Myślenie dywergencyjne w prawniczej analogii
| dc.contributor.author | Zygmunt-Gruszka, Tomasz | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Lizak, Jadwiga (red.) | |
| dc.contributor.editor | Sidor, Maria Wanda (red.) | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-08-25T09:45:51Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja obszarów potencjalnej rekonstrukcji tradycyjnych ram teoretycznych opisujących analogię prawniczą, opartej na współczesnych badaniach kognitywnych dotyczących myślenia kreatywnego. Analiza koncentruje się na rozumowaniach prawniczych per analogiam w kontekście cech myślenia konwergencyjnego i dywergencyjnego. Obecny stan badań nad ludzkimi rozumowaniami analogicznymi wskazuje, że tego rodzaju rzeczywiste procesy myślowe prawników mogą wykazywać więcej cech myślenia dywergencyjnego niż sugerują klasyczne koncepcje teoretycznoprawne. Rozwój wiedzy na temat tychże procesów umożliwia z kolei ich lepszą kontrolę. Prezentowana analiza przedstawia więc znaczenie nie tylko dla potrzeb aktualizacji tradycyjnych modeli teoretycznych, lecz również dla praktyki prawniczej – zwłaszcza w kontekście pracy sędziów, rozwiązujących rzeczywiste przypadki. | pl |
| dc.description.abstract | The article aims to identify areas for the potential reconstruction of traditional theoretical frameworks describing legal analogy, based on contemporary cognitive research. In particular, the presented analysis examines analogical legal reasoning through the lens of convergent and divergent thinking processes. Recent studies indicate that the cognitive mechanisms underlying legal analogical reasoning may exhibit more characteristics of divergent thinking than classical models suggest. Importantly, the advancement of cognitive knowledge enables enhanced regulation of individual thought processes. Thus, this analysis holds importance not only for updating traditional theoretical models but also for enhancing legal practice, particularly in the context of judicial decision-making. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Zygmunt-Gruszka, T. (2025). Myślenie dywergencyjne w prawniczej analogii. W: J. Lizak, M. W. Sidor (red.), Nowe wyzwania w naukach społecznych i technicznych: podejście interdyscyplinarne (t. 2) (s. 1-). Wydawnictwo WSB-NLU. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.66935/978-83-65926-17-3.10 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-83-65926-17-3 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://repozytorium.wsb-nlu.edu.pl/handle/11199/11413 | |
| dc.language.iso | pl | |
| dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo WSB-NLU | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Nowe wyzwania w naukach społecznych i technicznych: podejście interdyscyplinarne | |
| dc.relation.references | Acar, S., Runco, M. A. (2019). Divergent thinking: New methods, recent research, and extended theory. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 13(2), 153-158. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000231 | |
| dc.relation.references | de Andrade, P. C., de Almeida, G. F. C. F., Hannikainen, I. R., Struchiner, N. (2022). What Do We Mean by Precedent? Empirical Evidence of Ordinary Usage. W: P. Bystranowski, B. Janik, M. Próchnicki (red.), Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (s. 7-24). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11744-2_2 | |
| dc.relation.references | Araszkiewicz, M. (2011). Analogy, similarity and factors. W Proceedings of the 13th international conference on artificial intelligence and law (s. 101-105). https://doi.org/10.1145/2018358.2018372 | |
| dc.relation.references | Araszkiewicz, M. (2021). Rozumowania prawnicze i schematy argumentacyjne w sądowym stosowaniu prawa. W: M. Florczak-Wątor, A. Grabowski (red.), Argumenty i rozumowania prawnicze w konstytucyjnym państwie prawa (s. 90-156). Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka. https://doi.org/10.12797/9788381383370 | |
| dc.relation.references | Araszkiewicz, M., Michalczak, R., Pach, M. (2021). Argument z analogii. W: M. Florczak-Wątor, A. Grabowski (red.), Argumenty i rozumowania prawnicze w konstytucyjnym państwie prawa (s. 1052-1071). Wydawnictwo Księgarnia Akademicka. https://doi.org/10.12797/9788381383370.73 | |
| dc.relation.references | Barbot, N., Miclet, L., Prade, H. (2019). Analogy between concepts. Artificial Intelligence, 275, 487-539. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.06.008 | |
| dc.relation.references | Beaty, R. E., Benedek, M., Silvia, P. J., Schacter, D. L. (2016). Creative cognition and brain network dynamics. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(2), 87-95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.004 | |
| dc.relation.references | Benedek, M., Neubauer, A. C. (2013). Revisiting Mednick's Model on Creativity-Related Differences in Associative Hierarchies. Evidence for a Common Path to Uncommon Thought. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 47(4), 273-289. https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.35 | |
| dc.relation.references | Bergen, B. K. (2012). Louder than words: The new science of how the mind makes meaning. Basic Books. | |
| dc.relation.references | Berger, L. L. (2013). A revised view of the judicial hunch. Legal Comm. & Rhetoric: JAWLD, 1-39. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2196090 | |
| dc.relation.references | Borghi, A. M., Scorolli, C., Caligiore, D., Baldassarre, G., Tummolini, L. (2013). The embodied mind extended: using words as social tools. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00214 | |
| dc.relation.references | Bowden, E. M., Jung-Beeman, M., Fleck, J., Kounios, J. (2005). New approaches to demystifying insight. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(7), 322-328. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.05.012 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brewer, S. (1996). Exemplary reasoning: Semantics, pragmatics, and the rational force of legal argument by analogy. Harvard Law Review, 109(5), 923-1028. https://doi.org/10.2307/1342258 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brozek, B. (2021). The architecture of the legal mind. W: B. Brożek, J. Hage, N. A. Vincent (red.), Law and mind: A survey of law and the cognitive sciences (s. 138-164). Cambridge University Press. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2021-21525-007 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brożek, B. (2008). Analogy in legal discourse. ARSP: Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie/Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 94(2), 188-201. https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2008-0011 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brożek, B. (2015). Analogy and balancing. A reply to David Duarte. Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law/Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava, 25, 163-170. https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3264 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brożek, B. (2017). On the naturalisation of law. Polish Law Review, 3(1), 13-33. https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0010.7840 | |
| dc.relation.references | Brożek, B. (2017b). Myślenie: Podręcznik użytkownika. Copernicus Center Press. | |
| dc.relation.references | Brożek, B. (2020). The legal mind: a new introduction to legal epistemology. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108695084 | |
| dc.relation.references | Bystranowski, P., Janik, B., Próchnicki, M. (red.). (2022). Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11744-2 | |
| dc.relation.references | Bystranowski, P., Janik, B., Próchnicki, M., Skórska, P. (2021). Anchoring effect in legal decision-making: A meta-analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 45(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000438 | |
| dc.relation.references | Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67(6), 380-400. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040373 | |
| dc.relation.references | Canale, D., Tuzet, G. (2017). Analogical reasoning and extensive interpretation. Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, 103(1), 117-135. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2887922 | |
| dc.relation.references | Cropley, A. (2006). In praise of convergent thinking. Creativity Research Journal, 18(3), 391-404. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15326934crj1803_13 | |
| dc.relation.references | Crowe, J. (2019). Not-so-easy cases. Statute Law Review, 40(1), 75-86. https://doi.org/10.1093/SLR/HMY027 | |
| dc.relation.references | Dahl, D. W., Moreau, P. (2002). The influence and value of analogical thinking during new product ideation. Journal of Marketing Research, 39(1), 47-60. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.39.1.47.18930 | |
| dc.relation.references | Damele, G. (2014). Analogia Legis and Analogia Iuris: An Overview from a Rhetorical Perspective. W: H. J. Ribeiro (red.), Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy (s. 243-256). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8_14 | |
| dc.relation.references | Del Mar, M. (2020). Artefacts of legal inquiry: the value of imagination in adjudication. Bloomsbury Publishing. | |
| dc.relation.references | Duarte, D. (2015). Analogy and balancing: the partial reducibility thesis and its problems. Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law/Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava, 25, 141-154. https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.3244 | |
| dc.relation.references | Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., Strack, F. (2006). Playing dice with criminal sentences: The influence of irrelevant anchors on experts’ judicial decision making. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(2), 188-200. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205282152 | |
| dc.relation.references | Epstein, S. (2010). Demystifying Intuition: What It Is, What It Does, and How It Does It. Psychological Inquiry, 21(4), 295–312. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2010.523875 | |
| dc.relation.references | Ericsson, K. A., Hoffman, R. R., Kozbelt, A., Williams, A. M. (red.). (2018). The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316480748 | |
| dc.relation.references | Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155-170. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0364-0213(83)80009-3 | |
| dc.relation.references | Gentner, D., Holyoak, K. J., Kokinov, B. N. (red.). (2001). The analogical mind: Perspectives from cognitive science. MIT press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1251.001.0001 | |
| dc.relation.references | Guarini, M., Butchart, A., Smith, P. S., Moldovan, A. (2009). Resources for research on analogy: A multi-disciplinary guide. Informal Logic, 29(2), 84-197. https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v29i2.1225 | |
| dc.relation.references | Guilford, J. P. (1968). Intelligence, creativity, and their educational implications. EDITS/Knapp. | |
| dc.relation.references | Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., Wistrich, A. J. (2007). Blinking on the bench: How judges decide cases. Cornell Law Review, 93, 1-43. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol93/iss1/9 | |
| dc.relation.references | Heller, M. (2006). Przeciw fundacjonizmowi. W: Filozofia i wszechświat: wybór pism (s. 82-100). Towarzystwo Autorów i Wydawców Prac Naukowych UNIVERSITAS. | |
| dc.relation.references | Hutcheson, J. Jr (1929). The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the „Hunch” Judicial Decision. Cornell Law Review, 14, 274-288. https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol14/iss3/2 | |
| dc.relation.references | Kaufman, J. C., Glăveanu, V. P. (2019). A review of creativity theories: What questions are we trying to answer? W: J. C. Kaufman, R. J. Sternberg (red.), The Cambridge handbook of creativity (wyd. 2.) (s. 27-43). Cambridge University Press. | |
| dc.relation.references | Kounios, J., Beeman, M. (2014). The cognitive neuroscience of insight. Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 71-93. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115154 | |
| dc.relation.references | Leiter, B. (2007). Naturalizing jurisprudence: Essays on American legal realism and naturalism in legal philosophy. Oxford University Press. | |
| dc.relation.references | Lonergan, D. C., Scott, G. M., Mumford, M. D. (2004). Evaluative aspects of creative thought: Effects on appraisal and revision standards. Creativity Research Journal, 16(2-3), 231-246. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15326934crj1602&3_7 | |
| dc.relation.references | MacCormick, N., Summers R. (1991). Interpretation and Justification. W: N. MacCormick, R. Summers (red.), Interpreting Statutes. A comparative study (s. 511-544). Ashgate, Dartmouth. | |
| dc.relation.references | Mednick, S. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review, 69(3), 220-232. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0048850 | |
| dc.relation.references | Mitchell, M. (2021). Abstraction and analogy‐making in artificial intelligence. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1505(1), 79-101. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.14619 | |
| dc.relation.references | Morawski, L. (2016). Wstęp do prawoznawstwa (wyd. 17). TNOiK „Dom Organizatora”. | |
| dc.relation.references | Mussweiler, T., Strack, F., Pfeiffer, T. (2000). Overcoming the inevitable anchoring effect: Considering the opposite compensates for selective accessibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1142-1150. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672002611010 | |
| dc.relation.references | Nęcka, E. (2005). Psychologia twórczości. Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne. | |
| dc.relation.references | Nowacki, J. (1966). Analogia legis. PWN. | |
| dc.relation.references | Ohlsson, S. (2011). Deep Learning: How the Mind Overrides Experience. Cambridge University Press. | |
| dc.relation.references | Peczenik, A. (2009). On Law and Reason (wyd. 2). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-8730-1 | |
| dc.relation.references | Perelman, Ch. (1963). The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. Humanities Press. | |
| dc.relation.references | Pietrzykowski, T. (2012). Intuicja prawnicza w stronę zewnętrznej integracji teorii prawa. Difin. | |
| dc.relation.references | Pogarsky, G., Babcock, L. (2001). Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse. The Journal of Legal Studies, 30(1), 143–159. https://doi.org/10.1086/468114 | |
| dc.relation.references | Puccio, G. J., Burnett, C., Acar, S., Yudess, J. A., Holinger, M., Cabra, J. F. (2020). Creative problem solving in small groups: The effects of creativity training on idea generation, solution creativity, and leadership effectiveness. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 54(2), 453-471. https://doi.org/10.1002/jocb.381 | |
| dc.relation.references | Rachlinski, J. (2022). Introduction: Judging Is Human. W: P. Bystranowski, B. Janik, M. Próchnicki (red.), Judicial Decision-Making: Integrating Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives (s. 1-5). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11744-2_2 | |
| dc.relation.references | Rachlinski, J. J., Johnson, S., Wistrich, A. J., Guthrie, C. (2009). Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges. Notre Dame Law Review, 84(3), 1195–1246. https://heinonline-1org-11tudzxbd3fd3.hps.bj.uj.edu.pl/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/tndl84&i=1201 | |
| dc.relation.references | Ribeiro, H. J. (red.). (2014). Systematic approaches to argument by analogy. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8 | |
| dc.relation.references | Richards, D. (2016). When judges have a hunch: Intuition and experience in judicial decision-making. ARSP: Archiv Für Rechts-Und Sozialphilosophie/Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, (102), 245-260. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2009883 | |
| dc.relation.references | Rigoni, A. (2014). Common-law judicial reasoning and analogy. Legal Theory, 20(2), 133-156. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1352325214000044 | |
| dc.relation.references | Rosch, E., Thompson, E., Varela, F. (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/6730.001.0001 | |
| dc.relation.references | Schauer, F. (2008). Why precedent in law (and elsewhere) is not totally (or even substantially) about analogy. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(6), 454-460. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00090.x | |
| dc.relation.references | Shaw, W. H., Ashley, L. R. (1983). Analogy and inference. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie, 22(3), 415-432. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300046588 | |
| dc.relation.references | Shettleworth, S. J. (2012). Do animals have insight, and what is insight anyway? Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology = Revue canadienne de psychologie experimentale, 66(4), 217–226. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030674 | |
| dc.relation.references | Simonton, D. K. (1999). Creativity as blind variation and selective retention: Is the creative process Darwinian? Psychological Inquiry, 10(4), 309–328. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1004_4 | |
| dc.relation.references | Spellman, B. (2010), Judges, Expertise, and Analogy. W: D. Klein, G. Mitchell (red.), The Psychology of Judicial Decision Making (s. 149-163). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195367584.001.0001 | |
| dc.relation.references | Stelmach, J., Brozek, B. (2006). Methods of legal reasoning. Springer. | |
| dc.relation.references | Stevens, K. (2018). Case-to-case arguments. Argumentation, 32(3), 431-455. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-018-9448-z | |
| dc.relation.references | Szymanek, K. (2008). Argument z podobieństwa. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego. | |
| dc.relation.references | Walton, D. (2014). Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy. W: H. J. Ribeiro (red.), Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8 | |
| dc.relation.references | Ward, T., Kolomyts, Y. (2019). Creative Cognition. W: J. C. Kaufman, R. J. Sternberg (red.), The Cambridge handbook of creativity (s. 27-43). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316979839 | |
| dc.relation.references | Wiśniewski, A. (1995). The Posing of Questions: Logical Foundations of Erotetic Inferences. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8406-7 | |
| dc.relation.references | Wołoszyn, K., Hohol, M. (2017). Commentary: The poverty of embodied cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 273466. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00845 | |
| dc.relation.references | Zander, T., Öllinger, M., & Volz, K. G. (2016). Intuition and insight: Two processes that build on each other or fundamentally differ? Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 208147. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01395 | |
| dc.relation.references | Zygmunt, T. (2020). An Intuitive Approach to Hard Cases. Utrecht Law Review, 16, 21-38. https://doi.org/10.36633/ulr.505 | |
| dc.relation.references | Zygmunt-Gruszka, T. (2024). Intuition and judicial morality in hard cases. W: M. Dybowski, W. Dzięgielewska, W. Rzepiński (red.), Practice theory and law: on practices in legal and social sciences (s. 293-311). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003428794-15 | |
| dc.rights | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 | |
| dc.subject | rozumowania prawnicze | pl |
| dc.subject | prawnicza analogia | pl |
| dc.subject | myślenie dywergencyjne | pl |
| dc.subject | legal reasoning | en_US |
| dc.subject | legal analogy | en_US |
| dc.subject | divergent thinking | en_US |
| dc.title | Myślenie dywergencyjne w prawniczej analogii | |
| dc.title.alternative | Divergent Thinking in Legal Analogy | en_US |
| dc.type | Book chapter |