–1570) and Yi I (1536–1584).

Strong civil societies have long played a role in East Asian history and culture, though the most prominent civic movements in the region are found in Korea. While it is difficult to identify the exact emergence of societal organizations in Korea, scholars suggest that such groups first gained traction during the *Choson*

⁵ It lasted until 108 BCE.

dynasty of the early nineteenth century [22]. At that time, progressive intellectuals formed independent associations designed to prevent foreign influences from eroding traditional norms and the Korean national identity. In fact, in Korea's case, civil society was created to preserve the nation's very identity. Korean civil society also relied on the Confucian tradition of remonstrance, providing citizens with greater opportunity to communicate with political elites [23, p. 63].

Characteristically, during the authoritarian period of the Third and Fourth Republics, President Park Chung Hee's ruling party was called the Democratic Republican Party. That is, the president's strategic goal was to create conditions for the transition to a full-fledged democracy.

It is also characteristic that Chiang Kai-shek's son Jiang Jinguo (1978–1988) made the transition to democracy in Taiwan during his presidency: martial law was abolished in 1987, and Taiwan's policy followed a democratic path. At the same time, by analogy with South Korea, Taiwan's economy developed successfully (Jiang Jinguo paid great attention to the economic growth of Taiwan. Under his administration, the national infrastructure “Ten Major Construction Projects” began).

The basic Confucian idea of proper relationships presuppose deference respectively minister towards ruler, son towards father and wife towards husband. In the past, the central government made deep efforts to promote values of reference and deference among the rural population. Especially interesting examples include creation of community compacts in villages for the purpose of Confucian education and formation of social networks [24].

However, it is important to note that during the late Joseon period and the Japanese occupation, there were visible tendencies exhibited by both indigenous nationalists and Japanese occupational government, aiming to discredit Confucian thought as

sinocentric and reactive, a primary factor contributing to the fall of country's independence. The same notions were characteristic under the strictly authoritarian rule of general Park Chung-Hee, when the second war with North Korea strongly backed then by Beijing seemed imminent, so that Confucianism as a teaching of Chinese origin – was considered as inferior to indigenous Korean ethnic religion (shamanism) [25, pp. 29–30]. However, as Tomasz Śleziak rightly points out, “the movements aiming to present Confucianism either in a negative way or to nationalize this philosophy were exhibited in the entire sinic sphere of influence – including Japan [25, p. 30].” Thus, the negative perception of Confucianism was largely caused not by its inherent ideological and value qualities, but by geopolitical and ethno-national factors.

On the other hand, the same Park, especially in the 1960s, promoted Confucianism with the purpose of the ROK's economic breakthrough [13, pp. 37–38]. According to Kim Kyong-dong, two negative elements of Confucianism – orientations of authoritarian statecraft and collectivist hierarchical behavioral traits – have been used by the South Korean political elite in their effort to maintain authoritarian rule and block democratization processes [26]. Exploitation of the image of the strong central government and the traditional model of the obedient subject, especially during the authoritarian rule of general Park Chung-Hee, factored in the development of the new state doctrine centered on industrialization [27].

Speaking of deep conformities of the Western, primarily Protestant, and the Confucian cultures, Fukuyama draws attention to the fact that

even in the American tradition, the inherent individualism of the constitutional-legal system has always been counterbalanced in practice by strongly communitarian social habits. ... It is only in

the past couple of generations that the balance between individualism and communalism in the United States has been tipped decisively in favor of the former. [28, p. 31]

In this regard, it deserves special attention that at the stage of “administrative democracy” in the Republic of Korea, the Sillan collectivism based on Confucianism and communal tradition was opposed to the ideal of the legal Western state.

However, in sympathy for the authoritarian regime and in its active support, one could notice, for example, not a few Protestant leaders, which does not at all indicate the authoritarian-conservative essence of Protestantism – the state religion of the most developed democracies of the states of Northern Europe and the leading religion of the Anglo-American world.

The symbiosis of church and state was clear in the participation by leading Protestant clergy in presidential “prayer breakfasts” invoking divine guidance (and favor) for General-turned-President Park Chung-hee and the country’s ruling military apparatus. The symbiosis was nurtured in especially egregious ways by right-wing Christian leaders from the United States who frequently turned up in Seoul to praise the South Korean regime as a fearless defender in the worldwide crusade against godless communism. [29, p. 175]

On the other hand,

The confrontation between church and state became particularly acute in the 1970s, after Park Chung-hee declared a state of national emergency and began ruling by decree under what is known as the Yushin (“Revitalizing Reforms”) constitution, a system that gave him dictatorial powers. ...

The rise of General Chun Doo-hwan in the aftermath of Park Chung-hee’s assassination in 1979 and the bloody suppression of the democracy movement in the Kwangju massacre of May

1980 created an atmosphere of real terror in South Korea that silenced much of the opposition that had roiled the 1970s. Christian publications were shut down, Christian broadcasting outlets were subjected to censorship and lost their reputation for independent news reporting, clergymen were ordered from their pulpits, and services were subjected to surveillance in a manner reminiscent of the worst years of Japanese thought control. Korea had changed, however, and even Chun Doo-hwan could not control the demand for democratic participation. [29, pp. 177–178]

As Bruce Cumings argues the contribution of protest to Korean democracy cannot be overstated [30, pp. 28–29]; it is a classic case of “the civilizing force of a new vision of society ... created in struggle [31, p. 231].” Confronted with unprecedented mass protests and mobilization, on June 29, 1987, the authoritarian regime finally announced dramatic and unexpected concessions to the demands of civil society groups and the political opposition, adopting a direct presidential election system [32, p. 58].

It is important to emphasize in this regard that the continuity of the South Korean political system is highlighted by the fact that the current constitution of democratic Korea is presented not as a fundamentally new basic law, but as a version of the 1948 Constitution, which is also reflected in its Preamble.

Peculiarities of the Confucian Political Culture of South Korean Society

The mass protests that led to the impeachment of Park Chung-hae were clear evidence of the mechanism of action of the Confucian doctrine under the conditions of contemporary Korean democracy of the Confucian tradition: the authoritarian manners and behavior of President Park, of course, were due to the

peculiarities of the Confucian political culture of Korean society and its political elite. It is hardly in doubt that the origin of Park also played a role, since she, after the murder of her mother, had performed the functions of the first lady under the authoritarian father (actual dictator) Park Chung-hee. It left an imprint on her deep values. During her stay at presidential office Park Geun-hye had been often criticized for being the “daughter of a dictator” [33]. During a 2012 interview with the Cheongju broadcast station *CJB*, Park commented regarding her stance that her father’s May 16 coup was a “revolution to save the country” by stating, “I don’t think it’s the place of politicians to be fighting over whether [the events of 1961] were a “coup d’etat” or a “revolution [34].”

A serious constraint for South Korean democracy, as Young Whan Kihl believes, refers to “internal clashes over inherited values and acquired norms (Asian values versus the Western notion of democracy, for instance) as manifested by the rampant practice of “crony” capitalism and corruption scandals involving close family members and associates of the president” [35, p. xi] and even the president personally as it took place in the case of Park Jong-hae. At the same time, what fundamentally distinguishes the practice of “crony” capitalism in South Korea from that of Ukraine or some states of South-Eastern Europe⁶ is the presence of a strong state in the former and its absence in the latter.

Some political observers have attributed the December 2016 crisis of South Korean democracy to “conflicting views held by the citizens living in the 21st century and a political class stuck in a

⁶ The common features of such governance models are the high concentration of economic assets in the hands of a small number of politically connected business owners in environments characterized by the use of public resources for the few, low transparency, limited accountability and weak rule of law. The effects may include the undermining of democratic governance, distortions of economy, the promotion of organized criminality and corrupt practices through the influence on public policy of a dominant group’s business interests. [36, p. 12].

20th-century style of ruling [37],” But, at the same time, there were powerfully and effectively implemented the fundamental Confucian principles of remonstrance and dissent (against any injustice or malice) towards the ruler with lacking virtues, who neglected the fundamental to the ruler principles of piety, as well as that of the eventual popular right to depose the incorrigibly corrupted ruler.

Confucian society does not mean the absence of problems. The latter arise, of course, even quite acute ones. But the South Korean democracy of the Confucian tradition has learned to solve them quickly and efficiently.

Alarm signals from the media, NGOs and individuals are usually met quickly, and an urgent and adequate action is taken.

The main Korean parties, despite repeated name changes, are primarily ideological, offering a voter a specific project of societal development. For example, the Joint Democratic Party, whose candidate Moon Jae-in won the 2017 presidential election and became the country’s president, was formed in 1955. That is, the party is already more than 65 years old. All these years the party professes social liberalism. And the origins of the main opposition the People Power party, which is on the right-wing conservative flank of the political spectrum, date back to the early 1960s.

Moreover, the leadership of the latter had enough political will not to hide under the new name of the party, but to publicly apologize to the people in December 2020 for the mistakes of the former presidents of the country who represented this party.

Confucian Tradition Democracy facing the COVID-19 pandemic challenges

In 2020 the strength of democracy everywhere in the world was severely tested by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

While, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2020 Report, a large majority of countries, 116 of total amount of 167⁷ (almost 70%), recorded a decline in their total Democracy Index score compared with 2019, South Korea (along with Japan and Taiwan) moved from the "flawed democracy" category to be classified as "full democracy" (see Table). Thus, it took the 23rd position in the global rating list (ahead of the USA and France), having joined the group of only 23 countries being "full democracies". [1, pp. 10–14; 38, pp. 9–13]

At the same time, some structural features of South Korean democracy still need further improvement. As can be seen from components of the rating of the five "full democracies" in Asia and Australasia, the Republic of Korea has a very high rating (9.17 out of 10.00) in terms of "Electoral process and pluralism" but still lags significantly behind the leaders in terms of political culture and civil liberties (see Table).

South Korea challenges the stark philosophical or rhetorical binary of "East versus West" or "Confucian democracy versus liberal democracy", to which many Confucian political philosophers subscribe (although such a "black and white" dichotomy essentially violates the very foundations of the Confucian vision and the Confucian logic of society), and encourages them (and, more importantly, citizens in East Asia) to think about ways to develop democratic institutions and constitutional practices in a Confucian cultural and societal context. The Korean case provides us with important insights into ways that the institutional hardware of liberal democracy and democratic constitutionalism can be compatible with Confucian cultural software – namely, Confucian legal and political reasoning and practices [14, p. 6].

⁷ 165 independent states and two territories (Hong Kong and Taiwan).

**Democracy Indices of 5 Advanced Democracies
in East Asia and Australasia as well as the USA, France,
China, and North Korea by the end of 2020 compared
to 2019 preceding the COVID-19 Crisis⁸**
(on a 10-point scale)

Country	Overall score	Global Rank	Regional rank	I Electoral process and pluralism	II Functioning of government	III Political participation	IV Political culture	V Civil liberties	Regime type
New Zealand	9.25 ↓ (9.26)	4 (4)	1 (1)	10.00 (10.00)	8.93 ↓ (9.29)	8.89 (8.89)	8.75 ↑ (8.13)	9.71 ↓ (10.00)	Full democracy
Australia	8.96 ↓ (9.09)	9 (9)	2 (2)	10.00 (10.00)	8.57 ↓ (8.93)	7.78 (7.78)	8.75 (8.75)	9.71 ↓ (10.00)	Full democracy
Taiwan	8.94 ↑ (7.73)	11 ↑ (31)	3 ↑ (5)	10.00 ↑ (9.58)	9.64 ↑ (8.21)	7.22 ↑ (6.11)	8.13 ↑ (5.63)	9.71 ↑ (9.12)	Full democracy (Flawed democracy)
Japan	8.13 ↓ (7.99)	21 ↑ (24)	4 (4)	8.75 (8.75)	8.57 ↑ (8.21)	6.67 (6.67)	8.13 ↑ (7.50)	8.53 ↓ (8.82)	Full democracy (Flawed democracy)
South Korea	8.01 ↑ (8.00)	23 (23)	5 ↓ (3)	9.17 (9.17)	8.21 ↑ (7.86)	7.22 (7.22)	7.50 (7.50)	7.94 ↓ (8.24)	Full democracy (Flawed democracy)
France	7.99 ↓ (8.12)	24 ↓ (20)	14 (14)	9.58 (9.58)	7.50 ↓ (7.86)	7.78 (7.78)	6.88 (6.88)	8.24 ↓ (8.53)	Flawed democracy (Full democracy)
USA	7.92 ↓ (7.96)	25 (25)	2 (2)	9.17 (9.17)	6.79 ↓ (7.14)	8.89 ↑ (7.78)	6.25 ↓ (7.50)	8.53 ↑ (8.24)	Flawed democracy (Flawed democracy)
China	2.27 ↑ (2.26)	151 ↑ (153)	26 (26)	0.00 (0.00)	4.29 (4.29)	2.78 ↓ (3.33)	3.13 ↑ (2.50)	1.18 (1.18)	Authoritarian (Authoritarian)
North Korea	1.08 (1.08)	167 (167)	28 (28)	0.00 (0.00)	2.50 (2.50)	1.67 (1.67)	1.25 (1.25)	0.00 (0.00)	Authoritarian (Authoritarian)

Source: Based on Economist Intelligence Unit indicators for 2019 and 2020.

⁸ Data for 2019 are given within brackets.

Of particular interest in terms of national adaptation to current global challenges, including the unprecedented scale of the coronavirus pandemic challenge, is the experience of three consolidated East Asian democracies under more (South Korea, Taiwan) or less powerful (Japan) influences of the Confucian traditions and values.

In particular, the Republic of Korea is one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of combating the coronavirus pandemic. The ROK was well prepared and acted quickly at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020. It managed to pioneer new methods of aggressive COVID-19 containment while avoiding a national lockdown, a hard border, or overly disruptive lifestyle measures. As a result, South Korea has suffered just 54 deaths per million as of 23 October 2021. This is in stark contrast with a global average death rate of 628 per million. Since the country remained open to trade and its chaebols (large conglomerates) cushioned the shock, the ROK only endured a 1% economic recession in 2020. And it may expect quite a positive 4.2 % growth rate for 2021. [39]

The resilience of the economic and social democracies of the three East Asian democracies to the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic is due to a number of factors.

First, all three of the above democracies have developed adequate state capacity to overcome a variety of social or natural crisis situations. The political elites in these countries were not swayed, like in the West, “by the prevailing ethos of neoliberal ideology, which enshrines the free market while demonizing the state [40].” Over the past decades, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo have continually modernized and invested in the state’s ability to address the socio-economic problems of their countries, as well as short-term shocks such as financial crises, earthquakes, typhoons, or disease [40].

In particular, Taiwan since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002–2004 established the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) to coordinate cross-ministry efforts in handling future epidemics. During a public health emergency, the minister of public health serves as the commanding officer of the CECC and enjoys sweeping emergency powers. In addition, all large medical centers, which are mainly owned and operated by the government, must be equipped with a sufficient number of isolation facilities, which require considerable resources to maintain, and which are not normally used.

Secondly, in all three democracies mentioned above, citizens are characterized by obedience to the law and by conscientious attitude to their moral duty to sacrifice individual freedom for the sake of social welfare. Local societies are characterized by a high level of public confidence in government, especially during a national crisis. According to Taiwanese political scientist Yunhan Chu.

These widely shared social norms and predispositions stem from East Asian cultural genes that prioritize collective welfare over individual rights while keenly recognizing the imperative to regulate externalities (side-effects on other people and surroundings) of individual behaviors in a resource-scarce and densely populated society. [40]

In all three societies, adherence to guidelines on self-isolation, social distancing, and wearing face masks in public was voluntary, with little resistance.

Finally, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have established a highly efficient and responsive health service that meets many of the socially desirable goals of universal coverage, accessibility, quality service, easy and equal access. Compulsory health insurance schemes have been in place in all three democracies for decades.

Conclusion

The Republic of Korea combines features of multi-confessional inter-civilizational society, the globally competitive national economy and developed structural democracy based on the all-pervading Confucian intellectual, moral, social, cultural, political, and other tradition. Meanwhile, the actual number of Confucianism believers in the contemporary ROK is not comparable with the powerful influence of Confucianism as rational ethical teaching and value system.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that Confucianism and its ethical standards are by no means a doctrine infinitely far from the realities of modern Ukrainian society. First, Confucianism does not have any signs of theosophy, mysticism, or occultism, but appeals to reason, being one of the most rationalistic teachings of human civilization. Secondly, Confucius never limited his teaching to ethnic, geographical, or historical and cultural frameworks, but turned primarily to universal human values and categories. That is why Confucian values were deeply introduced and widely applied in such ethnically, culturally and politically heterogeneous societies as imperial, early republican (under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek) and contemporary post-reform (as a result of Deng Xiaoping's reforms) multiethnic China, feudal Korea of the Joseon dynasty era (late 14th – late 19th centuries), the Republic of Korea of the rigid authoritarianism period (1961–1987) and, lastly, the ROK's modern pluralistic democracy with a relative quantitative predominance of the confessionally Christian population.

It is the South Korean experience of the effective synthesis of Confucian and Western values in socio-political and economic modernization which is of practical use for Ukraine when implementing the bilateral political, trade and economic, investment, technological, educational, and cultural cooperation.

That is especially evident in building up the national economy's international competitiveness, for example, in the areas of structural reforms, improving corporate management, combating corruption, etc.

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Chapter 4

CONFUCIANISM ON KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION: REFLECTIONS IN THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT⁹

Education and morality as the highest standards

During conversations with his disciples Confucius often spoke about the role of knowledge in a broad sense in the formation of personality and the need to obtain systematic knowledge for self-cultivation and subsequent social growth in society. In the Confucian tradition, the fundamental human responsibility is to respect knowledge and to strive for lifelong learning, while full human self-realization is achievable only through an ordered model of education and personal development.

Confucius has always advocated universal education and taught that diplomatic and administrative positions should be held by those with the best academic, not social, qualifications. Confucius also denied the inheritance of the aristocracy and stood for replacing it with a civil service examination system. In the Confucian tradition, education is the paramount factor determining

⁹ This Chapter is authored by Leonid Kistersky and Igor Piliaiev.

social status. Rulers win public trust through very careful training in morality. Government and officials should be appointed on the basis of education and ethics. Officials should not be appointed on a whim – Confucius advised the government to be frugal and hire the righteous. Confucius viewed the government as an agency designed to effectively manage the country’s economy and be morally responsible for the actions of senior officials, who should be an example of moral behavior and education [1, pp. 1–5].

In the modern world, it is supposed that rational knowledge serves as the basis for a prosperous life. However, this judgment dates back to ancient times. “The early Greeks believed that a successful career in a democratic government required an above-secondary education” [2, p. 47].

Interestingly, Confucius’ political thought does not imply punishment, but sets up positive examples. Instead of moralizing about what people should or should not do, Confucius prescribes to educate as many people as possible. Confucius nevertheless believed that a ruler of even the highest level would not be able to make a breakthrough in the development of his country in a few years. He will need at least a generation for life to radically change for the better and virtue to triumph. The example of South Korea is the best confirmation of this concept.

It is necessary to re-emphasize the obvious fact that the economic development of South Korea has been one of the fastest and most sustainable in the world. It is the accumulation of human capital through education that has become an important element of the successful economic development of Korea. Education was seen as an important source of upward mobility as well as an opportunity for new jobs.

Education for all

According to Confucius, to become a good worker, one must have at least a basic education. Consequently, to provide people with a livelihood, it is necessary to pursue a policy of mass education. The industrialization of the Confucian region began with economic reforms and at the same time with mass education in order to correspond to the production modernization processes.

Nowadays, human capital plays an increasingly important role in economic production. Education and training became key elements in defining the quality aspects of the workforce. Unsurprisingly, the economic success of Japan and the four tigers, these five resource-poor regions, is closely related to their emphasis on developing human capital through education. Long-term Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew has repeatedly stressed the importance of education for the development of democracy and the economy of any country [3, pp. 3–9].

Regarding the industrial process models of the Confucian region, all five polities followed similar patterns of economic progress. Political freedom was not put in the first place, but the emphasis was on the livelihood of citizens through teaching people science and technology at all stages of development.

Confucius did not at all oppose the wealth of people, but he believed that wealth corrupts the minds. According to Confucius, knowledge is the true wealth that a person possesses for effective service to society and enjoyment of life. In the Confucian tradition, the accumulation of knowledge is aimed not only at learning itself, but also at economic and social benefits. But since people are very different, then only a person with high moral and ethical values is able to devote oneself exclusively to virtue and service to society.

Confucius not only promoted the need for quality education for the development of the society and economy, but also

personally taught students. Several books have survived that contain subjects and teaching methods. It was noted that Confucius had always been paying special attention to the individual abilities of his students. For example, the Analects contain Confucius' comment regarding individual differences of students and their better predisposition to different types of activities. "To people above average, one can impart higher things; to people below average, one cannot impart higher things" [1, p. 19]. Confucius also believed that his students should be interested in gaining knowledge and be motivated and active in this process.

In the practice of Confucius, moral education played a particularly important role. According to the testimony of his students, Confucius taught four aspects:

- culture;
- moral behavior;
- sincerity;
- truthfulness.

The last three aspects relate specifically to moral education. Confucius and his followers had a huge impact on the development of Chinese society in general and on education in particular. This influence also spread to many countries in East and Southeast Asia. Although there have been ups and downs in the history of the Confucian school, its representatives have always had high authority in society. During some dynasties, only representatives of the Confucian school could advise political leaders [1, p. 20].

Confucius' education was focused more on social rather than individual development.

The moral values he advocated were ultimately related to governing and regulating social relationships. Confucius depicted a developmental path for his students – to achieve self-cultivation first, then family harmony, then good order in the state, and finally peace in the empire. Therefore, the real emphasis was on the social rather than private purpose of education. The emphasis on the social dimension is usually related to the instrumental purpose of education, i.e., to use education as a vehicle to achieve a purpose other than education per se. The training of talent loyal to the government was the fundamental principle of the official Confucian education [1, p. 21].

Confucius believed that the accumulation of knowledge positively affects the effectiveness of persons' efforts, although the effectiveness of training can vary depending on individual abilities and efforts. Since individual abilities are different and people must be paid according to talents and efforts, incomes may vary among individuals. Confucius did not regard interest in the accumulation of (material) wealth as inferiority sign. "Confucius' doctrines emphasize not only material wealth but also education. The reason why some traditional Confucian scholars who showed great interest in social status and fame did not appear to care much about material riches, might be that scholarship was highly respected in traditional China" [2, p. 83].

In the Confucian tradition, respect for knowledge and the pursuit of lifelong learning are fundamental human responsibilities. It is believed that the full self-realization of a person is achievable only through an orderly model of learning and self-improvement.

Knowledge application

Confucian followers believe that a scholar should be able to apply his knowledge in practice. This is clearly reflected in Confucius's attitude towards knowledge and action. It is by applying past knowledge and accumulating new knowledge through actions that one can reach far horizons in personal and social development, self-improving in the process of learning and practical actions. "Before we act, we need to know. This is why the Great Doctrine speaks for the first time about the expansion of knowledge" [2, pp. 151–152].

Confucianism places equal importance on knowledge and action. Knowledge must always be combined with action and preceded by it. That is, knowledge and action, theory and practice should be combined. In turn, knowledge can become a science only in the case of a systemic integral unity of different views and trends.

Confucius believed that education should not serve any abstract principle at all. The systematic acquisition of knowledge to achieve a high standard of living is considered a generally accepted goal of education.

At the same time Confucius noted the need for a constant interest of people and especially academics in the replenishment of knowledge. "For example, – he concluded – a research professor who loses intellectual interest in knowledge and does not conduct any research should not be addressed as a professor" [2, p. 60].

Education has always been considered the most important mechanism for influencing the consciousness of people, especially young generation, and the processes of transformation of society. Ideally, of course, education should instill in students the ideals of Confucian teaching. In practice, however, education has in some cases become the decisive channel through which the youth of the ruling class climbed the bureaucratic ladder. In fact, in some cases, educational institutions have become hotbeds of factional power

struggle between rival groups. In addition, education was used by the ruling elite as a tool for instilling state ideology and exercising social control [4, p. 26].

Science and education in Ukraine

The importance of value factors and motivations for the development of science has clearly manifested itself in the process of cardinal socio-economic and political transformations in Ukraine in recent decades. A course was proclaimed to build a democratic society, a competitive market economy, and to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

After the proclamation of independence in 1991, Ukraine was among the twenty most developed countries in the world and in the five countries with a full cycle of space technologies. It produced the world's most powerful transport aircraft, built aircraft carriers, and possessed advanced information and medical technologies. At present, Ukraine's gross domestic product is only slightly more than half of the 1990 level, and science in the country has been in a state of continuous crisis for three decades. In fact, spending on science fell to 7.5% of the 1990 level [5], although before independence Ukraine's GDP was largely formed due to military production.

The reduction in spending on science, accordingly, entailed a reduction in the number of scientists and this process turned out to be very stable and continues to this day. Moreover,

R&D intensity, i.e., R&D expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) remains critically low in Ukraine. In 2019, R&D intensity was 0.43% (a record low for the past 10 years), and 0.17% in the state budget expenditure. For reference: according to 2018 data, the average R&D intensity of the EU-28 member states was 2.12% [6].

For comparison, in South Korea the total R&D spending translated to 4.64 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 – the second highest ratio among OECD countries [7]. In 2020, the total amount of expenditure on research and development (R&D) in both public and private sectors in South Korea reached over 93 trillion South Korean won, or 78 billion USD – more than twice as high as in 2010 [8]. And the number of researchers in the country in 2019 amounted to 538,136 [7].

Due to the low salary in the field of science in Ukraine, the prestige of scientific work began to decline. Young people are already reluctant to go to science, and scientists over the age of 65 have become the most popular age group in academic institutes and research institutes. At the same time, after the salary increases in 2019 for judges, prosecutors and other law enforcement officials, their salaries exceed the salary of a candidate of sciences by about 35 times [7, p. 208]. Such disparities in wages indicate a catastrophic underestimation in Ukraine of the importance of science for the development of the country.

Ukrainian scientists, particularly young researchers, currently have limited opportunities and generally unsatisfactory conditions for their professional fulfillment in science. There is virtually no motivation for them to stay in science. This results in massive brain drain – scientists migrate abroad or to other areas. The number of researchers in Ukraine has decreased by nearly three times since 2010: from 133.7 thousand to 51.1 thousand in 2019 [6].

Organizationally, science in Ukraine mainly exists at the expense of state budget funding, and so far the country's enterprises are not ready to mutually beneficially cooperate with science for effective development. In search of funding, Ukrainian scientists work with international grant programs, but these programs, as a

rule, are focused more on the development of the grantor economy, rather than the Ukrainian one [9, p. 209].

Many institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine are forced to survive by renting out their premises, making the placement of their research workers extremely tight. These institutions have become accustomed to get profit not from their main research activities, but from lease agreements with non-core businesses. Such a “re-profiling” of the activities of a scientific institution can lead to a disastrous outcome. An example is the fate of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The Academy Commission found “the suspension of the scientific and organizational activities of the institute’s divisions in the main areas of research and numerous violations in the budgetary and financial activities” [10]. Although in this case there were enough other fundamental errors of a purely academic nature.

The situation in the field of university science is also unfavorable in Ukraine today. The ranking of the 1000 best universities in the world, published by the authoritative portal QS World University Rankings, in 2019 included 6 Ukrainian universities, but only one of them was included in the list of 500 best universities [11].

There is no direct relationship in the country between a certificate or diploma and the real quality of education and the professionalism of graduates of educational institutions of all types, which undermines the system of qualified personnel preparation. The imitation, especially by small private universities, of the educational process and the purchase of diplomas has become widespread practice, which has led to further depreciation of holders of higher education degrees in the labor market of Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the field of science also has similar problems. We mean holders of scientific degrees and titles in science and

education. For example, in Ukraine it is fashionable and prestigious among high-ranking officials and politicians to acquire academic degrees and academic titles in the field of social disciplines – such as economics, law, political science, public administration, i.e., in fields of science where there are no objective quantitative indicators. New degree and title holders often appear unexpectedly for the scientific community, and sometimes their names become known completely by accident after a few years.

Although it is well known that on average 3–4 years of hard work should be devoted to writing and defending a candidate’s dissertation, and at least twice as much to a doctoral dissertation; high-ranking officials and politicians should have neither time nor energy for scientific work due to the volume and complexity of the tasks to be solved. In countries with a single-degree system, for example, to obtain a PhD degree (Doctor of Philosophy) the applicant spends 5–6 years of hard work.

These terms, of course, are needed by those who professionally without weekends and holidays engaged in research. Many years of effort spent on dissertation preparation do not always lead to results due to various reasons, and there is a real risk of losing a lot of time, because writing and defending a dissertation is quite time consuming, complex, and specific process.

Under a developed democracy, the defense of a dissertation by a high-ranking official or Member of Parliament will automatically lead to a public scandal, resignation, and the end of a political career. In developed democracies, it is well recognized that either the degree holder did not perform the job honestly, or did not write a dissertation on one’s own, or both. In any case, in a developed Western democracy to which we aspire, such a “combination of responsibilities” with other matters can be hardly imagined even theoretically.

Thus, modern Ukraine is characterized by a transformational paradox: even though up to 80% of Ukrainian youth strive to get a higher education, only a few strive for scientific knowledge. Higher education is viewed primarily as a status formal sign for obtaining, if possible, an easy position that is not associated with hard work and does not require deep knowledge and highly professional skills. In contrast to the Protestant or Confucian work ethic, in such a corrupted system of value coordinates, the work of a scientist, which requires high intellectual creative energy, and the conscientious efforts of a worker, which requires special skills and physical efforts, are equally underestimated, being considered not prestigious.

Meanwhile, the recommendations of the European Commission of March 11, 2005 on the European Charter for Researchers and the Code of Conduct for the Recruitment of Researchers, which significantly reflected the influence of Protestant ethics, note: “The levels of qualifications required should be in line with the needs of the position and not be set as a barrier to entry. Recognition and evaluation of qualifications should focus on judging the achievements of the person rather than his/her circumstances or the reputation of the institution where the qualifications were gained” [12].

Only 13 years after the adoption of these Recommendations, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine in its letter to scientific organizations and institutions had officially recognized their importance for “developing and implementing new tools for scientific career development, improving career prospects for scientists and creating a comfortable environment for them to realize scientific potential” [13]. Thus, the institutional and administrative reforms carried out in Ukraine in the field of state regulation and financing of the scientific sphere, taking into account the experience of the advanced countries of the West, so far give some grounds for optimistic expectations.

Science and education in Ukraine have long been in need of systematic rapprochement and evolutionary reform. In contrast to developed countries, where science and education are closely linked in the system of old prestigious private universities, where their financial support is developed by firms and individual patrons, the knowledge system in Ukraine is scattered between academic, branch, and university components, which have little to do with each other. In addition, the vast opportunities for international scientific cooperation with international financial support are underutilized in both science and education.

However, it is already possible to use available resources more efficiently without additional budget expenditures, bringing intellectually and organizationally academic science closer to the university one, ensuring their interpenetration, including the educational process.

Under the current circumstances, as the practice of modern Ukraine shows, branch scientific institutions do not give any benefit at all. In modern conditions, to meet the scientific, organizational or other similar needs of government agencies, one can use such an opportunity as tenders for projects to perform the necessary work for the ministry or department. Clearly underutilized academic and university structures as well as private consulting firms could take part in such tendering procedures. In addition, it is advisable to adopt legislation that would stimulate ties of private business with domestic science and education.

There is an international experience of world leading universities, which from year to year occupy the top ranks in the lists of the best universities in the world. Borrowing the best world university experience and its adaptation to modern conditions of Ukraine is quite realistic.

The “face” of these universities is their professorship, and students have a choice of courses to attend, i.e., professors from

whom they would like to study. As a rule, professors teach courses based on the results of their research, prepare and distribute supporting visual materials for classes, interactively communicate with students during lectures and seminars, i.e., not only provide information but also teach to analyze material and generate new ideas. If for various reasons there is no demand among students for a particular professor's course, the contract with such a teacher is not extended.

There has long been a demand among young people around the world for specific knowledge and the acquisition of specific practical skills in various fields – business, state-building, law, international economic relations, etc. Methodology and theoretical aspects of teaching a particular subject of social sciences in Ukraine occupy a significant part of the classroom workload. As the authors' personal practice shows, those components of knowledge are not very interesting and useful for most students. Those who will be willing to start a research career in this field of science can read the textbook on methodology on their own. Modern students are interested in the reasons for a professor to teach a particular subject, which, in addition to pure teaching, he has practical experience – in business, diplomacy, civil service, or in any other field that is important for future students' careers.

Another problem to be addressed in the sphere of higher education in Ukraine is creation of a teaching system in English. As a subject English is taught in almost all universities in Ukraine. However, few universities teach specialized subjects in English. Preparing for EU membership, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe began to massively switch to teaching in English at the universities of their countries. In Ukraine, this trend has not yet acquired a massive character. Despite the fact that many universities have opened/renamed chairs whose titles contain the term “international” in different versions – international

economics, international marketing, international business, international law, etc, there are only a few places where English is the language of instruction at least of several courses.

Among the leaders in this regard, the Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and the National Economic University named after Vadym Getman could be highlighted. In most universities, however, such chairs and departments are only formally “international” and do little to support the country’s European integration aspirations.

Poland, for instance, in the mid-90s of the last century was most active in Europe in the transfer of university education to teaching specialized subjects in English in the process of preparing for EU membership.

In the system of university education in South Korea, the teaching of subjects in English has been very developed for a long time. This approach has helped the country not only to quickly integrate into the system of international economic relations, but also to take a leading position in it. In addition, the active transition of the education system to the language of international communication allows South Korea to stimulate the influx of foreign students, since knowledge of the Korean language is an advantage and not a mandatory requirement for foreign students, and a significant part of educational programs at universities in the country involves teaching in English. Thus, in any case, an applicant will need a certificate confirming knowledge of the English language.

Among the relatively new but critically important disciplines, it is also worth noting those that contribute to the education of high moral and ethical values in young people, as even the highest quality reform program will not work if it is carried out by professionals who do not have these values. In South Korea, for example, it is Confucian tradition that greatly contributes to the education of citizens in the spirit of high moral and ethical values.

In Ukraine, appropriate steps in this direction are also being taken. For example, the Institute of International Relations of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and the Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University (Vinnytsia) have developed and purposefully teach relevant courses on business ethics and development of students' moral and ethical values in Ukrainian and in English, since these requirements are among major determinants in the country's reform process in the European style [14, pp.126–136].

Research assessment

At one time, by unclear criteria the Ministry of Science and Education of Ukraine selected two scientometric databases – Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) to accelerate the integration of Ukrainian science into the world scientific space and increase the rankings of Ukrainian universities. But it quickly became clear that such “evaluation” criteria had nothing to do with the system of evaluation of scientific research and certification of scientific personnel. There are many other general and branch scientometric databases, but all of them have been ignored without any explanation.

In addition, the two scientometric databases – Scopus and WoS – are primarily focused on natural and technical sciences. The presentation of socio-humanitarian journals in them does not correspond to the general ratio of scientific periodicals in the world, does not take into account entire branches of scientific knowledge – and this is not based on qualitative criteria. One of the reasons for this is the specificity of socio-humanitarian knowledge, which in many cases is not fully internationalized, but on the contrary – has a clear and unconditional national and sometimes even local connection. Back in 2018, a newspaper of

the Parliament of Ukraine published an article “Scopus instead of science: does Ukraine need it?” which was signed by a large group of scientists. A very critical viewpoint of Ukrainian researchers from different fields of science concerning the role of scientometric databases in the scientific environment of the country has been expressed [15].

The general sentiment was that requirements for the list of scientific journals where research results can be published, for foreign publications and publications in journals included in a scientometric database, are generally unacceptable due to their formal nature, they cannot serve as a tool for evaluating research results. The existence of formal criteria for evaluating a researcher, one of which is a defined place and number of publications of research results, replaces the qualitative evaluation of experts in general, fosters imitation and fraud in science, and stimulates corruption in the process of attestation of scientific personnel.

Representatives of Ukrainian science have long been publishing their works in English both in Ukraine and abroad. However, requirements for publications in journals included in the Scopus and WoS scientometric databases represent an attempt to transfer responsibility for evaluating research results to business corporations, which is not logical, but also illegal. It violates the integrity of the system of domestic certification of scientific personnel, recognizes the failure of public administration on the one hand, and an attempt to establish a tough ministry dictatorship on the other.

Such a system established by the Ministry actually implies the non-recognition by the official structure, which should take care of the development of science in Ukraine, of the qualifications of Ukrainian scientists who are members of editorial boards of domestic scientific journals not included in the mentioned scientometric databases. This system also calls into

question their qualifications and ability to adequately evaluate research in general, to be members of specialized academic councils, and so on. Thus, the system of “evaluation” of science established by the Ministry is, rather, an instrument of devaluation of individual researchers and the scientific field as a whole.

The international academic community has repeatedly expressed its negative attitude towards the existing system of assessing the quality of scientific publications and the level of university lecturers through scientometric bases. The presence or absence of such publications is an unreliable and formal indicator, which has only informational value and should not be of a normative nature. The joint assessment of the three reputable foreign academies stated that the availability of publications in journals from the Scopus or WoS scientometric databases could not be considered as one of the main tools for evaluating research results. The statement reads: “However, there has been too much reliance on bibliometric indices and indicator-based tools as measures of performance by many evaluation committees and exercises, leading to the danger of superficial, over-simplified and unreliable methods of evaluation”. It further notes that “Impact factors of journals should not be considered in evaluating research outputs [16].

A number of requirements contained in the Scopus and WoS scientometric databases make it extremely difficult to include Ukrainian scientific periodicals in them. The state policy in the field of evaluation of research results cannot promote the curtailment of scientific activity in the country in the field of social, natural, and technical sciences. These requirements for publications emphasize the secondary nature of Ukrainian academic periodicals, reduce their prestige, and promote the outflow of scientific content to foreign publications, losing it, thus, for Ukraine.

So, the possibility of evaluation and implementation of research results in Ukraine fade away, and instead they are exported to disinterested audiences, ignoring the real presence or absence of innovation and value of research. In most cases, Ukrainian materials in social sciences will be rejected in Western publications due to the lack of opportunity to examine them – that is, the gap between research, their results and implementation will only grow.

Thus, all these requirements cannot be recognized as criteria for qualitative evaluation of research results published in Ukrainian scientific, especially social science, periodicals. Measuring the quality of research solely through scientometric databases is not at all in the practice of the international academic community.

Modern Ukrainian state policy in the field of scientific research results evaluation hinders the development of scientific activity in the country. These requirements for publications emphasize the secondary nature of Ukrainian scientific periodicals, reduce their prestige, and contribute to the outflow of the scientific potential abroad, as university professors and employees of scientific institutions of Ukraine have long since become one of the poorest strata of society.

The scientometric databases selected by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine are neither complete, nor representative, nor relevantly considering qualitative criteria. In addition, the acts of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine do not take into account the corruption component of the monopoly of only two selected bases. There are already many pirate publications of Scopus and WoS, which use their columns not for scientific communication, but only to earn money by imitating the article. In this regard, the prices for publication in Scopus and WoS – \$800–1000 per article – are impressive. Those bases also offer direct sales of copyrighted places, while in many

developed countries such publication is free. Against the background of the income of our teachers and scientists, such a business approach is a deliberate destruction of Ukrainian science.

Such a situation places an unbearable moral and financial burden on the shoulders of Ukrainian scientists, violates the principles and criteria of evaluation of scientific activity and certification of scientific personnel, causes significant damage to the development of science and culture in Ukraine. Ultimately, it is a challenge to the national security of Ukraine in science and education.

Conclusion

In the Confucian tradition, the fundamental human responsibility is to respect knowledge and to strive for lifelong learning. In the modern world, it is believed that rational knowledge serves as the basis for a prosperous life.

Nowadays, human capital plays an increasingly important role in economic production. Education and training became key elements in defining the quality aspects of the workforce.

All five polities of the Confucian region followed similar patterns of economic development with the emphasis on the livelihood of citizens through teaching people science and technology at all stages of development. In the Confucian tradition, respect for knowledge and the pursuit of lifelong learning are fundamental human responsibilities.

Science and education in Ukraine need structural reforms and more significant government support to overcome the crisis. The experience and strategy of supporting science and education for economic development in South Korea deserves special attention and scrupulous study. This experience, adapted to the realities of Ukraine, can lead to long-term and sustainable economic growth.

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Chapter 5

IMPACT OF CONFUCIANISM ON THE ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION OF SOUTH KOREA

Starting point

The end of the Second World War (WWII) in 1945 marked the launch of a new world order formed during the period of the Cold War. As a result of the WWII Korea was split into two parts: Southern – later became the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Northern – later the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Northern Korea inherited practically all heavy industry, most of the electric power capacities and energy producing potential; whilst the Southern Korea took over most of the arable land and some production capacities of light industry.

After the end of the active phase of the Korean War the Republic of Korea stayed an underdeveloped poor country with unstable political situation inside the country. To alter the development trajectory the country started aggressively promoting investment inflow by the private sector through special treatment for capital goods investment and various incentive instruments.

Among the incentive instruments South Korea managed to “lure” domestic savings by setting attractive interest rates. So, South Korea became one of the most outstanding performers of the newly industrialized countries. “During 1953–62, initial efforts were made to reconstruct the economy. Foreign capital also provided an important source of funds for investment and economic development. Education received great emphasis. The economic development of South Korea has been among the most rapid and sustained in the world. The share of exports of primary products in total exports was 8 per cent and that of manufactured goods 92 per cent” [1, pp. 170–171].

Naturally, that such an unprecedented, sustainable, and long-term growth of the South Korean economy has generated much interest around the world. This complex and controversial economic, political, and social phenomenon still causes controversy among economists and politicians, and there is still no consensus in the scientific community as to why Korea turned from a backward agrarian country to one of the leaders of the industrialized world within one generation.

The results of industrialization and modernization of any country largely depend on the choice of an economic development model and the availability of real instruments of power in its implementation. The liberal model of economic development prioritizes economic freedom and adheres to a *laissez-faire* policy where individual interests of the entrepreneur are put in the first place. In this scenario, the state does not resort to tough measures of influence on the economy, and the implementation of reforms may drag on for an indefinite period of time or even stall.

At the same time, the Confucianism-based model of development primarily based on communitarian values, which became especially popular at the end of the twentieth century, prioritizes collective rights and freedoms, the obligations of

entrepreneurs to society and presupposes effective levers, sometimes even enforcement, of government influence on the economy. This development scenario, although restricts individual rights and freedoms, leads to quite noticeable results within one political cycle. As reference countries one can draw to Chile under the rule of Augusto Pinochet, Great Britain under Margaret Thatcher (Thatcherism), and the United States under Ronald Reagan (Reaganomics).

However, even in the early 60s, hardly any analyst could have foreseen the economic breakthrough of the Republic of Korea into the group of the most developed countries in the world. More so, South Korea had been devastated by the Korean War and in the first half of the twentieth century the industrial and relatively rich in natural resources north of the then united Korea was significantly ahead of the agricultural South in terms of industrial development. In 1945, about 65% of Korea's heavy industry was in the north [2, pp. 184–185], while two-thirds of all labor was concentrated in the south. In the first years after the Korean War, the Republic of Korea remained one of the poorest countries in the world: its average income in 1960 was only \$158 a year [3].

S. Kim believes that the problems, opportunities, and reasons for applying the modernization experience of South Korea (“arguably, the most Confucian in its legal, political, and cultural practices” for European transition economies, particularly for Ukraine, still remain worthwhile to be considered [4, p. 6].

Economic modernization tools

Among other things, the driving force behind South Korea's “economic miracle” were several hundred large corporations belonging to 63 family conglomerates (financial-industrial groups) – the so-called “chaebols”. They emerged as part of government

industrialization programs in the 1960s, when the government selected companies for public projects under the Managed Capitalism program and supplied them with funds from foreign loans and Korean banks.

By the 1990s, however, these corporations had become financially independent, but continued to enjoy government support, including tax holidays. According to McKinsey, the 30 largest companies in Korea (including Hyundai, Samsung, LG Electronics) now own 40% of the country's corporate assets, and account for 36% of all sales in the South Korean market [5, 96 pp].

Of course, economic concentration also raises some of the structural challenges currently facing the economy and society, including declining competition and family-related corruption risks. However, the country, especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, has accumulated solid experience in solving them, particularly through the concentration of previously widely diversified chaebols on “breakthrough” export-oriented areas and building networks of foreign branches, delegating many business areas to small and medium businesses.

The unprecedented growth rate in the modern history is still widely analyzed and discussed by international financial organizations and individual scholars. In its review Bloomberg remarked that in the early 1960's, Korea's per capita income was less than 10% of that of the United States, which was taken as the reference economy; per capita annual income growth then exceeded 10% for some 10-year period, which has been almost unparalleled in the historical experience [6].

After the Asian Financial Crisis, the growth slowed down, but it still remained high enough, raising Korea's per capita income level to two-thirds of that of the U.S. [7, p. 6].

In the World Bank's Doing Business ranking, South Korea is among the top five countries in the world in terms of ease of

doing business [8, p. 4]. All this provides a high level of investor activity, growth in production, communications and, ultimately, economic growth. South Korea's export-oriented policy is one of the most important factors in its success: the country is now one of the ten largest exporters in the world.

The Republic of Korea is a science and research spending leader: 4.53% of GDP is the second highest in the world after Israel (4.95%) and ahead of the two world innovation leaders – the United States (2.84%) and Japan (3.26%) [9]. According to Bloomberg, in 2020, South Korea led the top ten world leaders in innovation, overtaking Germany, Switzerland and the United States – not least due to activity in the patent field, although development and production potential of the country also played an important role [7].

The Korean government has spent and continues to spend heavily on developing high-tech Internet infrastructure because it believes that every Korean citizen will benefit from connecting to the global community. Moreover, Korea is one of the few countries in the world that invests public funds in national startups – more than a quarter of all venture capital expenditures.

Modernization under Dictatorship

The Republic of Korea (ROK) achieved its most notable success in the economic modernization and growth during General Park Chung Hee's rule. In fact, the reforms in South Korea began and were successful under his strict dictatorship since Park came to power in a military coup in 1961 and ruled the country as President from 1963 to 1979. His rise to power is associated with the beginning of the “economic miracle” in the country amid the suppression of political opposition. Referring to the example of the ROK, prominent Ukrainian researcher Yuriï

Kindzerskyi doesn't in any way call for the need to establish a dictatorship in Ukraine. It is a statement of the indisputable fact of how the political elite through the dictatorship managed to build a state-of-the-art developed high-tech economy [10, p. 15].

The military junta began to impose strict law and order in the country. The military ceased publishing more than a thousand periodicals banned the activities of political parties and public organizations; 39 thousand officials were fired from public service, about 12 thousand leaders of organized crime were arrested. Special courts carried out property confiscations of the most malicious corrupt officials, accounts of several private banks related to illegal operations were blocked. A blow was also struck at chaebols, including the famous Samsung, but there was a compromise – the chaebol owner eventually got off with a \$3 million fine for tax evasion. It should be noted that these actions got the full approval of the people of the country.

In August 1963, General Pak resigns from the military service and becomes a leader of the party he recently set up and a candidate for the presidency. In the presidential elections held in October of the same year, he wins with a narrow margin over the previous president. Thus, the results of the 1963 presidential elections showed that the military didn't have absolute superiority in the overall balance of political forces in the country. Park Chung Hee won the second presidential election in May 1967 by a noticeable margin. According to the provision of the Constitution, he could only hold the presidency twice in a row. But two years before the next presidential elections, he managed to pass through parliament a resolution on holding a referendum in the country on a constitutional amendment that abolishes the limitation of presidential powers to two terms. At the referendum, 65% of the voters supported the new version of the Constitution. In April 1971, the third presidential election was held, in which

Park Chung Hee received more than 53% of the vote. However, Park Chung Hee's victory in the third presidential election in 1971 by no means meant that he secured a stable political situation in the country [11, pp. 53–58, 60–63].

The democratic opposition in the country was gradually gaining strength and only feuds in its ranks prevented it from acting more effectively. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the military reformers was expressed by numerous former civil and military officials dismissed from public service. Moreover, even within the ranks of the military elite itself, there was no necessary mutual understanding on issues of national modernization, which created a real threat to further reforms. In such a critical situation, in October 1972, Park Chung Hee took a preemptive step by decreeing the dissolution of the National Assembly and freezing activities of all political parties. Thus, all the fullness of state power passed into the hands of the Extraordinary State Assembly, which through amendments to the country's Constitution secured that the president of the country was elected for 6 years and an unlimited number of times, that is, he became essentially a ruler for life.

The election of the President of South Korea on the basis of the new Constitution took place in December 1972, where Park Chung Hee was nominated for the presidency on an uncontested basis and received almost 100% of the votes of the Assembly's deputies. The country's new Basic Law was called the Constitution of the Yushin ("Revitalization Reform"), which announced the introduction of Korean-type democracy in the country, which played a very important, albeit controversial, role in the country's history in the 1970s–80s.

For economic modernization Park Chung Hee promoted a strategy of export promotion with a view of developing industrial sector onto locomotives of growth of the national economy. Park's modernization strategy was augmented by spiritual reform

of the Korean people and reorganization of the civil society on the basis of collective discipline and order. That was a classical type of the revolution from above like in some other countries of the Confucian region. By mobilizing country's comprehensive potential and maximizing the strategy of state interference effectiveness, President Park strongly promoted the philosophy of "rich nation – strong army".

In theory, Park's modernization strategy boiled down to eclectic mixture of his four ideas based on the authoritarian state administration:

1. Corporatism;
2. Mercantilism;
3. Statism;
4. American liberalism.

In the course of his modernization strategy implementation President Park has always been taking into account main aspirations of his people.

Park's modernization can be seen as the crystallization of the aspirations of the South Korean populace, who struggled to overcome backwardness, poverty, and military vulnerability. However, as the widespread political opposition to Park's yushin regime in the 1970s demonstrates, a new generation of more affluent, urban, and educated youth was also rapidly emerging on the political scene to challenge Park's ideas and actions in that decade [12, p. 139].

However, in the course of his presidency Park very flexibly and repeatedly had been changing his worldview tastes. Despite the thousand-year domination of Confucian traditions in the country, during the first decade of his rule he negated the positive influence of Confucianism on the society and publicly

spoke of Confucianism as a completely impractical theory that causes social stagnation in the society and slowdown in modernization of the economy. In the beginning of 1970s President Park altered ideological position and initiated promoting basic Confucian values to the countries' everyday life.

Park thus became a born-again Confucian, instructing the Ministry of Education to incorporate the traditions of loyalty and filial piety into the school curricula in 1977. The Academy of Korean Studies, modeled after the Academia Sinica of Taiwan, was established in 1978 to serve as the intellectual infrastructure for research in Korean studies and the dissemination of traditional values and historical ideas throughout society. The turn to Confucian values contradicted Park's past actions in 1961, but that past was now distant in the public's memory [12, p. 124].

The development of the Korean economy is usually divided into three major stages: import substitution (1953–1961), export orientation (1962–1972), industrialization (1973–1979), and each of the stages was heavily oriented on the inflow of foreign capital.

On the way of combating poverty and satisfying peoples' needs President Park attained a dramatic rise in export of goods which followed by increase in living standards of the Koreans. In fact, President Park Chung Hee encouraged foreign capital inflow by all available legal measures from all geographical venues. Given the acute shortage of financial resources in the country, he adhered to a purely pragmatic position in attracting foreign capital and considered the usefulness of the attracted resources for the Korean economy as the main criterion.

Nonetheless, welcoming foreign capital did not mean lifting regulatory measures. On the contrary, Park put in place a diverse array of restrictions and regulations, particularly on foreign direct investment, in order to nurture the chaebol into national champions and harness foreign capital for Park's goals of economic independence [12, p. 127].

Later, he made a special emphasis on increasing the share of heavy industry goods in the commodity exports which further augmented the living standards in the country and became vivid heritage of the President Park Chung Hee rule. By the end of his presidency Park maintained more balanced home economic policy using government subsidized soft term credits and loan guarantees that had been channeled not only to chaebols but also to public enterprises.

Thereby, to maintain a balanced evaluation of Park's presidency and his role in the country's general modernization process it is worth recognizing his merits and policy failures in this complex long-term process. World renowned researchers of President Park's political legacy in the life of South Korea have expressed a point of view on this matter, which, in our opinion, takes into account distinctive features of his almost twenty years of rule.

The presidents, more influenced by democratic standards, were continuing to weaken the country's coercive institutions. The influence of Park Chung Hee and the institutions he established were not dead, even three decades after his death. However, the post-Park era, during which he and his institutions continued to dominate the South Korean economy, politics, and coercive institutions, was over [12, p. 650].

Modernization and development under tough state regulation

In 2013 the General Conference of UNIDO has adopted a fundamental document regarding the importance of industrialization as a basis for economic development – a new Lima Declaration that specified the Organization’s development priorities for the coming years, placing special emphasis on inclusive and sustainable industrial development [13]. It is interesting to note that the document has been adopted exactly when the Secretary General of the UN was Ban Ki-Moon – a South Korean politician and diplomat who served as the eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 2007 to December 2016. Commenting on the Lima 2013 Declaration, Ban Ki-Moon said that “The Lima Declaration will create the foundation for the coming decades of UNIDO’s important work as the central agency in the United Nations for all matters related to industrialization” [14].

In practice, the success of industrialization and modernization processes largely depends on the chosen model of public policy and the subsequent consistency of its implementation. The authors of the Declaration perfectly understood that each country can choose its own path of industrialization and subsequent modernization based on the available technological processes and reflected this in the document. “We recognize the diversity of ways towards sustainable development and in this regard recall that each country has the primary responsibility for its own development and the right to determine its own development paths and appropriate strategies” [13, Para. 11].

World practice confirms that blind copying of someone else’s experience does not lead to the expected results of the original. Friedrich Nietzsche framed this thought in the original form inherent only to him, advising not to blindly repeat what has

already been done by others. “Seeing things as similar and making things the same is the sign of weak eyes” [12, p. 163]. However, the creative adaptation of already successful things, taking into account the realities of the country of intended use, has a positive effect. But invariably remain high ethical principles, confirmed by more than two thousand years of the history of Confucian teachings.

Among the many models of industrialization, the most common in world practice, according to UNCTAD, are the two most typical, the differences between which lie in the degree of correlation between structural and fundamental factors and implementation mechanisms. In addition, the socio-economic conditions of the countries of implementation are taken into account as important dominating factors. UNCTAD singles out the catch-up industrialization and the stalled industrialization as the two types of industrialization in developing countries. In the first case, the result is a rapid catch-up development of countries with a reduction or elimination of their lag from the most industrialized countries; and in the second – the conservation and even an increase in the gap in productivity and income from the most developed countries [15, pp. 77–81].

In practice, few countries have succeeded in implementing the catch- up industrialization model. In this series, South Korea has achieved the most impressive successes, having managed to move from low-tech to high-tech production in a short time. In this process, the country’s authorities provided targeted and effective support to national producers at all stages of production transformation based on advanced technologies: abundant lending to high-tech producers on preferential terms, export promotion, all kinds of support for the development of companies based on R&D, provision of special tax incentives for investors, purchasing power support for internal consumers to develop the domestic market, etc.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine for more than 30 years since independence governments have considered their main reformation goal as deregulation of the economy, which, according to the expectations, should secure foreign capital inflow to the country. However, for foreign investors, institutional changes aimed at creating sustainable long-term growth factors are much more important than deregulation. At the same time, the decline in domestic aggregate demand for domestic industrial goods due to increased imports and in the absence of corresponding growth in exports of processing industry was a factor in deepening deindustrialization, as there were expansion of low-productivity and low-paid activities in the primary sector [10, p. 26].

Separately, it should be noted the state support in the ROK for science and education at the university level, which accelerated the creation of new types of goods based on advanced technologies. This, in turn, allowed South Korean companies to significantly expand their export structure and strengthen their presence in the world markets for high-tech products. In parallel with the focus on high-tech exports, growing domestic demand and the related changes in income distribution as a result of increased labor productivity also played a critical role in the rise of South Korea. This allowed the creation of mass production of industrial goods for the domestic market and became an important factor in sustainable and long-term economic growth.

Confucian type modernization

One of the most prominent Korean researchers of the relationship between Confucianism and modernization in Southeast Asia Wei-Bin Zhang pointed out that

In order to understand the past, present and future of the modernization of the Confucian regions, it is important to be aware of the complexity of time and space in the evolution of economic geography. Without spatial and temporal senses it is difficult to analyze how similarity and difference in economic dynamics among these regions has occurred over time and space in modern times [1, p. 166].

It is interesting to note that at the beginning of the 20th century Confucianism was viewed rather as a barrier on the way of economic modernization. However, economic modernization developments in East Asia after the Korean War have been gradually changing attitudes towards Confucianism for the better. During this period countries of the Confucian region has demonstrated much success in the fields of economics, sociology, psychology, ethics, etc. So, in the light of this outstanding progress (with annual average growth rate around 9% from 1953 to 1962) [7, p. 5] views on Confucianism have undergone significant changes and its important role in the comprehensive modernization of the region has been recognized globally.

In fact, Confucianism as a philosophy and teaching has undergone many transformations in the history of human development and long before modern times it became a state ideology in the countries of the Confucian region. Given the success story of the Confucianism, many transition economy countries are supposed to be interested in developing diverse relationships with South Korea and studying Confucianism for better understanding of the counterpart at higher extend. There is now a strong tendency to rely on the Confucian work ethic as an effective tool to motivate people to acquire additional skills and ethical qualities of a person to accelerate modernization processes in the country in question.

In view of the expediency and possibility of expanding trade and economic relations between Ukraine and ROK increasingly important becomes the necessity to study and understand peculiarities of different cultures and beliefs that have formed the mentality of the nation. So, in order to establish effective interaction with South Korea, understanding the essence of Confucianism is ultimately a prerequisite. Incidentally, after World War II, South Korea and the entire Confucian region acted in a similar way. Those countries have studied and creatively applied the experience of industrial modernization of the West in combination with Confucian traditions.

The Confucian countries of East Asia, when they became industrialized and modernized, at the same time became quite developed democracies. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Confucian traditions and principles not only do not contradict general democratic principles, but basically coincide with them. Indeed, many of the Confucian principles correspond significantly to the industrialization and democratization principles. Such principles include building harmonious societal relations on the basis of mutual benefit, submission to talented authority, smoothing out significant differences in profit and eliminating other sharp differences in society. It is especially important to note the comprehensive state support for the education system, formation of deep respect for education and science, as well as public recognition of the merits of representatives of this sphere.

Confucian philosophy and principles are predominantly based on ethical norms and values, which, in turn, have led to the success of democratic principles and industrial modernization of the region. In Confucianism, the role of the state is mainly boils down to the establishment and promotion of a high moral order. In order for the state to earn the trust and respect of its citizens,

Confucius recommended to establish and unswervingly follow four basic norms:

1. Respect people's business;
2. Love people;
3. Tax properly;
4. Operate economically.

Confucius believed that ignoring these principles by the state may well lead to revolution.

In the era of modernization, Confucianism paid special attention to human resource management (HRM), recommending to judge people only by their personal qualities, carefully selecting candidates regardless of the position importance. Consequently, Confucius believed that people should be selected and given work precisely in accordance with their best qualities, entrusting significant positions only to people of appropriate professional qualities and high moral values. Confucius has always been saying that everybody should follow social norms and be dedicated to high moral standards. According to Confucius, regardless of a social status, a man should never give up, must be active and work hard for getting benefits.

In the course of modernization, Confucianism paid special attention to good governance: governments should always have their promises to keep which is a prerequisite of peoples' trust and respect for their leaders. At the same time, Confucius believed that "The common people can be made to follow a path but not to understand it" [16, Analects 8:9, p. 93], since he thought that ordinary men may not have deep minds.

However, Confucius has always supported the idea of educating people and choosing the right people to promote. For good and effective governance Confucius, in his usual structured manner, also recommended to a high level stuff to follow five excellent rules and to avoid four disgusting ones:

5 excellent rules	4 disgusting rules
when a person in authority is beneficent without great expenditure	to put the people to death without having instructed them (this is called cruelty)
when he lays tasks on the people without their repining	to require from the people, suddenly, the full tale of work, without having given them warning (this is called oppression)
when he pursues what he desires without being covetous	to issue orders as if without urgency, at first, and, when the time comes, to insist on them with severity (this is called injury)
when he maintains a dignified ease without being proud	to give pay or rewards to men, and yet to do it in a stingy way (this is called acting the part of a mere official)
when he is majestic without being fierce	

Source: [compiled from 1, pp. 5–8, 10–14, and 39–40].

Generally speaking, Confucius urged, when doing things, to be guided by common sense and practical knowledge based on the moral norms of society. In economic terms he also highly respected hard work and thrift of people as a means of wealth accumulation.

He was a strong opponent of terror as a method of governing people and characterized the adherents of terror stupid and evil. In his deliberations Confucius developed a type of a “social organization” with special HRM pattern where everybody does a job as per talent and ability and remunerated accordingly. However, he was persistently noting that nobody should extract profits if the business distresses others. In his economic teaching Confucius promoted the idea that people should be allowed to do what they are best equipped to do and what was most attractive for them justifying Government interference in case of necessity

only. According to Confucius, the people's standard of living should be the top priority for the government even higher than military strength of the country.

So, Confucius tried to design an economic paradigm with special mass behavior on the basis of high ethics with guaranteed level of economic protection. For this purpose, one of his main recommendations to governments was to maintain soft tax policy vis-à-vis private business for people could take care of themselves and maintain the state at the same time. Supporting the necessity of adequate living standards for the people, Confucius advocated the idea that remuneration for hard labor, especially for skilled one, should be sufficient to meet basic socio-economic needs of the worker's family. This approach largely mirrors the contemporary "gainful employment" approach.

Since Confucius' era contemporary economic realities has changed dramatically, became so technologically complicated and multifaceted that economic experts are cognizant in their specific spheres only. True, almost two and a half thousand years ago Confucius couldn't foresee and even imagine scientific, economic, social, political, and other developments of modern life. However, we cannot but agree with Wei-Bin Zhang, that "Confucius lost neither his practical sense nor his high standards in his teachings" [1, p. 87].

As a state ideology and a way of life Confucian teaching has been accepted by a large region of East Asia, although its countries demonstrated visible dissimilarities and variations in their economic and political evolution.

Sure, it would be hyperbole to say that Confucianism is a witchcraft stick that can settle all the arising issues of modernization at one fling. As rightly stresses Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University and a Member of the Korean National Academy of Sciences Kyong-Dong Kim:

It is mainly in the task of recasting the minds and hearts of humankind and reforming social life that it can make a significant difference. By doing so, it could cause the development process itself to become more humane and conducive to improving the lives and enhancing the happiness of people and communities [17, p. 214].

It should be noted that economic development and modernization process of the Confucian region countries have always been under significant influence of Western market economies but were able to preserve Confucian features. Among them there was one of the main Confucian economic prescriptions – to maintain economic freedom with minimum state interference. Moreover, Confucian spirit was retained not only in economic, but also in political life of the Confucian region countries.

Notwithstanding the Confucian modernization spirit in Korea, introduction of innovations and new technologies, however, required targeted importation from outside, basically from the United States, which developed their own modernization strategy for developing countries. In doing so, Korea retained its cultural peculiarities and ability to effectively adopt the imported innovations to its modernization and its development programs.

East Asian countries also became the object of this strategy application and demonstrated unusually high growth rates especially in 1960s. At the time, however, the prevailing view of the role of Confucian traditions in such an economic miracle of the region was rather negative. Moreover, before those countries started demonstrating high pace of economic modernization, namely Confucian traditions in the countries of East Asia were viewed by many Western intellectuals as the main reason for underdevelopment and poverty in the region. The influence of this

point of view was so significant that local academics began to share similar views.

However, not the entire intellectual community was in favor of Western-style modernization at the cost of sacrificing Confucian traditions and suggested at least reverberating the traditions in the course of industrial modernization. But most believed that if modernization requires abandoning some of their own traditions, they should agree with this, because the stakes were too high. Thus, at that stage the society positively responded to the Western culture indoctrination “to escape chronic poverty and restore national pride” [17, p. 4]. So, in South Korea, the doors to Western culture and Western-style economic modernization have opened wide.

The economic miracle, especially its cultural motive forces, was also widely discussed in the West. One of the most authoritative experts in this field, a British researcher and a reputable Sinologist Roderick MacFarquhar made, probably, a very non-trivial comment on this matter. He expressed serious concern about the possibility that the Confucian heirs posed “the greatest threat to Western supremacy” and even advised that the West might have to “surrender to equality” rather than risk a cultural conflict with them, considering the possibility of the formation of a Confucian bloc [18, pp. 67–68].

Modernization of the East Asia has clearly demonstrated prevailing convergence processes between East and West, their complementarity and mutuality. The region has managed to preserve Confucian principles alongside with adapting some institutions and norms of the Western civilization model. Still notwithstanding notable differences between various East Asia Confucian regions, they retained Confucius’ values of ethical and economic code of conduct. In a concentrated form these processes were subtly characterized by Wei-Bin Zhang, who pointed out that

this tendency to converge results from the fact that these regions tend to apply similar political and economic principles. I would suggest that these principles are mainly Confucian in a 'visionary sense'. Successful industrialization of the Confucian regions is characterized by strong government leadership, strict competition in education, a disciplined work force, and principles of equality (in the Confucian sense) measured in terms of merit and frugality [1, pp. 197–198].

Confucian countries like South Korea, having achieved high industrialization and modernization level, began energetic and rapid introduction and development of democracy. Accumulated wealth and improved living standards in Korea allowed to increase budgetary allocations for the development of science, education, medicine, which in its turn led to a more conscious, grounded, and democratic voting approach in selecting socially acceptable leaders of the country.

The modernization results and other achievements, including democratic developments, made an impetus for the scholars in the West to attend to Confucianism as a source of useful thoughts and concepts, including culture, which rapidly led the East Asian region to outstanding economic results. So, it was a real upheaval in the minds of intellectuals concerning the role of Confucianism in the modernization process. As Kyong-Dong Kim formulated that

This indeed is a curious turnabout in the intellectual disposition toward this very same traditional element, namely Confucianism, and its role in modernization, from a definitively negative view in the early years of the initial economic take-off in this region to one clearly ascribing to it a positive contribution to modernization or at least some meaningful linkage with it [17, p. 9].

Thus, Confucianism and Confucian values were returned to their rightful place in the process of modernization and began to be considered the principal positive factor in the process of overall modernization of Korea and other East Asian countries.

Given the wide spread of Confucianism in Asian countries and high authority of moral values of this doctrine, sometimes Confucian values are generally associated with Asian Values. Kyong-Dong Kim categorized the values which are unequivocally viewed to be important factors positively contributing to the success of industrial modernization in East Asia.

The list of categories is subdivided into five major sectors and contains rather detailed reasoning. The authors have limited themselves to an abbreviated consideration of these categories in accordance with the purposes of the book.

1. Individual Behavioral Inclinations:
 - frugality, savings;
 - asceticism, delayed gratification of needs;
 - work ethic;
 - sense of order.
2. Social Values Guiding Individual Behavior:
 - education for moral improvement;
 - general commitment to education;
 - high educational aspirations.
3. Principles of Social Organization:
 - developing collectivism;
 - importance of family;
 - harmonious human relations based on affective network;
 - reconciliation over confrontation and hostility;
 - importance of discipline for stable social order and security;
 - soft authoritarianism;
 - hierarchical order by age and seniority.

4. Political Culture:

- conception of the state as the extended family;
- function of the state as the leader and guide;
- role of government officials as leaders of the populace;
- political leader as moral example;
- politics for the people's wellbeing and for promotion of national interest.

5. Worldviews:

- ecological naturalism, harmony and unity with nature;
- vague distinction of sacred and secular;
- education for status achievement and upward mobility [17, pp. 10–17].

Thus, despite its enduring importance, Confucianism has experienced a series of ups and downs in the recent history of the region's modernization. Moreover, there is a direct link between economic success and the role of Confucianism in the works of researchers and politicians, and in the event of an economic crisis, critics primarily blame Confucianism.

As fresh examples of the opinion volatility about the role of Confucianism in the economy in general and modernization in particular, the global crises of 1997 and 2008 could be mentioned. Among the critics were such world renowned researchers as Francis Fukuyama and Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman. However, the criticism of Confucianism gradually subsided, since these were the countries of East Asia, and South Korea first of all, which coped faster than others with the mentioned crisis phenomena.

Regarding the “waves of criticism” of Confucianism, one should always pay attention to the fact that Confucianism in the region and in South Korea is not a frozen ideology but has changed over time at different stages of the development of society. Accordingly, the impact of Confucianism on the process

of modernization was modified, depending on the technological state of the country's productive capabilities and the time of its modernization. Thus, the "waves of criticism" of Confucianism, especially in modern history, once again proved that any theoretical construction should be treated with creative flexibility, always taking into account the context of socio-economic development. Based on this, as noted Kim Kyong-Dong,

Once the East Asian societies had gained some clout on the global stage, they started to look back on their history and found that their waning traditions were something to be cherished and respected, not to be dismissed and discarded. ...one's own culture is a valuable asset of which to be proud, and thus Asian Values discourse is meant to support this assertive attitude toward the supplier hitherto of modernity, the West [17, p. 28].

It is advisable for Ukraine to adopt a similar approach to the peculiarities of its historical development, namely, not to reject or consign to oblivion certain periods of its history, but to creatively study them and flexibly apply useful elements. As history in general and the history of South Korea testifies, that a balanced and civilized approach is always more appropriate and beneficial.

Global competitiveness dynamics

The Republic of Korea does not have many natural resources, but it has important intellectual arsenal and has been utilizing it effectively. Since the 1960s, the country's leadership has been purposefully developing critical sectors of the national industry. For example, if before that such firms as Samsung and Hyundai were not large companies, now they are known all over the world. In the same way, South Korea has developed and modernized a

number of important industries – automotive, shipbuilding, electronics, etc. Today, these South Korean industries compete successfully in world markets.

Successful modernization of the South Korean economy over the past quarter century has propelled the country even higher in the tightly compressed global competitiveness ranking where Japan has been one of the leaders in the ranking. Japan has long been considered almost the country's benchmark in terms of competitiveness and other economic indicators. The 2019 Global Competitiveness Report contains the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for over 200 countries and territories. The data of the Report show that Japan maintains its high position in the list, while South Korea is steadily climbing up the list of the GCI [19, pp. 11, 15].

In 2019, South Korea also overtook Japan in such an important indicator as the current gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP); so, in Japan this figure was \$44,585, and in Korea – \$45,042. Thus, according to such an important indicator, South Korea outstripped Japan and entered the top twenty countries in the world [20].

In addition to the above mentioned impressive domestic indicators, Korea has achieved significant success in external indicators. So, if in 1990 the export and import of South Korea accounted for 24% and 31% of the same indicators of Japan, then in 2020 they increased to 80% and 74%, respectively [21].

However, the growth of the most important economic indicators in comparison with one of the traditionally leading economies of the Asian region and of the world does not at all reassure the representatives of the Korean industry. For example, the director of the International Relations Department of the Korean Federation of Industry said that there is still a lag in investment opportunities and competitiveness in the sphere of

science and technology. To bridge these gaps, strategic support for R&D of South Korean industrial enterprises will be strengthened [21].

The future of Confucian values

It is surprising that throughout all the periods of modernization of the East Asian region, in many countries there were enough researchers and politicians questioning the positive role of the Confucian teaching in this process.

Nevertheless, even during periods of open criticism of the role of Confucianism in the modernization of the region and its individual countries, questions arose about the role and place of Confucian ideas and values in the future paths of civilization development. In fact, critics tried to reproduce the influence of Confucian ideas in the process of modernization in the past on the processes of modernization in the assumed forms of future civilizations. Moreover, this was done in relation not only to the Asian region, but also on a global scale.

In their attempts to foresee the role and compatibility of Confucian ideas in future forms of human development, researchers have tended to focus on the following four elements, which could be relevant to important subunit of the future society:

- democracy and political culture;
- market economic development;
- law and legal system;
- education.

In this regard, it is worth agreeing with the opinion of Kim Kyong-Dong, who believes that it is not yet advisable to enter into any discussion about

the relative merits and shortcomings of each of the works appearing mainly in the form of book chapters or journal articles. Glancing at the above list of those selected to be of some relevance and meaning for the sake of improving human conditions in the various spheres of politics, economy, law, and society at large, one notices the possible hazard of unjustifiably arguing for affinity or compatibility [17, pp. 39–40].

Yet, long-term historical experience of the impact of Confucian ideas and provisions on modernizing the countries of the region and, in particular, Korea, shows that Confucianism, as a cultural tradition, had an important influence during extremely complex transformations at all phases of modernization. Confucianism has become the basis for the East Asia region-specific management practices and ideology of management [22].

In its ethical teachings, modern Confucianism emphasizes such norms and virtues as thrift, diligence, hard work, self-sacrifice, discipline, which are essentially the components of the market economy and modern ideas of post-GDP economy [23, pp. 3–23]. The modern world is going through a period of radical social transformations. Nowadays, in the discourse on the future role of Confucianism, the main concern of intellectuals is the problem of finding sources of philosophical thought that will help providing effective moral guidance for the normalization of human life in an extremely unstable period of radical transformations, due to which people around the world suffer from constant maladjustment.

In September 2008, the First World Congress of Confucianism was held in the Chinese city of Qufu, in the homeland of Confucius. More than 170 scholars and experts from 22 countries and regions of the world took part in the event. The agenda of the three-day congress included issues related to the modern interpretation of

Confucianism and its current significance. According to the participants, the study of Confucianism contributes to the unification of traditional and modern values, contributes to the organic fusion of the cultures of the East and West. Moral and ethical standards put forward by Confucius thousands of years ago can make a noticeable positive contribution to the cohesion of humanity. In modern society, Confucianism can serve not only as a spiritual mentor, but also play a worthy role in promoting world peace, improving the moral qualities of mankind, the general prosperity of world culture and the reconciliation of world religious movements.

The participants were also unanimous that Confucianism is gaining more and more popularity in the world, becoming one of the important symbols of the culture of the East in the treasury of world history and culture. As more and more economic and other challenges emerge on the road to a new international order, it becomes more urgent to create a more harmonious world community based on values tested for millennia [24].

In the 21st century, in order to smooth over the most acute problems of our time, Confucian ideas could become the most realistic social philosophy for perception in countries of various formations and dominant religious traditions. As a centuries-old system of great ideas, the philosophy of Confucianism, abstracting from religious signs, presents a powerful and understandable system of moral and ethical principles applicable to any society with any religious tradition.

Although Confucianism as a set of ideas had been created two and a half thousand years ago, those ideas were modified and adapted during the civilization progress of mankind and occupied an important place at all stages of its development. Being an inexhaustible storehouse of wise concepts, the philosophy of Confucianism, when applied flexibly, will provide a useful

development tool not only in the current century, but also beyond. Confucius dreamed of a society in which civilized behavior would be quite natural. Such a society can be formed through purposeful and patient efforts of “noble people”, through the conscious and long-term teaching. Thus, Confucianism can be applied practically in many countries on different continents for the democratic progress of human civilization.

Conclusion

Thus, unprecedented in the modern history rate of economic development of South Korea is still widely analyzed and discussed by international financial organizations and individual scholars.

The Republic of Korea as a country of centuries-old and systemic Confucian tradition, at the same time, is a leader in the contemporary economic modernization in Asia. The influence of Confucianism as a philosophy of life, value system and practical ethics in the country is extremely high. Consequently, any discussion about Korea’s modernization should start with a discussion about Confucianism, because even in contemporary Korea the Confucian tradition remains intact to a greater extent than in neighboring East Asian countries.

In addition, the unique synthesis of values of the two most competitive systems of work ethic in the modern world – Confucianism and Protestantism – has amplified the phenomenal success of South Korean modernization.

It is the South Korean experience of the effective synthesis of Confucian and Western values in socio-political and economic modernization which is of practical use for Ukraine when implementing bilateral political, economic, technological, educational, and cultural cooperation. That is especially evident in

building up the national economy's international competitiveness in the areas of structural reforms, improving corporate management, and combating corruption.

East Asian countries consistently adhere to their traditions, do not reject, but respect and develop them. Your own culture is a valuable asset that you can be proud of and rely on in your all-round historical development. It is advisable for Ukraine to adopt a similar approach to the peculiarities of its historical development, namely, not to reject or consign to oblivion certain periods of its history, but to creatively study them and flexibly apply useful elements. As history in general, and the history of South Korea especially, testifies, a balanced and civilized approach is always more appropriate and beneficial.

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Chapter 6

CONFUCIANISM AND PROTESTANTISM: PROSPECTS FOR THE EAST-WEST TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL CONVERGENCE¹⁰

Today only the two macro-civilization systems in the world – the Western (mainly based on the Roman-Germanic heritage) and Northeast Asian (formed under the powerful civilizational influence by China and Confucian values) comprise the world-system core of states with most competitiveness, technological progress, and economic dynamics. Between those systems, in the northern and central parts of the Eurasian megacontinent, there is the post-Soviet space that, since the Migration Period (IV–

¹⁰ This Chapter presents the English version of the published article revised and completed by the author:

Piliaiev, Igor (2020) Konfutsianstvo i protestantyzm: perspektyvy transtsyvilizatsiynoyi konverhentsiyi “Skhid – Zakhid” [Confucianism and Protestantism: Prospects for the East-West Transcivilizational Convergence] *Ekonomichna teoriya [Economic Theory]*. No. 3, pp. 65–82 (in Ukrainian). doi.org/10.15407/etet2020.03.065;

Piliaiev Igor (2020) Konfutsianstvo i protestantizm: perspektyvy transtsyvilizatsionnoy konvergensii “Vostok – Zapad”. *Ekonomicheskaya teoriya*. No. 3, pp. 65–82 (in Russian). doi.org/10.15407/etet2020.03.065.

VI AD), and especially the Mongol invasion (the Horde), has been a zone of the historical East-West rivalry and now plunged into the systemic value and socioeconomic crisis.

In the light of the latest achievements of synergetics reviving, already at the scientific level, the holistic worldview (previously inherent to the mythology and religion) based on universal regularities and patterns [1; 2; 3; 4], the issue of trans-civilizational dialogue and integration looks particularly vital. This, in turn, determines relativism of dichotomous thinking characteristic of the bipolar and the post-bipolar worlds.

In view of the foregoing, the purpose of this Chapter is a comparative analysis of the social and value foundations of Confucianism and Protestantism, as religious and ethical systems inherent in the contemporary “core” of the world economic and innovative dynamics – East Asia and the West, determining the place and role of these religious teachings in the prospects of the East-West transcivilizational convergence.

The Present State of the Issue Development

Despite the huge amount of scientific literature devoted to the social mission of Confucianism and Protestantism in the modern world, their innovative and modernization potential, the research problem outlined above, with the exception of certain aspects of the work by Francis Fukuyama [5], published a quarter of a century ago and written from the standpoint of what seemed then unshakable triumph of neoliberal globalism, did not find proper coverage and appropriate development in social sciences¹¹. At the

¹¹ Victor Tarasevich in his recent work on the socio-evolutionary types of ancient Eastern civilizations points to the “‘noticeable’ grains of Calvinist Westernness” in Confucianism [4, p. 47], in particular China’s tendency to “‘weigh’ institutions on the ‘scales’ of Pragmatism” [4, p. 53].

same time, Max Weber's well-known thesis [6, p. 42] about two opposite types of rationality in Confucianism and Puritanism¹², as, respectively, "*adaptation* to the world" (with the absence of pathos to professional work and unlimited enrichment), which hinders the development of capitalism, among Confucians, and "*domination* over the world" (through relentless capitalization and effective rational transformation) among the "tools of God"-Puritans already in the last quarter of the 20th century was recognized by leading Western and Asian sociologists as very conditional, historically limited and outdated [7, p. 99; 8, pp. 1–2]. It should be emphasized that, firstly, due to insufficiently deep acquaintance with neo-Confucian philosophy [8, p. 5], Weber erroneously identified the Confucian ideal of a noble person with an aristocrat alien to professionalism, and not with an active man of knowledge. Secondly, Weber himself was convinced that many of the features of traditional Chinese society (for example, contempt for merchants) were "products of purely historically determined cultural influence [6, p. 28]." Therefore, he did not at all dispute the possibility of activating those social and mental qualities of Confucianism that are capable of ensuring the effective modernization of China and other countries of Confucian culture (for example, the absence in China of various monopolies that prevented the circulation of various objects of property in the West) [6, p. 42].

Among relatively recent works, one can single out an article by the Russian philosopher of economics Marina Fomina [9], dedicated to comparing the economic ethics of Protestantism and Confucianism. In it, however, the author baselessly antagonizes these religions, accusing Protestantism of admitting the "ontological

¹² Anglo-American version of Protestant Calvinism, which became in the XVIII–XIX centuries the most influential religious teaching in the United States and in many ways laid the foundations of American ethics, values, and cultural traditions.

nature of evil” in the nature of not only man, but also God, of completely suppressing the sensual nature of man by rationality, of “ontological damnation” of labor and its “psychological instability” in Protestant society, as the reason for “the transfer of all production in the world to the East [9, p. 96].” At the same time, Fomina significantly diminishes the rationalistic nature of Confucianism [9, p. 95]. Moreover, the author reduces the Confucian ideal to the level of the “average person” [9, p. 93], while for Confucius and the Confucians such an ideal is the “noble person”, embodying the principle of “the Mean”, i.e., measure and harmony, living in harmony with the laws of Heaven. Thus, Fomina is unable to explain either the fact of the Protestant West’s leadership at least over the past two centuries, in the economic, scientific and technological progress of mankind, or the consistent rationalism of the modernization strategies of the East Asian Tigers and China, or the colossal scale of cooperation and integration that the Protestant and Confucian worlds have achieved in such areas as industry, finance, trade, informatics, etc., especially in such epicenters of intercultural interaction between East and West as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore.

The Historical Background

Meanwhile, the mutual influence, interpenetration of values, civilizational and cultural orientations is inherent in Eurasia both by definition (in fact, its very name implies an asymmetric balance of two different wings of the continent) and historically. It is known that during the Migration Period, the borders of “political Asia” reached the territory of modern Switzerland (the Avar Khaganate of the 5th–6th centuries, founded by Attila), and in the 8th century – the territory of modern France (Arab conquests).

At the same time, Christianity (in its Nestorian version) penetrated China as early as 635 and was received very favorably by the government [10]. Various confessions of Christianity are now widespread in such countries of Confucian culture as China, South Korea, and Singapore. China and South Korea have a multi-million Protestant population: according to various estimates, from 60 to 100 million Chinese [11] and about 10 million South Korean Protestants, or about 20% of the total population of the Republic of Korea [12]. Notably, many contemporary Chinese see Christianity as an inspiration for their efforts to achieve social justice [11]. At the same time, many Chinese and South Korean Christians are well acquainted with Confucian teachings.

It should be noted not only traditional tolerance, but also the actual multi-confessionalism of representatives of the Confucian culture, who often visit, along with the shrines of Confucianism, also Taoist, Buddhist, Shinto (in Japan) temples, shamanistic shrines, etc. A prominent American sociologist of Chinese descent Ch'ing-k'un Yang emphasized the political role of Confucianism, in combination with other traditional religions of China, not only to maintain peace and stability in the state, but also to promote the overdue social transformations [13].

Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, the modernization potential and mental and value compatibility of the Western (especially Protestant) and Confucian worlds are apparently much higher¹³ than those of the Western and post-Soviet-Eurasian (the arenas of traditional competition between East and West).

An outstanding semiotician and cultural historian, a member of the Estonian Academy of Sciences Yuri Lotman pointed to the binary nature of consciousness intrinsic to the Russian Orthodox culture which is manifested in the justice/mercy dichotomy, while in Western culture it is balanced by the third, intermediate reality

¹³ A high degree of their commonality was pointed out by Fukuyama [5].

of law situated halfway between mercy and justice [14, p. 144]. Such a ternary nature¹⁴ of the Western culture has a match in Confucianism – the Doctrine of the Mean (“Golden Mean”). The latter, according to Confucius, is not only a virtue of the highest order and a key principle of human life, but also the basis for successful work, life, health, and wisdom necessary to correct various vices. This is a means for the growth of self-awareness, self-education, and self-improvement of a person, which, ultimately, allows you to achieve perfection. As sinologist Vladimir Malyavin notes:

The way of life and mentality of the Chinese is characterized by a certain all-encompassing and, in its own way, very stable balance of the monetary economy, the labor process and the experience of life as such [15, p. 24].

Perhaps, since the time of classical Greece, nowhere in Europe has there been such a harmonious balance between money, labor, and man.

The global survey on the nature and predictive power of preferences among population conducted in 2015 by University of Bonn, the Center for the Economics of Human Development and the Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Global Working Group (HCEO) of the University of Chicago reveals that such personality traits as self-restraint, patience, readiness to take risks and meet external challenges have a strong correlation rather with the dominant societal ethics than with certain ethnos or race. In particular, in South and East Asia people showed up to be “rather risk averse and impatient, except for the Confucian countries (China, Japan, South Korea)”, while the country-level analysis in

¹⁴ The term was proposed by Dmitry Uzlaner [16].

Western and “Neo” Europe (the post-communist Central and Eastern part of Europe) showed that vast majority of populations are relatively patient, like in the Confucian East [17]. Ch’ing-k’un Yang, who was closely familiar with Chinese society, showed that the main reasons why Qing China (1644–1911) lagged behind the West in industrial and technological development were rooted not in Confucian religious and ethical values, but in the then structure of Chinese society, which favored the socio-political dominance of educated officials and restrained challenges to their status from wealthy entrepreneurs [13, p. 80]. This became more and more evident with the successful socio-economic modernization of Confucian states (societies) in East and Southeast Asia, when the reform of traditional social structures caused rapid economic growth (the phenomenon of the Asian “economic miracle”). Yang noted the widespread cult of profit, conscientiously acquired wealth, the family, corporate and social cohesion in traditional Chinese society [13, p. 78–79].

Unlike European medieval Christianity, Confucianism never religiously condemned the desire to get rich as a sin of greed, subject to the reliability and good faith of contractual economic relations. Confucian doctrine and the traditional imperial socio-political order strongly condemned only speculative enrichment through trade. The profession of a merchant (merchant) was despised as incompatible with philanthropy, justice and nobility. Similar to Protestantism’s condemnation of gambling winners [18, pp. 175–176], merchants were seen as setting a bad example in acquiring wealth. One of the most serious restrictions until the 14th century was the prohibition of merchants from participating in special examinations for a degree that opened the way to public service [19]. However, already from the IX–X centuries in the official Confucian ideology, there was a trend towards a gradual weakening of social restrictions for merchants. Thus, the

philosopher Liu Zong-yuan (773–819) argued in one of his essays that “trade can be morally acceptable if it is well organized and far-sighted,” since “all problems stem only from myopic petty greed and unfair competition,” and the main representative of neo-Confucianism Zhu Xi (1130–1200) considered commercial profit to be quite acceptable if it is shared with other people (Danshin, 2013. P. 28–29).

The accelerated development of commodity-money relations during the period of the Qing Empire (1644–1911) led to the gradual discrediting of the theory of the “Four Public Occupations” adopted by the Confucians from ancient times, which placed merchants on one of the lowest levels in the hierarchy of traditional Chinese society, and to the convergence of the merchant professional ethics with the basic values and requirements of Confucianism [20, p. 31]. By the end of the 19th century, as the American anthropologist Donald DeGlopper notes, “the line between merchants and scholar-officials in many Chinese cities was thin or vague”, there was an interpenetration of the leadership of merchants and bureaucratic structures [21, p. 172]. As for other spheres and forms of economic activity, including large economic enterprises, Confucianism traditionally treated them positively.

Like Confucianism, Protestantism essentially provided person with the matrix of rationalized behavioral actions, desacralizing and demystifying human activity aimed at changing natural and social environment. At the same time, by imposing on the “inner man”, who is aware of “opaqueness” for himself, an epistemological matrix of a strict “worldview order”, Protestantism redirected the energy of the individual and communitarian subject from introvert wandering through irrational “darkness” to an optimistic transformation of the outside world.

Protestantism created a new work ethic, a religiously based doctrine of the virtue of work, the need to work conscientiously

and diligently. Max Weber rightly substantiated the economic success of the Protestant states by the fact that the work ethic extends there not only to the bulk of the population, but also to the ruling groups and entrepreneurs. In contrast to the communist ideas about labor, for Protestantism, primarily Puritanism, “not labor as such, but only rational activity within the framework of one’s profession is pleasing to God [22, pp. 189–190].” Under this condition, any work is revered in Protestantism, regardless of its cost and qualification, wage arrears and cruelty towards subordinates are prohibited – those features that strikingly distinguish Protestant countries, for example, from post-communist countries of the Orthodox or Islamic tradition, and even from Catholic ones such as of Mediterranean Europe and Latin America¹⁵.

Distinctive in this regard is the recent referendum in Switzerland held on June 5, 2016¹⁶. Half-Protestant Swiss population has voted decisively against a state-provided unconditional “basic income” of SFr 2,500 per adult a month: 68 per cent of voters rejected the respective public initiative which had also been strongly opposed by the Swiss government, and only 23 per cent favored the idea of minimum income, regardless of the recipients’ wealth or whether they worked [23]. Obviously, the Protestant ethic played an important role in this outcome of the referendum, which continues to largely determine the value-motivational orientations (aspirations) of at least about half of Swiss citizens.

¹⁵ At the same time, as David Landes notes regarding the realities of the second half of the 16th century, throughout Catholic Europe, secular life was revered, and manual labor was despised. Moreover, in Spain crafts and occupations in industry and agriculture have long been especially associated with despised minorities such as Jews and Muslims [18, p. 173].

¹⁶ In support of the referendum, 100,000 signatures were collected, as required by Swiss law.

It is noteworthy that among the EU countries where a model of “crony” capitalism¹⁷ is widespread (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania) [24, p. 12], one cannot find countries with a strong Protestant tradition.

The Protestant society in general “manifests a widespread desire to improve life, to do better, to innovate, and to become more productive” [25, pp. 343–344]. It is organically open to change, to get more perfect and modernized.

It can therefore be concluded that all modern Western values of secular thinking were already in the bud in the Reformation. And even if we assume that, as the South African economic historian of the British origin Hector Menteith Robertson pointed out, that majority of real capitalists during the Reformation and much later are quite secular people who are generally far from religion and not consider their daily activities as the fulfillment of a religious vocation [26, p. xiii–xiv], all the same, this does not negate the exceptional influence that the Reformation and Protestantism had on the formation of a system of rational secular, including socio-ethical, values of the West from modern times to the present day¹⁸.

An exceptional ability of Protestantism, like Confucianism, to arrange earthly life, competitiveness, rationalism, healthy pragmatism, ability to further reform, modernization determined the leading role of its ethical foundations and motivations in the

¹⁷ The key feature of crony capitalism is “an enduring relationship between big business and the political class that puts their own interests before those of society” [24, p. 4].

¹⁸ It is noteworthy that in the OECD Income Index indicating households’ incomes for 36 member countries, out of the first 12 positions in the ranking, nine are occupied by countries with a predominantly or very significant Protestant population (USA, Switzerland, UK, Iceland, Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden), i.e., the overwhelming majority [27], although about a quarter less than in the aggregated OECD Better Life Index [28]. This indicates, in our opinion, a significant social orientation of Protestant culture towards the moral and value component of human life, increased attention to issues of social cohesion, cultural integration, legal, institutional, moral (solidarity), and environmental protection of citizens.

development of both post-Westphalian Western society and globalized humanity as a whole.

Already in the Age of Enlightenment, Protestant thinkers see the fundamental commonality of Protestantism and Confucianism in recognizing the priority of rational activity of the mind [29, p. XXXIX]. In 1721, Christian von Wolff (1679–1754), an outstanding German philosopher, a follower of Leibniz, at the end of his term as rector of the University of Halle, delivered a solemn speech “On the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese.” In it, he compared Moses, Christ and Muhammad with Confucius, praised the purity of the moral precepts of Confucius, pointing to them as evidence of the power of the human mind to achieve moral truth through their own efforts [29, p. XXXIX]. One of the Founding Fathers of the United States Benjamin Franklin regarded Confucius as his example [30]. The following fact can be cited as an example of the reverse influence of the social ethics of Protestant thinkers on the ideological modernization of Confucian society: a famous American political economist Henry George (1839–1897), who found Georgism – the political-economic doctrine attempting to integrate economic efficiency with social justice – and sparked several reform movements of the Progressive Era in the USA, well influenced the first president of China Sun Yat-sen [31].

The freedom of earthly secular institutions and earthly activities is balanced in Protestantism by the severity of the spirit and mores. Meanwhile, Confucianism, as well as the khans of the Mongol Empire, who were in the zone of influence of the Confucian civilization, preaching strict subordination of subjects to absolutist political power and power hierarchy, at the same time allows a wide range of spiritual and religious freedom, religious tolerance, not only ideological, but also confessional pluralism which was not characteristic of Protestantism until

modern times. It is noteworthy that Protestant thinkers condemned spiritual freedom as a manifestation of “Mongolism”. Thus, the prominent German philosopher of the XIX century, Max Stirner, considered the forerunner of Friedrich Nietzsche, existentialism, postmodernism, and individualist anarchism, wrote:

To the Mongoloid age belong the invasions of the Huns and Mongols, up to the Russians. ... To want to win freedom for the spirit is Mongolism; freedom of the spirit is Mongolian freedom, freedom of feeling, moral freedom [32].

Therefore, the Western freedom of spirit, according to Stirner, has the “Mongolian”, i.e., Asian genetics.

Another quality cultivated by Protestants and directly related to their understanding of freedom is law-abiding. In this, Protestantism, as a religious and ethical message of modernization, largely converges with the ancient tradition of Confucianism. Both Confucianism and Protestantism are characterized by rationally motivated respect for persons and symbols of state power¹⁹.

¹⁹ Here are two typical examples:

- the Calvinist northern provinces of the Netherlands, only 15 years after the start of the uprising against Spanish domination and the subsequent war with the Spanish expeditionary forces, adopted the Act of Abjuration (1581) – a legal document which proclaimed that king Philip II of Spain had not fulfilled his obligations to Netherlands and therefore was no longer considered the legitimate king in their territories;
- the rupture of the earlier “fraternal” relations between the USSR and the PRC was largely caused by the disregard by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee headed by him of the basics of Confucian ethics implying ritual reverence for the status of the ruler (including the former), despite the critical assessment of the latter’s qualities and actions. The “Rubicon” in bilateral relations was crossed at the end of October 1961, when, having learned about the forthcoming decision of the XXII Congress of the CPSU on the removal of Stalin’s body from the Mausoleum, the Chinese delegation headed by Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhou Enlai (a descendant in the 33rd generation of the founder of neo-Confucianism Zhou Dunyi) left the congress early in protest, after which Soviet-Chinese relations became openly hostile.

At the same time, with all the positive, progressive qualities of Protestantism and Protestant ethics, their global significance for all civilizations, one cannot ignore the utilitarianism of Protestantism, its neglect of the contemplative, i.e. deeply philosophical and aesthetic aspects of being, as pointed out among the Western intellectual elite, for example, by George Santayana and The Bloomsbury Group intellectuals (philosophers, writers and artists) in the first half of the 20th century.

As Oleksiy Kuznetsov emphasizes, “The main and integral characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism is **“the primacy of commercial interests,** which qualitatively distinguishes it from other models of socio-economic development... [33, p. 388].” And “the driving factor of socio-economic development is the desire for the commercialization of all spheres of activity of society without exception in order to maximize profits [33, 389].”

According to Alexander Shmorgun, one cannot discount the emergence in Great Britain itself of a powerful socio-romantic spiritual opposition not only in relation to the utilitarianism and hedonism [the latter is more typical for countries of the Catholic rather than the Protestant tradition – *the authors*] of the classically industrial mode of production, but also to the principles of functioning of modern capitalism. Thanks to this opposition, almost all the outstanding thinkers of India and China of the late 19th – mid-20th centuries (as a rule, those who received an excellent education in Great Britain and other European countries) were able to join the spiritual treasury of European culture not only of the New, but also of the Newest Age. Moreover, representatives of the Western elites of the above type (including prominent representatives of social romance in the United States) not only supported the national leaders of the East and Asia in every possible way, but also sought to introduce and

develop a modern system of European education and enlightenment in the colonies [34].

As posits Fukuyama:

A modern state is generally characterized by the existence of a centralized bureaucracy with direct taxing authority, that seeks to govern impersonally. ... While China laid the groundwork for a modern state already in the 3rd century B.C., the first modern states did not appear in Europe until the 16th century [35].

Sun Yat-sen rightly pointed out that the public service in Great Britain (including the examination system), which became a model for many countries of the world, was in the middle of the 19th century [36, p. 32].

Confucianism and Protestantism: the Competitive Pros and Cons Axiology

A characteristic feature of the countries of Confucian culture is the ability to critically rethink and change the surrounding reality, borrowing the best practices from outside. The father of Singapore's "economic miracle" Lee Kuan Yew even regarded Singapore's British colonial past as an advantage [37]. **During his tenure as the first prime minister of independent Singapore,**

Lee retained the English language and the British legal system in the country, used the experience of the political non-partisanship of the colonial administration, strictly followed the principles of the rule of law, protection of intellectual property, etc. In religious matters, Lee was convinced that Singapore could unite all religions and peoples, except for fundamentalist Islam, since the latter, in his opinion, "separates itself from all others and pulls back into the 7th century [37]."

In this regard, it deserves special attention that at the stage of “administrative democracy” in the Republic of Korea, the Sillan collectivism based on Confucianism and communal tradition was opposed to the ideal of the legal Western state.

From the viewpoint of competitive qualities in today’s increasingly globalized world, along with the undeniable strengths of Protestantism, it would be fair to note some of its competitive shortcomings: certain exaggeration, at times reaching absolutization, of the role of reason and science; a purely pragmatic approach to life to the detriment of its aesthetic dimension; striving for discreteness, fragmentation; analyticity instead of syncretism and continuum. One should also note herewith a certain idealization by Protestant societies and states of their excellence and superiority over other confessional-value and civilizational communities, their values as a modernization model for the rest of the world.

The ontological problem of Protestantism is that, unlike Confucianism, whose ethics are based on rational justification, i.e., on conviction, the ethic of Protestantism is based on the symbolic foundation of faith. And although faith itself and its postulates come, as it were, from the realities of life itself, nevertheless, the problem remains. The Kantian axiom of “inherent moral law within us” is not always sufficiently effective and convincing, since it is also essentially a subjective-idealistic faith, and not a rational conviction, especially given the growing number of non-religious people in the countries of the Protestant tradition²⁰. Consequently, the arguments of the spiritual “strings” of faith for these people are no longer valid. The process of secularization that is steadily developing in the Western world determines the very understanding of the predominantly Protestant

²⁰ For example, according to the 2011 Estonian census, 54.14% of the country’s inhabitants declared themselves to be non-religious [38].

West as essentially a stronghold of “philosophical and existential overcoming of the religious form of worldview [34, p. 168].” In this regard, the prospects for a rational convergence of Protestantism and Confucianism within the framework of the formation of a rationalistic “living ethics” of global civilization seem very likely, since they give hope to the secularized elites of the Western countries (primarily the Protestant tradition) to maintain global competitiveness in the rapidly renewing world of the future. In this regard, the prospects for a rational convergence of Protestantism and Confucianism within the framework of the formation of a rationalistic “living ethic” of global civilization seem very likely, since they give hope to the secularized elites of the Western countries (primarily the Protestant tradition) to maintain global competitiveness in the rapidly renewing world of the future.

At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries, it became obvious that industrialization combined with the information revolution are the same organic phenomenon of the market economy of the Confucian East, as well as the West. The Confucian East has proved its ability to industrialize by market methods in a globalizing market, in contrast to the autarkic, non-market, mobilization industrialization of the Stalinist USSR or Maoist China. One may consider as a kind of Protestantism in Confucianism the latter’s socio-ethical adaptation (since its radical criticism in the Maoist mainland China followed by the subsequent convergence of Chinese communism and market economy) to modern conditions of developing Chinese society and Confucian civilization overall. The convergent model of socialism “with a Chinese face” and a deeply integrated, highly competitive at a global level market economy progressively develops and improves. China is increasingly returning to its cultural roots, to Confucian ethic with its notions of virtue, of

proper behavior in relations between state and citizens, the principle of good governance, etc. Although the Communist Party of China remains the core of the political system and directs these processes, however, as the well-known Russian Sinologist Vladimir Petrovsky believes, the system itself is consistently moving towards a converged model (“not socialism and not capitalism”), where “communist ideology would not be the dominant element [39]”. Moreover, according to Petrovsky, with the further growth of the middle class in the country and, accordingly, consumer demand, the Chinese economic model will approach the American one [39].

A similar assessment of the Chinese development model is given by the prominent Polish economist Grzegorz Kołodko. He believes that China

is going through a process of gradual merging of social and economic reality with what is called the foundations of capitalism, but capitalism is repelled or even sometimes supplanted by a typical socialist mentality [40, p. 32].

In other words, a phenomenal hybrid is developing, which can be called both capitalist socialism and socialist capitalism, and its qualitative characteristics go beyond the ideological dichotomy of the 20th century and give grounds to speak of a “third way” of not just catching up modernization, but entry, in fierce competition with the US and the collective West, into the global leadership of the 21st century. Such a converged model, fully in line with the Confucian concept of the “Middle Way”, demonstrates its high viability and resistance to global challenges.

A substantial set of economic and social features historically intrinsic to Protestant communities and nations, lately emphasized and systematized by Barry Asmus and Wayne Grudem, like

“Everyone in the nation has freedom to change and adopt newer, more effective means of work and production [25, p. 284]”, “to access useful knowledge, inventions, and technological developments [25, p. 285]”, “to move upward in social and economic status [25, p. 297]”, “to become wealthy by legal means [25, p. 301]”, etc. are nowadays almost equally characteristic for China and the Four Asian Tigers.

The dichotomous understanding of conflictogenity in society in its various strata, diachronic sections, and localizations in fact – through the doctrine of the dualism of the *yin-yang* powers – has been an indispensable element of dialectical constructions in Chinese philosophy, primarily in Taoism and Confucianism, for two and a half thousand years already. Being a fundamental model of everything, the concept of yin-yang explains the universal regularity of the universe: there can be no “final victory”, for there is nothing final, there is no end as such [41]. Hereof, respectively, there is a foundation of morality, moral conduct of man and social order.

According to a prominent American sociologist and orientalist Gilbert Rozman, the basic mental divide between the US thinking and the South Korean thinking was that the former “centered on polarization” while the latter “centered on bridge building, whether to North Korea, China, or Russia” [42]. Hence, for example, high authorities in both South Korea and Japan, the closest US allies in the Far East, emphasize the inexpediency of a confrontational view of the China-US alternative for their countries and prefer to speak out for pursuing cooperation in China’s One Belt, One Road transcontinental project, while trying to counter China’s growing economic, maritime, and geopolitical influence [43].

Confucianism and Protestantism in the Globalizing Perspective

A prominent Ukrainian economist Oleg Bilorus in his conception of the world system of globalism offers three possible scenarios of global development – the noosphere or solidary (in the spirit of ideas by Vladimir Vernadsky, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Nicholas Roerich, Sri Aurobindo et al.), the confrontational (provoking violent international conflicts) and the corporatist (essentially fragmenting the global space into zones controlled by various corporate players). Meanwhile, he does not regard individualism and communitarianism as antipodes but considers their complementarity and mutual enrichment as a requirement of our time [44].

The spiritual pluralism and religious tolerance of Confucianism, combined with a fairly high level of political culture of Confucian societies, including China²¹, in our opinion, are the key to the future success of the socio-political modernization of the PRC and the creation of real prerequisites for the formation of a common dynamic global civilization of the future, based on the convergence of values and achievements of East and West. Obviously, such a civilization will have the quality of the Mean and strive for a balance of Eastern and Western properties [4, pp. 46 and 67].

Pope Benedict XVI suggested turning to the “experience of polyphonic correlation”, which could include different cultures and different types of rationality [46, p. 107]. In our opinion, the normative foundation that can become the subject of intercultural, interreligious communication and universal agreement is the concept of humanity, put forward in the era of the late

²¹ According to the Economist’s 2018 World Democracy Index, China’s political culture index (6.25 on a scale of 10) surpassed that of France (5.63) [45, p. 39].

Enlightenment by Johann Herder [47] and correlating with the Confucian understanding of human's "Golden Mean" between the earthly and the heavenly [4, p. 47], while its practical institutional and legal embodiment is a system of modern universal and European values, principles and standards. Principal among them are pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, and respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals and minorities.

In his program work "Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity" (2004) Samuel Huntington, like some other conservative analysts, as a recipe for saving the United States from disintegration (caused by intra-country ethnic conflicts and the Anglo-Saxon super-ethnos' loss of its basic identity associated with creative activity), proposes the regeneration of precisely the Protestant motivation, however, not on (super) ethnic but on civic principles and meritocratic criteria of social advancement (career) [48]. And here a serious scientific, socio-philosophical problem arises whether Confucianism can work effectively in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial society, or it is effective only in societies with the overwhelming dominance of one ethnic group and one race (as is the case today in all Confucian countries, despite their inherent religious (confessional) pluralism.

According to Jürgen Habermas, post-secular society of the future will be able to overcome Huntington's "clash of civilizations" through the interactive communication, developing practices of "interpretation" of socially important religious concepts from a religious language into a secular one [49, p. 75]." Eastern non-Abrahamic religions, such as Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto in their modern versions adapted to Modernity, like Western forms of dynamically developing Protestantism, Pantheism and post-nonclassical philosophy, represent a powerful foundation for the civilizational interface of the East and the West. Especially favorable for such a dialogue

and mutual perception are the traditional religious tolerance and the actual multi-confessionalism of representatives of the Confucian culture.

As a reflection of these global trends one may see, inter alia, establishing in December 2015 in Seoul the Future Consensus Institute (*Yeosijae*²²) nonprofit research center – a solution-oriented think-tank found by outstanding representatives of the South Korean political elite, big business, and science. Lee Hun-jai, former Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, became the Chairman of the Board of the Institute. Proceeding from the fact that “for the last 30 years, Northeast Asia has been at the core of the transformation of world history” and believing “a new civilization that leaps beyond the current dichotomy between East and West should emerge in the near future [50]”, the newfound institution has started conducting research that is designed to promote the convergence of the accumulated wisdom of the West and the East “to advance the advent of a new civilization [51].”

Speaking in November 2018 in Beijing at the forum jointly organized by the Institute for Sustainable Development Goals of Tsinghua University (widely considered the best university of China and Asia) and the Future Consensus Institute, former UN Secretary General, Chairman of the Boao Forum for Asia (the “Asian Davos”), Ban Ki-Moon urged the audience to “broaden their horizons and enhance their global vision, and actively involve and solve the challenges facing humanity” as well as “to develop a sense of “global citizenship” and to build a sustainable future for humanity with a sense of mission and ethical responsibility [52].” At present, the Future Consensus Institute continues its work with the Chinese, East Asian and global elites to realize the above strategic goals.

²² *Yeosijae* in Korean means “to reflect the times”.

As realities of modern globalization testify, the East-West dichotomy is not antagonistic. On the contrary, the East and the West may and do efficiently interact, enrich each other, converge. Deng Xiaoping's famous guideline and policy of "one country, two systems", initially developed for Taiwan [53] but implemented by the PRC for Hong Kong and Macao, along with the three 2018 Inter-Korea Summits and the first North Korea–United States summit held in Singapore on June 12, 2018, aimed not only at denuclearization but also, in the strategic perspective, at peaceful reunification of Korean Peninsula pose special interest in this regard. Today, the Deng's guideline has acquired a global dimension in the strategy of the Chinese leadership, being expressed in the formula: "One planet, two systems."

Obviously, this implies the development of ways for the future trans-civilizational consensus, which is hardly achievable without settling strategic conflicts on the Korean Peninsula, around Taiwan and the hybrid armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, wherein different value orientations, geopolitical and geo-economic interests of key Eurasian and global actors have collided.

Taking into account that in the coming decades the main centers of the world socio-economic dynamics will be located in the areas of the Protestant and Confucian traditions, it is Protestantism and Confucianism, as the most rationalistic world religions, that can contribute to establishing a dialogue between representatives of the "world core" elites regarding the convergence of civilizations of the East and West into common dynamic civilization of the future.

Our analysis allows us to conclude that the increasingly active appeal of the Chinese party and state leadership to the cultural and value roots of traditional Chinese ethical and religious teachings (primarily Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism) not only does not threaten, but, on the contrary, will contribute to the

growth of rationality and competitiveness of China's global financial and economic leadership institutions.

Implemented in recent decades by several countries and economies of the Confucian tradition, primarily China and the Republic of Korea, the modernization breakthrough necessitates a systematic interdisciplinary study of their experience in socio-economic strategizing and the process of further modernization reforms in Ukraine.

Conclusion

Based on the synergistic interdisciplinary approach, we believe that contradictory diversity of various sociocultural systems will transform into a new integral sociocultural system, a new convergent civilization of the future, combining wisdom, knowledge, values, traditions, sociocultural and political practices of the most socially competitive societies of the East and West.

The study of the possibilities and prospects for the formation of a convergent type of democracy, which would be aimed, in the spirit of Western liberalism, at the progressive expansion of human rights and freedoms, and at the same time, in the Confucian spirit, at the strengthening of world harmony, seems to us a fundamental task of contemporary social sciences.

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Chapter 7

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SOCIETY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ROK AND UKRAINE

The role of religion

Religion has always played an exceptional role in influencing development of a society. Currently, one of the main concerns of intellectual discourses is the search for a philosophy that can become a moral guide for humanity in our unstable time, in order to normalize human life in an era of global transformations, as a result of which people around the world suffer from painful insecurity and maladjustment.²³

Religious teachings in their economic part and state formation actually created a system of religious-economic regulation. In the

²³ The authors believe that **religion** (Latin religare – to bind, unite) is a certain system of views, which includes a set of moral norms, types of behavior, rituals, cult actions that unite people into institutional organizations in accordance with faith. The authors also believe that historically Confucianism has won such a high prestige in countries and regions and has such a significant impact on the development of these countries and territories that it surpasses the influence of a particular religion in developed countries.

sacred books there are direct indications of the forms and methods of such regulation, which affect the production and distribution of national product. These standards determine the nature and possibility of property ownership, affect pricing, and contain recommendations for all areas of economic life.

Thus, the number of Christians at the time of the origin of the religion was a few dozen people; today this figure reaches $\frac{1}{4}$ of humanity – almost 2 billion. The number of Muslims at the beginning of the preaching of Islam was a few dozen people, today – 20% of the population, or almost 1,5 billion people. Buddhism and Shinto are practiced by 11% of humanity – more than 700 million people, Hinduism and Confucianism – 7.5% each. In general, about 80 countries of the world consider a certain religion to be the state one; a significant number of countries recognize 2 or more religions as official, and the number of these states fluctuates [1, pp. 21–22].

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright believes that

Religion is a powerful driving force and the nature of its impact on the world depends primarily on what feelings it inspires and what actions it stimulates. The task of leaders is to harness the full potential of religion, through which people can be united and, if possible, avoid situations where religion becomes a source of discord [2, p. 88].

After leaving the post of the Secretary of State, Albright has spoken many times about a pivotal role of religion in foreign policy and related discussions.

She always emphasizes that religion is no less important than economics or politics for international relations, relevant negotiations, or military operations. If the religion factor is ignored,

the results can be far from planned. As a dramatic case she mentions the US military operation in Iraq which demonstrated the limits of the America's power. The invasion caused a historic shift in power of Sunni and Shiite Muslims not only in Iraq but throughout the region. The installation of a permanent government in Iraq marked the first time in history that Shiites took power in a leading Arab state and provoked deep concern in such important Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and others.

Madeleine Albright also stressed that after the Iraqi operation no US ambassador could be appointed to a country with strong religious influence without detailed debriefing of the faiths in the country and instruction to establish and sustain strong relationship with local religious leaders. Over a long diplomatic career, and based on her rich life experience, she came to the conclusion that religion is an important motivational factor shaping people's values and subsequent actions, largely influencing the motives of countries' behavior at the international level [2].

The influence of religion on socio-economic development is profoundly substantiated by a prominent American political scientist Samuel Huntington, who emphasized that Catholicism and Protestantism are the most important historical features of Western civilization [3]. Huntington believed that after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, religious and intercivilizational contradictions would be a source of conflict. As known, Huntington assigned a particularly aggressive role in the modern world to Islam. This view has been criticized by many researchers and practitioners, including such authorities as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Francis Fukuyama, although a number of Huntington's predictions have materialized. One can at least refer to military action in the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia, or the origins and consequences of the American operation in Iraq.

Fukuyama indicates the regulatory function of religion in the economy. Moreover, he noted that Christianity and, in particular, the Catholic Church caused serious changes in the economic rules of the game in Europe – regarding property rights, inheritance rights, etc., which ultimately led to a change in the entire European continent [4].

It should be noted that economic provisions of the holy books concern the basic principles of economic development, explain the use of factors of production and provide for the application of various sanctions of economic and non-economic nature. It is also important to note that economic norms and guidelines set forth in the sacred books are not inherently rigid forms but provide an opportunity to apply them in dynamics in the process of economic development.

Religion not only centrally accumulates an economic message of a society, but also centrally produces norms of economic behavior. Thus, each type of human economic activity must be consistent with the existing norms, where an important place is occupied by general group's morality in the form of religion as the dominant precept for the whole community.

Peaceful interaction of Confucianism with various religions can be explained by its universal nature, which also explains the harmonious coexistence of various cultural values in the countries of the Confucian region. A shift in political or economic power does not mean a clash of civilizations. Civilization is the embodiment of civilized ideas and principles, and in the future Western and Eastern civilizations tend to converge rather than diverge [5, p. 7].

As a comprehensive system of ideas, Confucianism is therefore interpreted in a fairly wide range: as a special philosophy, as a religion, but more often as a behavioral system of moral and ethical values. Confucianism views society as an organic whole, although

it has different tendencies in its composition. Confucianism can effectively and freely interact with other religions and systems of thought, since there is faith, but there is no Confucian community to which one can join as a Buddhist Temple or Roman Catholic Church.

Although Confucianism has long been commonly accepted as one of the major world religions in our popular imagination, and portrayed as the most important religion of China in introductory textbooks on world religions, it might come as a surprise to many that it is neither considered a religion by most people in China nor counted as a religion by the Chinese government. In fact, Confucianism is not included in the Chinese official classification of the Five Major Religions, which include Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism [6, p.18].

Simply put, the main religious signs of Confucianism could be reduced to the idea of Heaven and spirituality, contemplation as a means of achieving the unity of man with nature, and also to the reverence of the Sages, including Confucius. However, it is important to note that the “religiosity” of Confucianism has been formed under the influence of other religions inherent to the East Asian Region. Specifically, these other religions were Buddhism, Taoism, Shamanism, Shinto, and various forms of Christianity. According to the records of Confucius’ thoughts that have come down to our time, he probably did not anticipate that his teachings would become a particular religion or would bear clear signs of religiosity.

And all the same, Confucianism is rather a philosophical system of moral and socio-political ideas and teachings, and not a set of institutionalized religious rites. And in the process of modernization, Confucianism was being adapted and upgraded.

As the tide of modernization hit the Confucian domain, the Christian thought and modern sciences developed in the West came to overwhelm the traditional culture in the twentieth century, almost wiping out Confucian cosmology and metaphysics, which came to be considered outdated and irrelevant. Nevertheless, other elements of Confucian philosophy, especially those dealing with moral or ethical issues, theories of human nature and social organization, and even some aspects of epistemology, still deserve close examination and possible restoration and further elaboration as guidelines for the future of human civilization. The possibility of retrieving and refining these and other philosophical thoughts has already been discussed by numerous authors, not only from East Asia but from outside the region as well [6, pp. 21–22].

In general, economic changes are not as fast and noticeable as changes of a purely political nature. There are, however, times when evolution of economic relations as if accelerated, and more rapid and diverse consequences were being reflected in everyday life.

The modern experience of the functioning of successful economies testifies to their close multi-year relationship with universal human values and the prevailing religion in the country. The same experience shows that the connection between economy and religion makes people wiser, and society is more humane and more stable. A purely pragmatic approach to economic development, although provides acceptable growth, does not solve many fundamental problems of society.

From the general postulates of state governance contained in the Old Testament section of the Holy Bible one can conclude that concern of a leader of his people gives such country advantages over other states:

“Moreover the profit of the earth is for all: the king himself is served by the field” [7, Ecclesiastes 5:9].

One of the most important principles of successful state governance is the ability of the ruler to avoid divisions in society and the art of smoothing out conflicts in order to preserve the integrity of society and ensure its successful economic development: “And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand” [7, Mark 3:24].

Ukraine is a multinational state, where different groups of citizens have their own views on the development of the history of the past several hundred years of the country; this requires special delicacy and political tact in the treatment of a new history, as well as in clarifying political relations with the closest neighbors on the formation of this story.

To retain Ukraine’s integrity and secure long-term prosperity it would be logical to leave these delicate topics to professional historians to avoid split in the society and conflicts, as recent practice has shown, with some EU member states. The Bible warns people of any level against such actions that can lead to contradictions and separatist sentiments within the country: “Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned; and avoid them” [7, Romans 16:17].

In essence, Confucianism is an exemplary model of social and personal relations that has absorbed the wisdom and experience of thousands of years of civilization, proved its exceptional viability, ability to dynamically modernize and creatively assimilate the achievements of other cultures and civilizations.

Confucianism had a colossal influence on the development of global civilization, although this teaching is more likely to be considered a philosophy, a set of moral and ethical norms, a way of life, and not a religion in the classical sense of this concept. Until now, experts have failed to develop a generally accepted definition of religion, and there is also no scientific consensus as

to what exactly constitutes religion. Nevertheless, the most commonly accepted definition of religion is most often reduced to the following set of common for leading religions qualities of the sociocultural system of designated behavior, morality, beliefs, worldviews, texts, prophecies and ethics that connect humanity with the spiritual environment. Confucius did not write anything in his life, but taught his followers orally. After his death, followers published notes about the thinker. Confucius expressed his philosophical thoughts during travels, where he was accompanied by numerous close disciples, and 12 of them constantly accompanied him [8, p. 102].

In life, Confucius adhered to four basic “no”:

1. Don't waste time on useless thoughts;
2. Don't speak categorically;
3. Don't be stubborn;
4. Don't think about yourself.

The ideal of Confucius is a perfect personality, which has two main features – humanism and a sense of proportion. After Confucius, many philosophers, thinkers, and eminent people associated sense of proportion with wisdom in one way or another. In different historical periods, different philosophical schools approached the subject of wisdom differently. According to the authors, the most acceptable formula is that wisdom is a sense of proportion in everything.

Nearly five hundred years later, Jesus spread his teachings in a similar pattern. The 12 apostles constantly accompanied him, took notes during sermons, and their names are widely recognized among the authors of the Bible texts. Moreover, Jesus authorized his closest disciples, the apostles, to speak on his behalf.

Thus, the most widespread religion in the world, Christianity, essentially inherited many of the provisions of Confucian philosophy, becoming the basis for democratic and socio-

economic transformations in modern Western Europe and North America.

Confucius created his teachings during the period of devastation and long-lasting brutal internecine wars in modern China, which he tried to oppose the system of humanistic values and high moral principles. Confucius' main idea was the "golden rule of morality" – not to do to other people what you do not want for yourself. By the way, the Bible contains a similar postulate – treat people the way you would like to be treated.

Interpretation of the Confucian teaching principles has come a long way, and the provisions on ethical norms have undergone gradual transformations. But it should be noted that religious and moral norms and concepts during the development of Confucian teachings not only did not weaken, but on the contrary, strengthened. To some extent, this applies to the priority of family interests, inheritance rights, consolidation of social hierarchy, sacralization of political power, property relations, and so on.

The system of relations regulation between individuals in society occupies an important place in Confucianism. Thus, the subject of religious affirmation is the Confucian postulate of five relations:

1. Emperor and subordinate;
2. Father and son;
3. Older and younger brothers;
4. Husband and wife;
5. Two friends.

In this regard, Confucian principles enshrine and develop the classical religious tenets of reverence, respect, justice, benevolence, fidelity. Thus, it is not a question of frozen conservative forms of relations, but of preserving the best moral and ethical traditions of teaching.

The development of Confucianism constantly emphasizes the importance of the role of rituals, rules of etiquette, established ceremonies – in essence the main features inherent in any religion, which make it possible to maintain social understanding in the framework of the Confucian perception of the world. Thus, Confucianism preserves certain behavioral norms and standards of thinking, which makes it possible to clearly correlate the possibilities and requirements for the implementation of certain economic tasks, the organization of production processes, and economic activity in general.

According to the Confucian approach, there are “eight respected and eight despicable” traits.

Respected traits	Despicable traits
1. Love for the Motherland;	1. Damage to the Motherland;
2. Service to the people;	2. Betrayal of the people;
3. The desire for science;	3. Ignorance;
4. Hard work	4. Laziness;
5. Mutual assistance;	5. Selfishness;
6. Honesty and unity;	6. Dishonesty;
7. Perseverance;	7. Life for one's own pleasure;
8. Compliance with laws.	8. Violation of laws.

Source: Compiled from [6, pp. 5–8, 10–14, and 39–40].

In Ukraine the Church continues to hold one of the leading positions in terms of public trust among public and political institutions (along with volunteer organizations and the Armed Forces). At the same time, compared to 2010, when the level of public trust in the Church reached its maximum (73%), now this figure is lower – 60% [9].

Religious profile of Ukraine

The religious profile of Ukraine, like that of the Republic of Korea, is very diverse and this is especially typical for certain oblasts and regions of the country. This can be judged by the annual opinion polls of the Razumkov Center, specially dedicated to religious topics both in Ukraine as a whole and in certain regions of the country. Such polls have been carried out for more than two decades, which makes it possible to track the dynamics of quantitative indicators of various beliefs and the attitude of citizens to various actions of the state in relation to beliefs and religion.

The reliability of such sociological surveys is very high, since the data, within the framework of the statistical error, are confirmed by the results of surveys on the same topic by special sociological services.

It should be stressed that in Ukraine the most recent sociological polls indicate that Ukrainian society has always shown a virtually stable and fairly high level of tolerance for the practice of different religions. Thus, in 2020, the vast majority of citizens (76%) believed that “any religion that proclaims the ideals of goodness, love, mercy and does not threaten the existence of another person has the right to exist” [9]. Thus, there is reason to believe that the Ukrainian society and believers of various faiths are quite capable of perceiving the concept of syncretism in the socio-economic development of the country in the manner of the Republic of Korea.

Ukrainian society constantly demonstrates a fairly high level of religiosity. Throughout the 20 year research period, the number of citizens who profess to be believers increased from 58 to 71%, fluctuating around 70% for the last ten years. Traditionally, the level of religiosity is higher in older age groups, compared to younger ones (in 2020: among 18–24-year-olds – 52% of

believers, among those aged 60 and over – 76%), among women, compared to men (74% and 61%, respectively) [9].

Among the confessions, Orthodoxy dominates, with almost 66% referring to it, and the second place belongs to Greek Catholics with a share of almost 10% in 2020. In addition, polls within the margin of error record representatives of Protestantism – 1.5%, the Roman Catholic Church – 1.2%, Islam – 0.5%, and Judaism – 0.1%.

Sociologists also single out a separate and fairly large group – “just Christians” – up to 9% in 2020. This group of believers does not identify itself with any of the ecclesiastical jurisdictions at all; among the Orthodox, this is the largest community of people of up to 27% of the respondents. It is interesting to note that throughout the monitoring period, the majority of citizens expressed the opinion that religious faith does not provide for mandatory religious affiliation. Currently, 65% (in 2000 – 64%) of respondents believe that “a person can be just a believer and not profess any particular religion” [9].

A well-known theologian Dmytro Horyevoy in his analytical comments to the mentioned Razumkov Center’s Information materials expressed the opinion that people very often do not know for sure exactly which church they go to. After all, the names of jurisdictions are very similar: “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” and “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”. Besides, the general ceremony and external decoration are very similar in those jurisdictions. For instance, a person visits the church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the same time believes that he/she goes to the “Ukrainian church”, because the plate says “Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, which is the official name of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine [10].

The state of affairs with visiting temples in Ukraine is quite consistent with the Protestant teachings of Martin Luther, who

considered important to have faith within a person, and not the institutional church. According to Luther's firm conviction, a person can and should turn to his Creator directly through prayers and doesn't need for this either church, or priests, or the holy intermediaries.

In addition to information materials of the Razumkov Center, Dmytro Horyevoy discusses the "religious map of Ukraine" and highlights several regions with their own particular historical, ethnic, and religious characteristics.

Galicia (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil oblasts) is a special region from a religious point of view. Here, unlike the rest of Ukraine, it is not Orthodox Christians who predominate, but Greek Catholics. In Volyn, the position of Protestants is historically strong, where they have 846 parishes.

A fairly diverse region from a religious point of view is the Transcarpathian oblast. Due to the proximity of the borders with Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, on the one hand, and the presence of a natural border from the rest of Ukraine – the Carpathian Mountains, on the other, the history, and most importantly, the population of the region is quite heterogeneous; here there are Hungarian, Romanian, Slovak and Roma minorities. Religiously, the Moscow Patriarchate still dominates here – 624 parishes, and the second largest is the Greek Catholic Church – 446 parishes. Interestingly, the local Greek Catholic diocese is autonomous and directly subordinate to the Vatican, without being part of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. There is also a unique local group – the Reformed Protestant Church, to which mainly belong members of the Hungarian community with 113 parishes.

Chernivtsi oblast is home to a significant Romanian diaspora, professing Orthodoxy; here, as in Volyn, the position of Protestants is also quite strong, where they have 470 communities.

Other regions of Ukraine are not so diverse in religious terms. In addition, they are much more secularized, and the role of religion there is significantly lower, which is manifested in the number of people who consider themselves believers, support the church financially and trust the priests. There are religious differences between the eastern and western parts of Ukraine, which can be explained by several historical circumstances.

The western regions of Ukraine were not part of Soviet Ukraine between the two world wars, but were ruled by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. There was no such outrageous violent fight against religion as in the eastern regions after the October 1917 revolution and especially during the activity of the Union of Militant Atheists, patronized by the authorities (formerly the Union of Atheists; Society of Friends of the *Bezbozhnik* [*Militant Atheist*] newspaper), a “voluntary” public organization in the USSR that existed from 1925 to 1947 but was extremely active in the 1930s. Religious life in the western regions of Ukraine, thus, began to be rooted out by the Soviet regime almost 30 years later and not so brutally.

In addition, the religious component in the western regions was often associated with the national Ukrainian idea. In contrast to the state atheism of the USSR, the role of the church there was quite high, and not only in the spiritual sphere, but also in national-patriotic education.

And finally, the western regions of Ukraine are predominantly agrarian, in contrast to the industrial east. As world practice shows, residents of agricultural regions are more religious than industrial ones, since agricultural economy, obviously, significantly depends on the influence of a large number of variables, primarily weather conditions, which do not depend on the will of people. Industry, on the other hand, is less susceptible to variable conditions. These circumstances largely

explain the differences in religious moods in the West and East of Ukraine [9].

Conclusion

So, the viability of Confucianism, according to majority views, is explained, first of all, by its tolerance to other philosophical movements and religions, as well as by the synergy of positive qualities of various worldview trends and the ability to smooth out conflict situations instead of stirring them up. Besides, the continuing influence of Confucianism is possibly due to the fact that it is conducted in the form of folk tales, proverbs, historical stories, literature, poetry, traditional customs, traditional institutions and values, traditional thought patterns and so on, rather than as direct inspiration from reading the Confucian classics. Thus, Confucianism has been retaining its thousand-year influence on the course of the historical development of the region.

Kim Kyong-Dong noted that:

Finally, one could ask if Confucianism, which is actually a set of ideas created in ancient times and enlarged and modified over the millennia, could be useful to the modern world of complex systems in great flux. Once again, a flexible posture and an open mind could be the only suitable answer. The version of Confucianism that may be useful in this effort should not be fixed. Since it is a vast sea of ideas, one could make wise selections with a view to reorienting the direction of human civilization in the future [6, p. 237].

Of course, it would be naive to claim that Confucianism is capable of solving all these problems in one fell swoop. However, developing a value system in the minds of people and reforming social life can significantly improve the situation and could make

the development process more humane and contribute to the improvement of the lives of individuals and communities. Caution is needed when trying to establish any meaningful relevance of Confucianism to the world of the twenty-first century. To begin with, it should be recognized that Confucianism is a great and very diverse system of ideas, both quantitatively and substantively. Confucian high moral and ethical values can be applied to renew the civilization foundations in almost any part of the world, acceptable for any country with different religious traditions.

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Chapter 8

THE EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY: ORIGINS, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS FOR BRIDGING

Origins of the East-West Dichotomy

The conceptual opposition of East and West, defined by Herodotus (484–425 BC), is certainly useful for scientific knowledge of the social world. However, it requires further significant interdisciplinary development following the latest advances in world science.

Until now, the “mainstream” of political philosophers and political scientists, following the classics of the theory of civilizations (from N. Danilevsky, O. Spengler, A. Toynbee to S. Huntington, A. Panarin, Yu. Pavlenko), consider civilizational and cultural differences, and contradictions as such that exist in the context of a separate, independent logic of development of each civilization. In this context, each of the civilizations and historical cultures that define them are self-sufficient, while convergent transcivilizational trends are virtually ignored. However, the categories of East and West, used in a dichotomous-

antagonistic context, oversimplify the modern world order, and hence all other cultural, geographical, historical, political, and social problems [1]. In particular, such approaches cannot properly take into account historical hybridity of the regions concerned.

In contrast to this approach, we consider the cultural, value, and civilizational dichotomy “East-West” in its fractal reproduction, in the close historical interaction and complementarity of East and West at all levels – from macro-regional to local and personal [2].

Thus, the Chapter’s aim herewith is an interdisciplinary analysis of the ontological foundations of the East-West dichotomy and its rethinking in the context of modern globalization processes, in particular the rise of the global role of the Confucian East.

In contemporary Western social sciences the conviction about the mechanical East-West dichotomy, let it be camouflaged with declarations of the East-West complementarity and integrity, still dominates. Thorsten Pattberg in his eponymous fundamental book posits:

Since our physiology projects itself on the world we perceive, this makes me wonder whether our definition of an inductive East and an analytical West is another example of the structure of our cognitive system – the two cerebral hemispheres – correctly corresponding and portraying categorizations of the world we perceive, namely the East-West dichotomy. <...> To my knowledge, no Western culture has ever produced anything like the works of Confucius, and no Eastern culture has ever produced anything like Plato’s ideals. The notion of the share of labor makes me think that the division of an analytically-based West and an integration-based East could be no coincidence in human evolution, but a collective behavior to fully exploit and develop all the cognitive capacities of the human race. [3]

Milan Lajciak, the Slovak political philosopher and long-standing diplomat in East Asia, presents a characteristic example: absolutizing the East-West dichotomy, he disputably opposes the critical thinking in the West to the allegedly subdued critical thinking in the Confucian East. In his conception, the West has produced “truth-seekers” striving for the transcendental truth beyond our world, while the East generated “way-seekers” searching for harmony in the existing material world. [4] Lajciak posits as if the West has created the man who incorporated spiritual aspects of the life, while the East produced the man oriented for ethical rules [4], ignoring the fact that Confucianism in the East Asia has always been supplemented by spiritually rich teachings of Taoism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Chinese ethnic religious cults (paganism), including those of pantheistic and polytheistic nature.

Meanwhile, Pattberg realizes the empirical difficulties to identify separate individuals or households as definitely belonging to East or West, but he is apparently inclined to do so with larger entities:

If zooming into separated households, naturally we would find each individual of that household having many identities. They identify themselves, for example, by their faith, profession, social status, ethnicity, hobbies, friends they have etc.

Looking at humankind from the moon, however, those identities can be summarized to belong to a certain region, cultural group, and civilization, East or West. [3]

That is why, in the above context of the mechanical division of East and West, we agree with Joy Hendry & Heung Wah Wang’s critics that these two categories are oversimplifying the current world-order and all other cultural, geographical, historical,

political, and social affairs [1]. In Olena Lyubchenko's view, "the West-East dichotomy mirrors the difference between normal and abnormal government and society [5, p. 48]." Especially, approaches to the East-West dichotomy have been criticized for failing to take into account the historical hybridity of the regions [6, p. 275]. Nevertheless, the conceptual contrast between East and West, determined since Herodotus (484 BC-425 BC) and developed by universal historians and theoreticians up to Samuel Huntington [7], Iver Neumann [8], Alexandr Panarin [9], Yuriy Pavlenko [10], is a quite relevant reflection of reality. But it needs a further essential interdisciplinary development according to the latest achievements of the natural and social sciences.

The dichotomy of values, civilizational and cultural aspirations is inherent in Eurasia both by definition (in fact, its very name implies the duality of the continent's two different wings) and historically, especially since the Mongol invasion. Moreover, such a dichotomy of classic Europe (that is Europe of the historical space of the Carolingian Empire) and classic Asia, as a zone of active civilization influence of the "Celestial Empire" ("Great China"), is a universal property of the whole post-Soviet space at the macro-regional, national, regional, subregional and local levels. We have shown that this dichotomy has a fractal nature, i.e., in practically every society, at each of its structural levels, there is a potential of both the East and the West. The question is in their dynamic proportions. [11] As Umberto Eco (2016) points out: "It is impossible to imagine Western civilization and, in particular, European civilization, without specifying the "Greek miracle", but "neither the Greek civilization nor the Roman one can be realized without reconstruction <...> of "their Eastern roots [12, p. 17]".

Iver Neumann emphasizes the role played by groups who are ambiguously poised between any identity poles. He argues that

collective identities are overlapping and multifaceted phenomena which must not be reified and studied in isolation from one another. [13]

Challenges for Western Liberal Democracy

Immanuel Kant claims that our will gives the moral law to itself, so that such a moral imperative is self-legislated as a truth of reason [14]. 500 years of the Reformation and 2500 years of Confucian tradition in some way formed such a law. In the Eastern Christian and Catholic traditions, moral law is primarily supported by external authority, the institutional power of the church, and external (primarily state) coercion. When these external clamps of the moral law weaken and become discredited, which we have obviously had for at least a hundred years, a moral vacuum arises that is filled mostly by archaic, pre-cultural instincts.

Founder of the Department of Sociology at Harvard, Pitirim Sorokin perceived a fundamental and ever-growing inherent threat to the modern Western liberal society in the shift to a “sensate” culture when people are guided by sensory utility and pleasure, which become the sole criteria of what is good and bad. A further consequence of such a system is the development of a nihilistic mentality.

The whole discourse of liberal postmodernism of the last half century was aimed at deconstructing multidimensional man with his hierarchy of values into one-dimensional man with a flat scale of values, which led to the spiritual and moral entropy of Western and peripheral societies.

In modern democracy, the issue of rational political consensus remains a difficult problem for Western liberal political philosophy among citizens being “flatly” equal in their civic

status and fundamental human rights but polarized by a countless variety of cultural and axiological self-identifications.

The problem in pluralist societies, Sungmoon Kim argues, is not only how to establish moral leadership, but how to accommodate “multiple moral goods” [15, p. 126]. In this respect, speaking of the contemporary developments, Francis Fukuyama emphasizes that present world is simultaneously moving toward the opposing dystopias of hypercentralization and endless fragmentation. And the latter, especially characteristic to contemporary liberal democracies, means “a growing lack of consensus over common ends.” Nowadays’ political strife, in both the USA and Europe, is increasingly defined by the conflictogenic demographic change and the erosion of traditional social hierarchies. [16]

Recent events suggest a disturbing symptom of moral discord in the Western society divided by different understandings and interpretations of an individual or minority rights and freedoms, which are increasingly being promoted regardless of national, ethical, religious, or cultural traditions (riots within the BLM transnational campaign in May and summer 2020, the gender and migration policy divide between Western and some EU Central European countries, etc.). Meanwhile, maintaining social and political stability in the Confucian East is closely linked to the priority sense of duty cultivated there for millennia. And in this regard, Confucian virtues such as respectful devotion to the state and filial reverence can perfectly fit into the standards of modern society of high socio-economic dynamics and sustainable development.

Alarming trends in socio-cultural dynamics, in particular polarization and fragmentation of Western liberal society, have sharply exacerbated against the backdrop of the current economic collapse caused by the coronavirus pandemic, the fiasco of many

national health systems and riots in the United States and Western Europe associated with criticism of identity politics and “racial liberalism”. Such an exacerbation of the systemic social crisis is fraught with the threat of a “war of all against all”.

A very characteristic open letter published on July 7, 2020 in Harper’s Magazine and signed by over 150 high-profile liberal social thinkers, writers and public figures, living in the West, including Francis Fukuyama, Noam Chomsky, JK Rowling, Sir Salman Rushdie, Fareed Zakaria, warns against the spreading “ensoriousness”, especially “intolerance of opposing views, a vogue for public shaming and ostracism” (the “cancel culture” phenomenon) and the growing threat to the “free exchange of information and ideas” in Western society. While condemning such a white and black, narrowly dichotomic thinking, the signatories “refuse any false choice between justice and freedom, which cannot exist without each other”. [17]

The fundamental problem of democracy and understanding of civil and political equality is the problem of the very nature of human rights: either humans are entitled to them just by virtue of their inherent dignity or, as Laura Valentini argues, “human rights articulate standards for respecting the status dignity of the subjects of sovereign authority, rather than the inherent dignity of human beings qua humans [18, p. 862].” In this regard, we also believe that true democracy important preconditions should include a certain level of mutual confidence, ideological cohesion, and convergence of interests among individuals.

As John Dewey anxiously emphasized, the older “atomic” individualism – where natural egoists vie to maximize their standing – was now harming not protecting individuals; such individualism, deployed as a rhetorical pretext, was enabling the wealthy and powerful to undermine (for most) the protections which justified liberalism, initially [19].

A feature of the modern consumer society is its desire to destroy the dualistic structure of the world, in which two planes have long coexisted: the sphere of the exchanged, sold, and the sphere of intrinsic value, not measured in money [20]. But it is precisely this dualistic harmony between the monetary-material and spiritual aspects of life that Confucianism supports.

The political philosopher, founder, and interim first president of the Republic of China Sun Yat-sen proposed to base the building of a harmonious society on the principle of mutual assistance, which he clearly considered his strategic goal. Sun posited: “Species exist on the principle of competition, while people live on the principle of mutual assistance. Society and nation are organizations for mutual assistance. Morality and virtue should be used in mutual assistance. If this principle is followed, people will prosper, if not, they will die [21, p. 17].”

On the subject of previously stated issues, there is currently a significant shift in the international academic discourse from the problem of democratization itself to that of ensuring an effective functioning of the state, especially a state with pluralistic democracy, its ability to ensure sustainable development, social justice and welfare for its citizens.

The global political stress caused by COVID-19 pandemic has testified that countries with weak state capacity and low level of liquid reserves or poor leadership will be set for stagnation. To handle the initial stages of the crisis successfully, countries need not only capable states and adequate resources but also a great deal of social consensus and competent leaders who inspire confidence. This need was met by South Korea, which delegated management of the epidemic to the professional health care bureaucracy.

Donald Trump during his turbulent US presidency railed against the elites and promised to restore traditional sources of

meaning to disempowered and atomized individuals. The same can be observed in case of the Hungarian leader Viktor Orban, or the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki who have strongly opposed the EU Brussels establishment bureaucracy in matters of family values, gender equality, or migration policy. But the problem, as Daniel Bell and Pei Wang point out, is not elitism or hierarchy per se. Any modern society needs hierarchies, and the task is to distinguish between bad forms of hierarchy that benefit the powerful and oppress the weak and good forms of hierarchy that express morally defensible values [22]. Thus, hierarchical forms of communal life might be reinterpreted and modernized in a way compatible with progressive values. But what is still vitally needed is a broad intercivilizational sociopolitical movement capable of reinvigorating and reinterpreting dimensions of communal life to catch *Zeitgeist* (the spirit of modernity) and meet contemporary global challenges.

On the political plane, the crisis of Western neoliberalism is emphasized by the growing value differences within both American and European society, in particular between the old and new members of the EU. A striking example here is the disagreement between Budapest and Warsaw, on the one hand, and Brussels, on the other, on a few issues, including migration and gender policies, independence of justice, media independence, etc. It is worth noting that the ruling Polish nationalist Law and Justice party and its Eurosceptic ally, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, have been promoting at home what they call traditional social values and have repeatedly clashed with their more liberal Western colleagues because of the rights of women, gays, and migrants.

Supporters of “Huxit” (Hungarian exit – by analogy with Brexit) appeared in *Magyar Nemzet* (*Hungarian Nation*) in August 2021 with the article titled “It’s time to talk about Huxit –

Hungary's exit from the European Union.” [23] Given that this is a pro-government mouthpiece, a publication on a topic that had not yet been accepted openly to discuss and had been considered taboo even in governmental circles caused a huge outcry. The author of the article, right-wing conservative political analyst Tamás Fricz, who is close to the Hungarian authorities, writes about the divergence of values between the center and the new members who joined the union not so long ago, in the 2000s: “Our paths have diverged. While the West deliberately – I emphasize: consciously! – breaks with the Christian morality and value systems and instead aims to build a cosmopolitan faceless global community based on the unbridled self-enjoyment and self-destruction of the individual (see The Great Reset), we, Hungarians, Poles and other Central & Eastern Europeans, want to preserve our millennial cultural and religious foundations [23].”

The unique European system of human rights protection is in fact unraveling out. Russia, Turkey, Poland declare the priority of national legislation over the prescriptions (decisions) of the European Court of Human Rights. And on October 17, 2021, Great Britain, one of the first countries that ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in 1949, also announced its fundamental claims to the Court. Minister of Justice of that country Dominic Raab stated: “We want the Supreme Court to have a last word on interpreting the laws of the land, not the Strasbourg court,” adding that he would work to “protect and preserve the prerogatives of [the British] parliament from being whittled away by judicial legislation, abroad or indeed at home.” Arguing that public services, such as the National Health Service, should be governed by “elected lawmakers” rather than “judicial legislation,” the minister questioned the legitimacy of the European court to issue judgments on domestic affairs in the U.K.

[24] The British minister's reasoning evokes associations with the historical disputes between Confucians and Legalists on the correlation between the formal law and the political elite's moral commitment as well as with the Confucian tradition to rule *by* (means of) law versus a fundamental Western liberal principle *of* the rule of law.

Unlike Confucianism, where there is no fundamental difference between ours and others, since relationships with all require harmonization, in the Western discourse of the Alien (Other), the imperative of harmonizing relations is absent. Moreover, relations with the Other imply permanent conflict due to the immanent insolvability of the deep contradictions of identity, a certain estrangement in relations, distrust of a partner acting in the status of "The Other" – such a Protestant value-civilizational approach especially manifested in the concept of the "Other" developed by the Norwegian political scientist Iver Neumann [8], is especially characteristic of the Protestant worldview (conceptual and doctrinal thinking). Such (permanent or wavy) escalating tension in relations with the Other implies corresponding doctrines, such as (e.g., practiced in the USA–USSR relations) *brinkmanship*, *nuclear deterrence*, *containment*, etc.

The fundamental problem for settling the strategic value conflicts in Eurasia is the belief in Western exceptionalism.

For instance, Mikhail Minakov, while expressing hope for "a new generation of leaders able to reverse the entropic trends in Eastern Europe and make the "One Big Europe" idea return to the political agenda", considers, meantime, the EU as "the only agent for healing Europe." [25, p. 328] From this viewpoint, neither the post-Communist EU member countries, nor the Eastern Partnership countries, not to mention Russia or the already six unrecognized post-Soviet separatist states, but "only a united Western Europe can take responsibility for a free, safe and

dignified life across the whole of Europe [25, p. 328].” It implies that the political agenda for a Wider or the “One Big Europe” might be formed only on the basis of the Western liberal values without taking into account any pro- Imperial, “sovereign democracy” or pro-Soviet transnational values peculiar to the Eastern Europe region and its present politics (as well as, by the way, to the traditionalist discourse of the new West European right in Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, etc.). Nothing from the value baggage of the Eurasian conservative project [25, p. 315], nothing from the past history “modes of collective life” [25, p. 314] is, therefore, allowed even for a pan-European discussion table. In fact, we have here the same “zero-sum game”, however not in the “hard power” but in the “soft power” sphere. At the same time, as Minakov himself admits: “The option of “One Big Europe” seems too utopian today. Without trustworthy partners in the East, this project is simply untenable [25, p. 323].”

Olena Lyubchenko, while living in multicultural and ethnically tolerant Canada, has researched the substantial interaction between pro-Western liberals and the anti-Russian radical right forces during and after the victory of Euromaidan rally protests in Ukraine. She posits that within the classical Carl Schmitt’s *friend-enemy* mental distinction “no longer geographically defined, those who have not embraced ‘Europe’ for ideological or socio-economic reasons are deemed irretrievably backward and, virtually, ethnically different [5, p. 54].” Such an essentialised and, eventually, irrationalized cultural argument refutes and delegitimizes any opposite opinion with regard to the national geopolitical choice, economic or cultural policy.

To our mind, the lack of progress in settling the Ukraine crisis is just due to the dominance in the Western, Ukrainian, and Russian political discourse of the culturally *Alien (Other)*,

relations with which are doomed to conflict due to values antagonism. In the Central and Eastern Europe countries, since the conflict with Russia, “New Orientalism” is growing [5] delegitimizing the “East” from the cultural standpoint as the Europe’s Other²⁴.

One of the pillars of civilizational theory Samuel Huntington puts forward a hypothesis about the civilizational decline of the West precisely because of the loss of its own identity: “The survival of the West depends on ... Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal [7].” Events in Afghanistan in August 2021, associated with the country’s rapid transition under the control of Taliban Islamic Movement accompanied by the American troops’ hasty departure from the country and the panic flight of Afghans who collaborated with Western embassies and military, only empirically confirm Huntington’s words.

The same Fukuyama today has not just refused the idea of the universal eligibility of a liberal model (the alleged “end of history”) but defends the principles of strong state as a universal anti-crisis model for both the East and the West. He also encourages the United States to return to the religious values of Protestantism, which, according to Fukuyama, by their capacity to ensure the so-called level of confidence – ability to nationwide consolidation (via national “civil religion”, according to Robert Bellah [27]) – are typologically similar to the Confucian identity of Japan [28].

²⁴ Carl Schmitt in his probably most influential work titled *The Concept of the Political* (first published in 1932) grounds his conception of state sovereignty (or autonomy) upon the *friend – enemy* distinction. The latter is to be determined subjectively, “existentially”, i.e., the enemy is whoever is “the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible [26, p. 27].” This concept was further developed in the works of contemporary Norwegian political scientist Iver Brynild Neumann [8].

Meanwhile, Confucianism is far from being conducive to the model characteristic of the modern West's "mass consumption society" – primarily due to the quest for harmony, nobility, and self-improvement in the spirit of the Confucian ideal.

As Fukuyama rightly points out, in order to make possible, for example, forms of economic organization such as lifelong employment in Japan – a country with a rooted Confucian tradition – without formalizing an employment contract, but only on the basis of an informal agreement between labor and capital according to the principle of corporatism, it is necessary that the country has a special spiritual climate, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, which in reality means the ability to maximize the consolidation of a society united by values of an intangible nature. As Fukuyama rightly notes, in the contemporary United States and Europe, with their emphasis on liberal individualism, the rule of law cult and formal legal regulating economic relations, the mutual confidence potential is hindered by the practice of legally fixed individual and collective labor contracts.

Confidence as a feature of mass consciousness should be based on non-pragmatic, specifically religious (or civil-religious) attitudes. Therefore, Fukuyama himself quite rightly emphasizes that the East's economic successes and a high level of trust are based on ethno-religious traditionalism and calls for a return to the traditions of reformed Christianity in the United States, which supposedly until recently were quite comparable in terms of confidence level to that of Japan and other Confucian tradition countries. [28]

Thus, the crisis of social confidence in the West, including in the field of work ethics, relations between labor and capital due to the decline in religious Protestant consciousness and the active process of secularization of American society after World War II and especially since the late 1960s, is a serious obstacle to consolidation and mobilization of society to solve national problems

related to contemporary global, in particular geopolitical and geo-economic, challenges.

The East-West Dichotomy in the Globalizing Perspective

The dichotomous understanding of the nature of conflict potential in society in its various strata, diachronic divisions, and localizations – through the doctrine of the dualism of universal powers of Yin and Yang – for two and a half thousand years has been an essential element of dialectical constructions in Chinese philosophy, especially in Taoism and Confucianism. Being a fundamental model of everything, the Yin-Yang concept explains the general model of the universe: there can be no “final victory” of only one side, only one force, because there is nothing final, there is no end as such [29].

Here are just a few typical examples of the relativism of the East-West dichotomy.

It is known that in the era of the Great Migration, the borders of “political Asia” reached the territory of modern Switzerland (the Avar Khaganate of the 5th–6th centuries founded by Attila), and in the 8th century – the territory of modern France (the Arab conquests).

The lands of modern Southern and South-Eastern Ukraine from the middle of the 6th to the start of the 8th century were under the rule of the Turkic and West Turkic Khaganates, from the middle of the 8th to the middle of the 9th century – of the Khazar Khaganate. The lands of modern Northern and Central Ukraine for more than 120 years had been under the rule of the Horde, and in the 16–18 centuries – under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

The relativism of the East-West dichotomy (Europe-Asia) is also evident in modern politics. For example, in Central European

Hungary, the nationalist parties Fidesz and Jobbik declare the Turkic roots of the Hungarian nation and their pan-Turkist sympathies. Particularly, in 2011 the first Bible with Turkic-runic script was published in Hungary [30, pp. 472–473].

Instead, the Taiping Uprising in southern China, which lasted from 1850 till 1864 and is considered the bloodiest civil war in world history (20–30 million dead), was led by Hong Xiuquan of the Hakka people, a sub-ethnic group of Chinese (Han). Under the influence of a Protestant missionary, Hong proclaimed himself the younger brother of Jesus Christ and sought to convert Han Chinese to a syncretic version of Christianity (with a significant influence of Taoism), overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty, and thus transform the Chinese Empire into the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (literally Taiping means Great Peace or Universal Welfare). At the time of its rise (the rebels controlled a territory of 30 million people for a long time), the Taiping faith actually “developed into a dynamic new Chinese religion ... Taiping Christianity” [30, p. 4].

The largest religious community in the contemporary Republic of Korea, the most economically developed country in mainland Asia, is made up of Protestant Christians (about 20% of the population), and Roman Catholics are the third (after Buddhists) largest denomination (8%).

Among powerful critics of the Western modern society’s atomism, Charles Taylor objected to the liberal vision of individuals as self-sufficient outside of society. Conversely, he advocates the Aristotelian view that “Man is a social animal, indeed a political animal, because he is not self-sufficient alone, and in an important sense is not self-sufficient outside a polis” [31, p. 190].

Charles Taylor calls representatives of different cultural traditions to learn from each other’s “moral universe”. [32]

Values of democracy cannot be considered as universally appropriate for all historical times, cultures, and circumstances. Instead, one should rather fit democratic rights into a certain social and cultural context. It would be much more grounded if, under realities of the Confucian tradition society in South Korea or Singapore one tries to justify democratic rights through the argument of further consolidating communitarian ties within the family and the nation as Confucian traditional values.

As Daniel A. Bell points out:

In contrast to 1980s communitarian thinkers, East Asian critics of liberal universalism have succeeded in pointing to particular non-liberal practices and institutions that may be appropriate for the contemporary world. Some of these may be appropriate only for societies with a Confucian heritage, others may also offer insights for mitigating the excesses of liberal modernity in the West. [33]

As the experience of the post-war development of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore convincingly shows, Confucian values are by no means antagonistic to the values of liberal democracy. Rather, the latter have been originally thought out and deepened by the Confucian tradition. Thus, freedom in Confucianism is an opportunity for the individual's rational choice within the framework of his/her social responsibility to the family, society, and state. Confucianism recognizes brotherhood – but hierarchical (elder brother – younger brother), recognizes equality – not horizontal-general (in Confucianism it has traditionally been seen as chaos and anarchy) but as a vertically organized system of detection based on equal opportunities (primarily by independent testing) of the most talented and worthy of significant public positions. Justice, as the social embodiment of

harmony, in the Confucian tradition is achieved not by the impartial rule of law but rather by the virtuous rule by law.

It is characteristic that an outstanding South Korean human rights activist and democracy fighter Kim Dae-Jung, who played a key role in the democratization of the ROK, later the President of the Republic of Korea and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, resolutely opposed the tendentious opposition of Confucian values to universal values. In this regard, he, *inter alia*, compared John Locke's philosophy of natural rights and the government's accountability to law with the Heavenly Mandate and Mencius' concepts, which the latter expressed two millennia before Locke. In Kim Dae-Jung's opinion, all this indicates that democracy is naturally inherent in the East Asian civilization, and, therefore, it would be senseless to divide that into "Western" and "Asian". Moreover, according to Kim, Asia has a rich heritage of democratically oriented teachings (to which he attributed not only Confucianism but also Buddhism) and a chance to even surpass the West in developing democracy [34].

As admits even the world-famous theorist of neoliberal globalism Francis Fukuyama, "a great deal of recent research in the life sciences ... shows that human beings are hard-wired to be social creatures [35]." That applies, particularly, to recent discoveries in the field of fractality, which indicate the network nature of all forms of existence and organization of insentient substance and living matter, including man and society [36]. Today it has become clear that personality is an integral and organic component of social networks.

East Asia is nowadays more dynamic in terms of economic development, infrastructure mega-projects, or responding to the challenges of the COVID-19 global pandemic than Europe or North America. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are currently among the most developed structural democracies on the planet,

significantly ahead of France and the United States in the world ranking of democracies [37].

As “Architect of Modern China” Deng Xiaoping famously said when defending his epoch-making far-reaching market-economy reforms under the Communist Party’s political regime: “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice [38].” And if one takes the ideological criteria adopted in the West and Eastern Europe, now China has essentially built a society combining market socialism and state capitalism with dynamic conservatism (primarily of Confucian tradition).

Bohdan Hawrylyshyn characterizes the optimal social order, towards which, in his opinion, China is evolving, in the universal concepts of egalitarian group-cooperative values and a consensus system of power and economy which is based on agreed cooperative values [39, p. 13]. For Post-Reform China, according to Hawrylyshyn, the model of market socialism is characteristic, in contrast to the model of distributive socialism in the USSR and Maoist China.

In keeping with the Confucian doctrine of the Mean, China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, characterizes his policies as rooted in homegrown order and virtues that reach back 5,000 years. Unlike during the Maoist “cultural revolution” and Mao’s campaigns against Confucian traditions, Xi Jinping most often in his speeches and political campaigns refers to Confucius, a staunch supporter of a paternalistic hierarchy, to justify that the ruling China’s Communist Party should command obedience because it represents traditional, time-tested values being part of “socialist core values,” in contrast to the West suffering a “crisis of confidence” [40]. Xi also quotes many times the Chinese “Second Sage” (after Confucius himself), the Neo-Confucian Mencius and other ancient thinkers, in particular the Legalists (representatives

of the Legalism school we mentioned above), who more than 23 centuries ago argued that people should obey a pure, uncompromising order maintained by a strong ruler. The influence of the latter on the incumbent Chinese leader is especially noteworthy in the context of his propaganda of the “rule of law” principle. According to Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society in New York, unlike the Western liberal version, Mr. Xi’s “rule of law” looks more like the “rule by law” advocated by the Legalists [40]. At the same time, Xi’s numerous references to Tradition are combined with regular tributes to the memory of China’s communist founding father Mao Zedong and the architect of China’s market reforms and “economic miracle” Deng Xiaoping [41].

It is noteworthy that in contemporary China,

... diversity remains a defining feature of the Chinese cultural type due to regional and local variegation, which makes it impossible for rigid ideological dictate and the unification of life forms like under the CPC [Communist Party of China] of the Mao Zedong era [42, p. 11].”

In contrast to former Soviet policy of rejecting the Western-style democracy as “fully false and hypocritical”, the Communist leadership of post-reform mainland China declares, in the Confucian spirit, that democracy “is destined to form different gene combinations in different social environments and manifest itself in various forms, just like that of plants and flowers [43].” At the same time, the official Beijing, pledging its adherence to “a more pluralistic China”, admits that “The Chinese and Western democratic systems could learn from each other and carry out sound competition” given the West abandons the efforts “to turn the two systems into antagonistic relations [43].”

Nevertheless, it is also characteristic that on December 21, 2021, *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, the CCP Central Committee's official newspaper, published an article titled "China's Democracy Is an Extensive and True Democracy That Works", which elaborated on the Chinese conception of "a true democracy." Contrasting it with the Western conceptions of democracy, which is often associated with electoral and procedural rights for people, the article claims a true democracy is one which not only ensures "full expression" but also "effective fulfillment" of people's wishes through institutional frameworks that enable people's participation. [44]

We can assume that in mainland China the energetic efforts have been made for some kind of coexistence of Confucian, Marxist and democratic values and institutions and their evolutionary convergence within "a vigorous democracy with Chinese characteristics" based on the "people first" Mencius' principle and where "Everyone has the right to share the fruits of national development" [43], while in South Korea and Taiwan emphasis is made on the more active integration of Confucian and liberal democracy values and institutions.

It is characteristic that in contemporary Taiwan (the official self-name not recognized by the UN is the "Republic of China") with its developed pluralistic structural democracy, both the values of Confucianism and Three People's Principles by the founder of the Republic of China Sun Yat-sen (civil nationalism, as opposed to ethnocentrism, democracy, and popular welfare) are sacredly revered [45], from which follows their organic compatibility.

We cannot agree with Pavlo and Olena Kretov that "globalism in the Chinese sense is only a tool for elevating the national and state identity, and its universality at the level of humanitarian knowledge and specific ideology is highly questionable [42, p. 12]." After all, Confucianism in its content is

devoid of any ethno-national or specific state supremacy, as evidenced by the indisputable fact that it has been quite consciously and voluntarily, for rationalist and politically realistic reasons, accepted both by the peoples different from ethnic Chinese (the Han) and whose representatives for long historical periods had ruled in China (Mongols, Manchus), and the peoples that retained, along with state independence from China, their lasting and steadfast (ethno)national identity.

Due to strengthening the global role of China and South Korea, especially in the economic, financial, and infrastructural spheres, Confucian values, and East Asian models of successful modernization of the economy and society have been having a significant impact on the socio-economic policy of several Central and Eastern European countries, inducing therein the process of converging Confucian, European, and universal values. This can be seen in the diverse examples of Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and so on. It is worth noting at least the Polish – South Korean intergovernmental agreement signed in February 2021 as part of a strategic partnership to build a huge transit hub 45 km far from Warsaw, which will combine air, rail, and road traffic. It is planned that at the first stage, the transport hub will serve 45 million passengers a year, but its passenger capacity may increase to 100 million, and the first flights are expected in 2027. Poland thus strives to realize its strategic goal of becoming “the Far East’s gateway to the European Union” [46].

The experience of adaptation by Poland (with which Ukraine largely shares a historical past and, consequently, sociocultural and mental similarities) of Confucian approaches and the practical implementation since 2016 by the Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s national-conservative government of prescriptions of the Confucian-based modernization theory of the new structural economy founded by former Chief Economist of the

World Bank (2008–2012), currently a Professor at Peking University Justin Yifu Lin [47, pp. 19–20], could be particularly useful for Ukraine and its national economy.

In March 2021, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine and the South Korean National Railways signed a memorandum on the joint development of high-speed Euro rail in Ukraine. The agreements provide for grant funding of the Terms of Reference in the amount of \$2 million for the construction of a high-speed railway, on which trains will be able to move at a speed of 250 km/h. The project will take 4–5 years to implement, and the length of the Kyiv – Lviv – State Border route will be almost 2,000 kilometers. The agreement is a follow-up of a successful project between Ukraine and South Korea in the field of supply of high-speed Hyundai trains and their maintenance. [48, p. 54]

The above area of cooperation undoubtedly has great potential given the large territory of Ukraine and the need to develop railways based on European standards: in Ukraine it is advisable and realistic to organize the production of high-speed locomotives and wagons on South Korean technology as well as to cooperate in infrastructure modernization.

In his online speech on April 19, 2021, at the Boao Asian Forum (known as the Asian Davos) Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba called on the participants to jointly develop trade in the Western Europe-Ukraine-Asia triangle that could be considered remarkable from the viewpoint of turning the attention of the leadership of Ukraine, as a pivot state in Eastern Europe, to the East Asian vector [49].

In particular, the head of Ukrainian diplomacy stressed that Ukraine remains a strategically important logistics hub for multimodal container transportation between the EU and Asia. The Minister's support for Asian countries' trade liberalization efforts may be seen as Ukraine's commitment to developing long-

standing bilateral free trade agreements with East Asian countries, particularly with the Republic of Korea. It may also be seen as the readiness to consider the institutional possibilities of involving Ukraine in the format of the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership established in November 2020 in which for the first time the long-standing competitors – South Korea, China, and Japan – as well as ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand united in a common preferential trade area.

In fact, it is about the prospects of a convergent dialogue between neoliberal democracy, in which the consumer society considers nature as property, as an object of consumption [50], and the democracy of the Confucian tradition with its deep respect for a strong state and meritocratic social hierarchy, but by no means denying the values of classical liberal democracy. At the same time, for Confucianism, the person's primarily moral, but also professional, cultural, ideological development and improvement within the framework of harmonizing his/her relationship with the community and the state is an unshakable postulate.

In this regard, actualized is the discourse of classical liberalism, which, in contrast to the neoliberal mainstream of the modern West (being often far from tolerating dissent or views and values of the "Other"), can best be understood as "an institutional solution to the problem of governing over diversity [35]."

Protestant, and the Confucian cultures, Fukuyama draws attention to the fact that

... even in the American tradition, the inherent individualism of the constitutional-legal system has always been counterbalanced in practice by strongly communitarian social habits. ... It is only in the past couple of generations that the balance between individualism and communalism in the United States has been tipped decisively in favor of the former. [51, p. 31]

The evolution of liberalism into neoliberalism since the 1980s, which peaked in the early 21st century, has narrowed the scope for political maneuver available to centrist political leaders and allowed for huge inequalities that fuels populism from both the right and the left. Instead, as Fukuyama points out, “Classical liberalism is perfectly compatible with a strong state that seeks social protections for populations left behind by globalization, even as it protects basic property rights and a market economy [35].” In the same context, the authoritative Polish economist Michał Woźniak emphasizes the need for integrated development, where economic, social and environmental components are balanced [52].

We are used to saying that the European Union is a liberal democracy and a market economy based on liberal principles. However, this view is not entirely consistent with today’s realities.

Due to the strengthening of the global role of China and the Republic of Korea, in particular in the economic, financial, infrastructure spheres, in fact, today there is a tangible influence of Confucian values and East Asian models of successful modernization of the economy and society on the socio-economic policy of a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where processes of converging Christian, Confucian and universal values are emerging, that can be observed in the diverse examples of Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, etc.

The foregoing poses serious challenges to contemporary economic science. After all, the example of the PRC, other countries of the Confucian tradition (South Korea, Singapore, the “non-sovereign state” Taiwan) shows that with the strengthening of the role of the state, in particular its economic functions, the effectiveness of the latter, in particular economic, does not decrease, but grows, which is convincingly evidenced by the impressive success of the communitarian strategies and policies

of those countries in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, that contradicts the basic principles of the mainstream of neoclassical economic thought, which postulates an assessment of economic phenomena from the viewpoint of an individual economic entity, regarding the utilitarian-rationalistic preferences of people when choosing between different benefits, the dominant desire of individuals for maximizing benefits (satisfaction) and companies for profit as the main drivers of economic growth, productivity, and innovation. After all, for example, in modern China, the main paths of development are determined not by the economy, but by the state, the main value of which is the national and cultural-civilizational identity, “the own Chinese way” [53], and it is to strengthen and develop this identity that economic growth is stimulated.

Therefore, it’s about the prospects for a convergent dialogue between neoliberal democracy, in which a “marketized” consumer society considers nature as property and an object of consumption, while social relations are maximally “commodified” [50, p. 27], and the Confucian tradition democracy, with its reverence for a strong state and meritocratic hierarchy, that, however, does not negate the institutional values of Western liberal democracy. At the same time, for Confucian communitarianism, an unshakable postulate is both professional and moral self-improvement of a person within the framework of harmonizing his/her relations with society and the state [54].

In this context, one can talk about the actualization of the theoretical heritage of the German Historical School of economic thought, the most prominent representatives of which are Gustav von Schmoller, Max Weber, Werner Sombart, and Josef Schumpeter, and which emphasizes the decisive role of specific-historical social values and moral factors compared to the universal rationalism of *homo economicus* and personal gain.

At the same time, the discourse of classical liberalism is becoming more relevant, which, unlike the neoliberal mainstream of the contemporary West (being often far from tolerant of the views and values of the Other), is best understood in terms of “an institutional solution to the problem of governing over diversity [35].”

As emphasizes the Japanese economist Yuichi Shionoya, the leading representative of the modern school of Evolutionary economics, close to the ideas of German historicism:

The dispute between liberalism and communitarianism is not a real conflict of values. These two doctrines deal with morality of a certain scale: liberalism is primarily concerned with the universal principle of justice, which must be observed by free and equal citizens, while communitarianism presupposes the existence of a limited community and the common good to be shared by its members [54, p. 10].

In this regard, the political theory of cosmopolitan democracy, which explores the application of democracy values at the transnational and global level with adherents from Immanuel Kant [55] to Richard Falk [56], Daniele Archibugi and David Held [57], can take on a new breath. Respectively, a cosmopolitan democracy model, envisaging humane and efficient global governance without world government, may include such potential institutions as a directly elected World Parliament or, through the UN democratic reforming, a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly [58].

As is known, an outstanding American sociologist, professor at Harvard University Daniel Bell developed the theory of post-industrial society as the highest stage in the development of human society in the process of globalization. Post-industrial

society is characterized by the primacy of knowledge (rather than property), availability of intellectual technologies, growth in the number of knowledge carriers. If in an industrial society the main figures were an entrepreneur, businessman, head of an industrial enterprise, then scientists and other representatives of intellectual technologies are nominated for a key role in a post-industrial society. [59] Thus, the key figure of Bell's post-industrial society, as in the Confucian system, is a scholar.

Thus, the position of the supreme spiritual authority and arbiter in the state, who puts forward the most important state initiatives and approves the most important legislative decisions, which was occupied by high priests in ancient and feudal societies, scholars who support the integration of democracy and Confucianism propose to give scholars (sages). By the way, there is such experience in modern European and world politics. For instance, a few authoritative international organizations have groups (commissions) of Wise persons from among the most authoritative politicians, retired statesmen, scholars who are entrusted with the development of most important documents and draft treaties. One may recall the following prime examples herewith.

From May 7 to 10, 1948, an ambitious Congress of Europe was held in The Hague, under the honorary chairmanship of Winston Churchill. The International Committee of the Movements for European Unity had invited nearly 800 eminent figures from most Western European countries as well as from Eastern Europe, Canada, and the USA, including a broad range of philosophers, lawyers, professors, writers, and historians who took an active role in the event. This was an ambitious Congress which set itself to discuss the challenges posed by European unity and propose practical solutions to governments. [60] In particular, the Congress discussed the future institutional foundations and

role of the Council of Europe – the first multilateral interstate organization of European integration. Also, a call was launched for a political, economic, and monetary Union of Europe.

Józef Hieronim Retinger (1888–1960), a prominent Polish scholar, writer, and international political activist of the 20th century, went on to cofound the European Movement, which led to the establishment of the European Union, and was instrumental in architecting the famous Bilderberg Group aiming to foster dialogue between Europe and North America in the globalization context. In 2001, Denis Healey, a Bilderberg Group founder, and a steering committee member for 30 years, stated, “To say we were striving for a one-world government is exaggerated, but not wholly unfair [61].”

Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1926–2020), President of France from 1974 to 1981 elected in 2003 to the Académie Française, who notably presided over the Convention on the Future of Europe, also known as the European Convention, a body established by the European Council in December 2001, which drafted the (though ill-fated) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe adopted by the 25 European Union Heads of State and Government in Brussels on 17 and 18 June 2004.

Confucianism Nowadays: between Ethics, Ideology and (Civil) Religion

Since the issue of his globally influential essay “Civil Religion in America” (1967) a famous American sociologist of religion Robert Bellah (1927–2013) had consistently championed an idea of the possibility of a “world civil religion [62, p. 205].”

Robert Bellah has put forward the concept of the existence of the civil religion in America that overarches the diverse creeds of Americans, expressing common belief in America’s special

relation to God. According to Bellah, it has its own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own solemn rituals, and symbols. It is concerned that America be a society as perfectly in accord with the will of God as men can make it, and a light to all nations. [63] Such “habits of the heart” flow forth freely and spontaneously; they cannot be engineered by a central authority and stamped upon the souls. Civil religion is, in fact, the most important part of the “soft” infrastructure among the main factors of the material and spiritual production of the country. In this respect, Confucian tradition in the contemporary Republic of Korea may also be represented as a rationalistic civil religion [64, pp. 3–4], since most South Korean citizens, living in a pluralistic structural democracy, have absorbed Confucian ethical, cultural traditions and values to one degree or another – what Sungmoon Kim calls *civil Confucianism* [65, p. 20].

In this context, Sébastien Billiond draws attention a widespread phenomenon of “promotion of the Confucian classics or core elements of Confucian ethics by Buddhist organizations” (e.g., the moral training regimen organized by a Taiwanese Buddhist monk the Venerable Master Jingkong) [66, p. 55]. That demonstrates the powerful potential of Confucianism to develop into a common “civil religion with a primary social – rather than political – orientation [66, p. 58].”

Confucianism is not a religious tradition in a classical Western sense – because it lacks institutional framework (nevertheless, in 1999 Korean Confucians tried to bridge this gap). However, as Sungmoon Kim and Philip Ivanhoe posit:

Confucianism has been and remains one among several habits of the heart for most East Asian peoples, a set of moral principles, life orientations and aims, and styles of reasoning describing what a good person and a good society are like and how one

fosters personal moral development and social harmony.” Such a habit of the heart reveals itself in many of the fundamental attitudes and unselfconscious behaviors of a people ... [64, pp. 3–4]

In order to serve as the basis for a universal civil religion in an open global information society, as Richard Madsen rightly points out, Confucianism needs further reforms which cannot be ordered from the top down but should be developed from the ground up and become “more credible globally than that promoted from the top down [67, p. 109].” In this regard, the strength of civil society and the moral potential of Confucianism, combined with the organic synthesis of Confucian and Christian (primarily Protestant) values, can truly work wonders in terms of modernizing not only South Korean society, but also East Asian society as a whole and, more broadly, the movement of all mankind towards a single global and dynamic civilization of the future.

Sociologist at Purdue University (USA) Fenggang Yang advocates the development of a new civil religion “based on both Confucianism and Christianity, which would serve not only China but also East Asia, the Pacific region, even possibly “all under Heaven” [68, p. 25]. Regarding contemporary China, according to Yang, Christianity provides a way, perhaps the best way, to critically evaluate and purge the Confucian tradition society’s feudalist remnants, including gender inequality [68, p. 40].

Indicative in this regard are long-term studies (from 1992 to the present) by Professor of the University of Jerusalem Shalom Schwartz in the field of quantitative analysis of culture through values, covering mass surveys of residents of 82 countries of the world. Shwartz offered respondents a self-completion questionnaire, where it was necessary to evaluate each of the 57 values on a

9-point scale [69]. These values belong, according to Schwartz's classification, to 10 groups of basic value types that make up the "general cultural profile of mankind": Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence, Universalism [70].

The merit of Schwartz lies in the fact that he showed that the perceived system of values and their hierarchy in most modern societies is approximately the same. Here is how Schwartz himself characterizes this phenomenon:

An astonishing finding of the cross-cultural research is the high level of consensus regarding the relative importance of the ten values across societies. In the vast majority of nations studied, benevolence, universalism, and self-direction values appear at the top of the hierarchy and power, tradition, and stimulation values appear at the bottom. This implies that the aspects of human nature and of social functioning that shape individual value priorities are widely shared across cultures. ... Values are critical motivators of behaviors and attitudes. [69, p. 17]

But benevolence (emphasizing voluntary concern for others' welfare, promoting cooperative and supportive social relations), universalism (accepting and understanding others, striving for tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature), and self-direction (choice of independent thinking and behavior, creativity, propensity to explore, inner freedom, curiosity, setting one's own goals) – this is just par excellence Confucian values. This suggests that Confucian values contain to a large extent the core (backbone) of universal values common to all major world cultures and civilizations. At the same time, based on his surveys, Schwartz places the value of tradition at the bottom of the values hierarchy. It is significant, however, that

Schwartz himself lives in Jerusalem – the center of the deep traditions of the three world religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Thus, it is obvious that behind any identity, to one degree or another, there is a tradition.

As argues Tu Weiming, one of the most famous contemporary Confucian thinkers serving both at Beijing University and Harvard [71], Confucian humanism “addresses the ideal of universal ethic in the reality of culture diversity [72, p. 7205]”.

Perhaps the most daring and consistent conclusions from Confucian ontology as applied to political philosophy and the theory of constitutionalism are put forward by Hwa Yol Jung, the late Professor Emeritus at Moravian College (Bethlehem, PA). Trying to transcend the Eurocentric universality and embodying a dialogic engagement with the other, Jung proposes to build on Confucian ethics a fundamentally different concept of constitutionalism, unlike the one existing in the West, as a system of fundamental values, ideas, norms, institutions, and mechanisms for building a state and exercising state power based on the constitution. Such a concept of constitutionalism would be based on the Confucian relational ontology of “Interbeing” a derivative of which is the Confucian ethics of care and responsibility for others, therefore genuinely concerned with the social wellbeing [73]. Thus, just the Confucian ontology and ethics, as Jung believes, would serve the constitutional grounding for the future intercontinental “transversality ethics” [74]. Such an ontological foundation of constitutionalism implies by no means an opposition, and certainly not an antagonism between East and West, but, on the contrary, – the importance of transversality: their cultural, ethnic, and linguistic cross-breeding in the global trans-civilizational order of the future. Thus, Jung’s core argument is that there is a remarkable similarity between Confucian relational ontology and the Western communitarian-

mode humanistic thinking, focused on what Pierre Bourdieu calls “the performative magic of the social [75, pp. 106, 122]”, and Emmanuel Levinas’ “ethics of Otherness” meaning “infinite responsibility” and care for the Other rooted, within human’s subjective constitution [76, p. 74], at the core of which are self-transcendence as opposed to self-absorption. In fact, Jung’s “geophilosophical” concept opens new horizons of the East-West communication as well as synthesizing classical, modern, and postmodern philosophy.

Such latest concepts in the actual development of Confucianism, as post-Confucianism and post-Neo-Confucianism, questioned and challenged Neo-Confucianism which was based on a pattern of modernity. They, in their turn, come from a post-modernist context and were influenced by a post-modernist ideological mode reflecting significant philosophical, ethical, and social changes in times. [77] These new trends in Confucianism represent effective ethical and philosophical models for understanding and translating globalization messages into the culture of contemporary globalized societies of the Confucian tradition [42, p. 12]. At the same time, the prefix *post-* only testifies to the adaptation of Western ideas to Confucianism, but not vice versa.

Ukrainian researchers Pavlo Kretov and Olena Kretova consider the potential of post-neo-Confucianism (especially, its influence on achieving social consensus) from the viewpoint of its understanding as a civil religion of the globalized “Greater China” [42]. The same, of course, could be judged regarding the contemporary state and society of South Korea. Paradoxically correlating with the complex of ideas of globalism, post-neo-Confucianism allows to substantiate the presumption of ethical and cultural superiority and civil nationalist worldview models. Thus, post-neo-Confucianism may simultaneously lose the normative

nature of rational philosophical theory and acquire the normative nature of customary law and civil religion [42, pp. 15–16].

Conclusion

Recent historical experience provides quite successful examples of the integration of Eastern (primarily Confucian) and Western values in building modernized, highly competitive, and socially cohesive societies, especially in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The concept and policy of “One Country, Two Systems” was originally developed for Taiwan, but successfully implemented by China for Hong Kong and Macao.

The current transforming of the unipolar world order, characterized by the hegemony of the United States, into a world order where there will be not one, but two or several global leaders, most likely, presupposes a growing understanding by the global community of the wholesomeness of overcoming the traditional East-West, Asia-Europe, individualism-collectivism and similar dichotomies, the synthesis, on the universal value basis, of various value systems associated with the heritage of a particular civilization, primarily those of the Protestant West and Confucian East having been demonstrating the world’s greatest competitiveness and socio-economic dynamics.

The Confucianism-based model of development could smooth out the existing contradictions in many countries and their unions. At the European Union level, this model would help overcome the acute political and economic crises that are undermining this unique integration partnership, since some EU members in recent years have selfishly put their individual interests above the collective interests of the Union, and liberal relations only stimulate the growth of the number of “selfish” countries, endangering the very existence of the EU.

There is a non-antagonistic, rather convergent, alternative between neoliberal democracy, which appeals to individualism and universalism of human rights, and democracy of Confucian tradition, which adapts the values of classical liberal democracy, but strives for a harmony of collective and individual interests, champions the value of strong nation-state in the processes of globalization and regional integration.

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CONCLUSION

As the analysis of the topic under study shows, the Confucian worldview and understanding of reality are surprisingly close to the contemporary scientific post-non-classical conception of the world in all its fractal diversity being discovered by neoteric synergistic tools. The phenomenal capacity of Confucian systems for homeostasis is amazing. That is, the ability to reproduce themselves, to maintain dynamic equilibrium in conditions of competitive openness, readiness to flexibly borrow successful institutions and technologies from other social systems to restore and maintain dynamic equilibrium, provide thereby horizons for further systemic development.

Confucianism makes it possible to combine unprecedented rates of scientific, technical, and socio-economic progress with the preservation of the moral and aesthetic traditions of the people. In the words of the organizers of the recent exhibition of Korean folk painting in Kyiv, “South Korea is rushing into the high-tech future at an incredible speed, and in the minhwa space time is flowing slowly and cranes are dreamily watching the Moon’s rise [1]”.

We argue that fundamental principles of modern Western society as pluralism and the rule of law have their traditional conformities among core values of the Confucian social culture, although in substantially converted forms.

Despite keen rivalry and geopolitical confrontation, today the conflicting world powers have much more internationally declared values in common than under the Cold War era: they proclaim their commitment to the market economy, respectively universal and mutually compatible European/Confucian values, especially the rule of law, respect for human rights and rights of national minorities, respect for private life, common global challenges (fight against terrorism, religious fundamentalism, illegal migration, energy efficiency, etc.).

There is a non-antagonistic, rather convergent, alternative between neoliberal democracy, which appeals to individualism and universalism of human rights, and democracy of Confucian tradition (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), which adapts the values of classical liberal democracy, but strives for harmony of collective and individual interests, upholds the value of a strong nation-state in the processes of modernization, globalization, and regional integration.

The authors believe that a historical alternative to neoliberal democracy and unlimited freedom can be the communitarian, or social, democracy which presupposes “responsible freedom.” That is essentially a “responsible” democracy capable of ensuring a balance of interests and freedoms of various social groups. It is this kind of democracy that fully meets the spirit and letter of the constitutional law of Ukraine [2] declaring it “a sovereign and independent, democratic, social, law-based state”, and that “The human being, his or her life and health, honor and dignity, inviolability and security are recognized in Ukraine as the highest social value.”

In this context, the political theory of cosmopolitan democracy at the origins of which was the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant, exploring the application of the values of democracy at the transnational and global level, can take on a new breath.

Despite ideological disputes and the recent exchange of limited sanctions between Brussels and Beijing, there is a geostrategic rebalancing of the EU's trade, economic, and investment policies to the Confucian East, which has demonstrated the powerful potential and high efficiency of its public, social and business management in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic and remains the region of the world's highest socio-economic dynamics.

The conceptual opposition of East and West requires further significant interdisciplinary research and development. While ontologically Confucianism is by no means antagonistic to the values of Western liberal democracy, a convergent alternative between globalist neoliberalism and the Confucian tradition democracy appealing to social harmony and a strong state may be found. Due to strengthening the global role of China and Confucian tradition democracies, especially in the economic, financial, and infrastructural “soft power” spheres, Confucian approaches and East Asian models of successful modernization have been increasingly influencing the socio-economic policy of some Central and Eastern European states, inducing therein the effective interaction of Confucian, European, and universal values. With this regard, there is a vital need to revise the dominant approaches in economic science towards greater attention to ethical, political, cultural, and other specific historical conditions and factors of economic activity, intensify interdisciplinary research herein.

The authors have substantiated in this book that the modernization potential and mental-value compatibility of the

Protestant and Confucian worlds is much higher than that of the Protestant and post-Soviet-Eurasian worlds. We have identified the key correspondences between the ethical-value principles and motivations of Protestant and Confucian cultures in their genetics, historical dynamics, and modern dimension. It is shown that such fundamental principles of modern Western society as pluralism and the rule of law have their traditional correspondences, albeit in a transformed form, among the main values of Confucian social culture. Therefore, not only the appeal of South Korea and other “East Asian dragons” to the Confucian heritage turned out to be very productive for the success of their systemic modernization, but the current tendency of China’s return to its cultural roots, to Confucian ethics, not only does not impede modernization and strengthening the global competitiveness of the national economy, but, on the contrary, contributes to the above processes. In this regard, the prospects for rational converging the values of East and West, primarily Protestantism and Confucianism, within the framework of the new globalized civilization of the future look rather likely.

Apparently, in the progress toward a multivariate vision of the world and its spatial and temporal dynamics, one may foresee the emergences of new trans-civilizational intellectual currents and socio-political initiatives aiming to reconcile the traditional East-West dichotomy through the global synthesis of different civilizational views of religion, ethics, metaphysics, science, and art.

Given South Korea’s outstanding performance during the life of one generation and geostrategic similarity with Ukraine, it is expedient to use positive experience of the ROK in attaining the priority goals of Ukraine’s reform strategy.

Priorities include restoring the country’s good governance system, decentralization, abolishing monopolies, fighting corruption

at all levels, effectively reforming the judiciary and solving other important problems, as was once done in South Korea.

In South Korea, the president's political instruments were used to bring about vigorous and effective changes in public policy. The success of the reforms was also largely ensured by the rigidity in making, and especially in the implementation of vital decisions, which is critically important for modern Ukraine.

World practice confirms that blind copying of someone else's experience does not lead to the expected results of the original. Ukraine doesn't need to fully copy the experience of South Korea due to a number of economic and political peculiarities. On the one hand, the Ukrainian society cannot yet be called fully mature, since the level of legal awareness and understanding of the basic requirements of modern socio-economic life is clearly not sufficient. On the other hand, the country could adapt the positive experience of South Korea and successfully apply it to promote reforms and modernize the economy.

Industrialization and modernization of the South Korean economy was carried out with significant support from American aid flows, and in a later period – with the support of multibillion-dollar loans and private direct investments. So far, Ukraine can hardly count on significant financial support from donors, investors, or international financial organizations.

Nevertheless, Ukraine has significant potential for drawing the necessary financial resources into the economy. First of all, it is necessary to stimulate the flow of huge financial resources located at private hiding places or offshore into the banking system of Ukraine; it is also necessary to significantly improve the investment climate in the country, to which the government's efforts are already directed. Achievement of these two goals will strengthen relations with international financial institutions,

which will have a cumulative effect on the further increase in investment inflows into the country.

As evidenced by the South Korean experience of economic modernization launched under the highly controversial period of authoritarian dictatorship, the extreme privatization of public resources and assets can lead to opposite results compared to what took place in Ukraine. The impact of “soft” infrastructure, primarily the Confucian prototype of “civil religion”, on the direction, mechanisms, and efficiency of using all other factors of production can be of decisive importance for economic reforms, privatization, and modernization of the country. As it turned out, the extreme privatization under the centuries-old Confucian tradition and responsible, in Confucian understanding, government served the national interests and led to an impressive “economic miracle” accompanied by an unprecedented leap in the people’s well-being.

Given Ukraine’s place in the inter-civilizational, borderland space of cultural and axiological dimensions, the basic parameters of its culture represent a limited resource for catch-up modernization. Meanwhile, copying the institutional patterns of Western countries will also not ensure a break-through economic growth. It is hardly useful to expect a rapid change in values soon, as well as the fact that Ukraine would be able to get closer to world leaders in terms of economic development, prosperity, and democracy. On the other hand, that emphasizes the importance of a focused approach to education and sustainable development in the coming decades, low power distance values, and a balance of communitarianism and individualism, including motivation for self-cultivation and social responsibility. The strategy of value transformation must be based primarily on changes in the education system and other institutions of socialization of children and youth, which would take place in parallel with socio-

economic reforms. Then, after some time, Ukraine would at least get a chance to become a developed society.

Rapid and radical changes in the state policy, rigidity in making and, especially, in the implementation of vital decisions, are considered extremely relevant for modern Ukraine. The primary tasks include rebuilding the system of economic and political relations in the country, decentralization, elimination of monopolies, combating corruption at all levels, effective reform of the judicial system and solving other crucial problems of the country just as it has been once done in South Korea.

Such sets of measures as the development of the export-oriented sphere of high-tech services and integration into relevant world markets, attracting “long money” from the population through deposits and the pension system may become strategically important for the growth of the Ukrainian economy. However, it will be possible to hope for their effectiveness only after the systemic stabilization of the situation in the country and the mass conviction of citizens in the predictability of the country’s development for years to come.

Proceeding from globalist thinking, Ukraine needs to aim at developing cutting-edge technologies (information, nano-, biotechnologies, etc.), global competitiveness, successfulness, rejection of social pessimism, and, at the same time, constructively rethinking communitarian, especially modern Confucian and post-neo-Confucian, values and alter-globalization concepts. Ukraine should also count on social justice, respect for social rights, dignity and ethnocultural identity of all citizens, traditional ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities of the country as a sovereign participant in European integration and globalization processes.

In order to overcome present value conflicts originated in the Cold War era and its legacy (in particular, in political psychology,

psychology of political elites in the West, in the CEE and in the post-Soviet space) this is necessary to move away from the Realpolitik thinking and Political doctrinism, from the logic of confrontation, confrontation, zero-sum games, from the logic of unilateral, monopoly, neoliberal globalism to the logic of coexistence of different value systems within the Eurasian space, to a new global thinking conceiving fractal dichotomies and possibilities of their transcending (bridging) at all levels.

Settling protracted conflicts in East Asia, along with reliance on the traditional and common for the region Confucian values, could be facilitated by using the long-term experience of conflict prevention and protecting fundamental human rights values accumulated in Europe by such an institutional mechanism as the OSCE [3]. In their turn, the Confucian tradition democracies successful experience of mobilizing societal consensus for the sake of economic and social progress inspires some optimism regarding the prospects for establishing an effective international multilateral collective security system both in the East Asia region, with the participation of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, and on the scale of Greater Eurasia, with the participation of global actors.

A settlement on the Korean Peninsula would mean that systems with extreme (polar) political-institutional and political-value parameters of conditionally East and West (the totalitarian communist regime of the DPRK and the regime of liberal structural democracy in the Republic of Korea) would find points not only of peaceful coexistence, but integration and convergence with the participation of great actors of world politics. The same prospect may be for a possible settlement of the Taiwan problem. The authors are confident that only through a fusion of Western liberalism (based primarily on the foundations of the reformist values of Protestantism, a modern neo-Confucianism and post-neo-

Confucianism it is possible to form a single global civilization of the future. This would open the way to the long-term peace and sustainable development of both the continental megaregion of Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific megaregion.

Thus, the current transformation of a unipolar world order into a world order, where there will be not one, but two or more global leaders, requires a growing awareness by the global community of the need for overcoming the traditional dichotomies (like *East – West*, *Asia – Europe*, *individualism – collectivism*, etc.) and the synthesis, based on universal values, of various ethical and value systems, primarily those of Protestant West and Confucian East, demonstrating the world’s greatest competitiveness and socio-economic dynamics.

It is the Confucian approach to resolving conflicts with elements of Taoism and Buddhism that could serve as the basis for resolving the great strategic conflict over Ukraine and a new political ethics in Eurasia. Since for Confucianism there is no fundamental difference between the Our and the Other, since any relations require “harmonious peace”, such a “Golden Middle” approach might be a pledge of peaceful, constructive resolution of such fractal contrapositions as *Eastern Ukraine – Western Ukraine*, *Ukraine – Russia*, *Russia – Europe*, *China – Russia – the West*. In this context, Ukraine may have a crucial significance for a success of the Asia – Europe pancontinental dialogue.

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**Political regime landmarks of the history
of the Republic of Korea**

First Republic 1948–60

Korean War 1950–53

Syngman Rhee government 1948–60

April Revolution 1960

Second Republic 1960–63

Yun Bo-seon government 1960

Chang Myon cabinet 1960–61

May 16 coup 1961

Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 1961–63

Third Republic 1963–72

Park Chung-hee government 1963–79

Yushin Constitution 1972

Fourth Republic 1972–81

Assassination of Park Chung-hee 1979

December 12 coup 1979

May 17 coup 1980

Gwangju Uprising 1980

Fifth Republic 1981–88

Chun Doo-hwan government 1981–87

June Democracy Movement 1987
Sixth Republic 1988–present
Roh Tae-woo government 1988–93
Kim Young-sam government 1993–98
1997 Asian financial crisis 1997–2001
Kim Dae-jung government 1998–2003
Roh Moo-hyun government 2003–08
Lee Myung-bak government 2008–13
Park Geun-hye government 2013–17
Moon Jae-in government 2017–present

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Scientific publication

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Marmazov Vasyl Ye.
Piliaiev Igor S.**

**PROSPECTS FOR THE EAST-WEST
CIVILIZATIONAL CONVERGENCE:
CONFUCIAN TRADITION DEMOCRACY
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

Monograph

(in English)

Editor Igor S. Piliaiev
Design Dmytro A. Tovmash

Format 60x84 1/16
Conventional printed sheets 14,42
Copies 350

CORETEX CZ SE
Pobřežní 394/12 186 00 Praha 8 Czech Republic
ID Business No.: 020 58 031

Kč 250,00

System. číslo 002633292
ISBN 978-80-907576-0-8